Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, all three of whom recently visited Vietnam and talked with commanders down to the battalion level.

With regard to procurement in the recent past, contract awards for essential end items were substantially greater than in prior years. For example, contract awards for ammunition during the four fiscal years 1962-1965 were double the total of the preceding four years; awards for weapons were over 40% higher; and awards for tanks and automotive vehicles were nearly 100% higher.

III.2. CHARGE

The depletion of our inventories would not have been so serious if the Services' requests for reopening production lines of aircraft and other items had not been denied.

Facts

The only request to reopen a production line that has been denied was a Navy proposal to resume production of the propeller-driven A-1 attack aircraft. Instead, additional procurement of modern jet aircraft was authorized. No other requests to reopen production lines have been denied.

III.3. CHARGE

Rates of consumption in Southeast Asia are considerably higher than expected, and many items are in such short supply that they are being issued on an "as available" basis.

Facts

Rates of consumption of munitions are generally equal to or lower than expected and planned for, and no shortages have impeded our combat operations in Southeast Asia or affected the morale or welfare of our men. This fact has been attested to by General Westmoreland, our Commander in South Vietnam, Admiral Sharp, our Commander in the Pacific, General McConnell, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and by General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, all three of whom recently visited Vietnam and talked with commanders down to the battalion level.

This is not to say that every one of the tens of thousands of Defense Department supply points is without a single "inventory shortage." Anyone who has had experience with large supply systems knows that somewhere, sometime, something will be lacking. No matter how much we spend for defense, someone, somewhere will be short some item at any particular time. This has nothing to do with the amount of funds requested and appropriated. It simply reflects the fact that no system involving literally hundreds of thousands of people and millions of different items and operating around the globe can be one hundred percent perfect.

Mistakes in distribution or requirements calculations will be made, and these mistakes will be reflected in an inventory shortage, or overage, somewhere in the system. This is true of private industry as well as government, and it is up to management at all levels to see to it that these mistakes are held to a minimum and corrected promptly when discovered.

There are a few items being issued on an as available basis, but these are generally new items which are currently being procured on an expedited basis.

Accordingly, the entire question of shortages must be viewed in perspective. The acid test of our logistics system is the ability of our forces to take the field and engage in combat, and that ability has been demonstrated in full measure during the last six months.

III.4. CHARGE

Spare parts of every type for aircraft and other equipment are in short supply everywhere.

Facts

This sweeping allegation is incorrect and gives a misleading impression. From time to time, because of maldistribution, unanticipated usage of multiplicity of models in commercial type equipment, temporary shortages do develop. This is particularly true in certain locations where conditions of usage are especially 62-633-66-38

severe.

These are being overcome by (1) expedited delivery of parts from stock, (2) increased procurement, and (3) standardization of equipment by location.

III.5. CHARGE

Navy destroyers often wait months for spare parts.

Facts

Critical spare parts for Navy destroyers are generally delivered in less than 20 days. Although there are individual cases where the delivery of spare parts has taken longer, it is misleading to imply that the effectiveness of our destroyers has been materially affected by long waits for critical spare parts.

III.6. CHARGE

The Military Airlift Command cannot maintain the past year's accelerated rate of flying.

Facts

The total tonnage transported by the Military Airlift Command has increased each month for the past year, and MAC has consistently equaled or exceeded its planned rate of activity. The tonnage per month will increase by another 20% during the first half of CY 66. The number of hours per day flown by C-130's and C-135's in MAC will increase from 5 in CY 65 to 6.5 by early 1966 and 8 by the end of 1966. Although the C-141 is just now being introduced, its flying hour rate will also increase to 8 hrs/day early next year. The higher rates can be maintained indefinitely if required.

III.7. CHARGE

The Army has an insufficient number of sandbags, barbed wire and field fortification equipment in Vietnam and of generators, batteries, tires for jeeps, trucks and aircraft, engineer and materials handling equipment.

Fact

There is today no significant problem in Vietnam with respect to barbed wire, sandbags, and other field fortification material. The Army has no shortages of tires for jeeps, trucks and aircraft. There are some shortages of particular types of generators, batteries, and engineer and materials handling equipment; these are not significantly affecting combat operations in Vietnam, and are being eliminated by normal and where needed accelerated procurement.

III.8. CHARGE

We are losing aircraft almost as fast as we are producing them, and any increase in Southeast Asian losses would make the situation much worse.

Facts

In the FY 1962-1965 period, we provided more than 2,600 new tactical fighter and attack aircraft. As the tempo of activities in Southeast Asia has increasd, we have taken steps to increase our deliveries of new tactical fighter and attack aircraft to almost 100 per month. This will be adequate to cope with our current loss rate of 29 aircraft per month, to provide for a possible increase in losses, and to augment and modernize our tactical aircraft forces.

Charge

IV.1. MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES

Although the war was expanding, Services were forced to finance the war out of their regular budgets until just last year. It was not until January of this year that an adequate appropriation was belatedly requested.

Facts

The FY 1966 Budget was submitted to the Congress in January 1965, whereas the level of activity in SEA did not start to increase substantially until February 1965. As soon as the increase started, estimates were made of the additional requirements and a Supplemental appropriation in the amount of $700 million for FY 65 was submitted in May.

In August, a request for $1.7 billion was submitted as an Amendment to the FY 1966 Budget which had not then been acted on by the Congress. The funds

included in the Amendment were the amounts needed to expand production rates, to buy tooling and long lead-time components, and to expand construction. In presenting this Supplemental to the Congress Secretary McNamara explained that it was not the total cost, and that other requirements would be submitted when more carefully prepared estimates were worked out. This was done in the FY 1966 Supplemental for $12.3 billion, and the regular FY 1967 Budget, both of which were submitted to the Congress in January 1966.

While we want to ensure that we have adequate funds to provide weapons and supplies for our forces in Vietnam, we also wish to benefit from the lessons learned during the Korean War. Funds requested and appropriated were considerably greater than was actually required and, as a result, much of the effective control exercised by the Congress and the top Defense managers over the Department of Defense was lost. One result was the buildup by the end of the conflict of huge excess stocks, which later were sold at a few cents on the dollar. Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be delighted to have the opportunity. Mrs. HANSEN. I would like to have a copy.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will see that each committee member gets a copy, and we will put it in the record, also.

SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT IN CONDUCT OF WAR

Mr. ANDREWS. I think, Mr. Secretary, one of our dangers today is to allow to be built up a lack of confidence in our Government in the conduct of this war.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I could not agree with you more.

Mr. ANDREWS. This has a direct effect on how long this war lasts because it affects the thinking in Hanoi and Peiping.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Also that of our own people and on their support of the war. If they think we are unprepared, and we are undertaking something that is excessively risky because we are overstretching ourselves, the support won't be as great as otherwise it would be. General Wheeler and I have spent almost literally the first 3 months of this year doing nothing but answering charges of this kind, before congressional committees, press conferences and on TV. You cannot imagine how many times this has come up. From what you say it is very clear that we have not answered it properly yet.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is your feeling that these dovelike statements that are being made or statements made by responsible individuals that we are not doing the right things, that we should circumscribe the powers of President Johnson, General Wheeler, and you, as Secretary; these things, in your judgment, can prolong the war rather than shortening it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. You are speaking of suggestions such as those made by Hansen Baldwin suggested in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; I am speaking of those who would say our Nation is not determined to follow through on its commitment. I am talking about suggestions such as the ones we just mentioned where we have people that are trying to undermine the confidence of the course of action you are following.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Let me distinguish between two points. First, I do believe that thoughtful debate strengthens our Nation. Mr. ANDREWS. I will agree completely with you on this.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not care whether it is a debate on an issue about which I feel very strongly and on which hence, my mind is already firmly made up on regardless of whether or not some other parties are taking the other side. I think a thoughtful debate strengthens our Nation.

Mrs. HANSEN. That is what we are fighting for.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, exactly. Debate, by definition, means that there are two sides being argued and, at any one time, presumably, you agree only with one side. Therefore, statements are being made in public with which you do not agree. Still, I think debate does strengthen our Nation.

Second, however, I strongly disagree with those who state that it is not in our interest to continue to support the South Vietnamese, because I think that, were we to withdraw on any pretext that has been suggested-moving to enclaves, or whatever pretext might be used to explain our withdrawal-we would weaken the confidence of other nations to whom we have commitments under the 40 other treaties I mentioned. We would open South Vietnam to domination by Red China. Because there is no question in my mind that North Vietnam is an agent of Red China in respect to South Vietnam, such a withdrawal would be but a step toward further extension of Red China's control in the entire area, and, ultimately, this would greatly increase the risk of confrontation between us and Red China.

Mr. ANDREWS. And in the long run would cost more American lives. Secretary MCNAMARA. Exactly. For these reasons I strongly support the Government's present policy. I support equally the right and, in a very real sense, the obligation of our people to debate this

issue.

HONOLULU CONFERENCE

Mr. ANDREWS. I think we all do that. This is why we are trying to find out the facts today. One thing Mr. Shriver asked earlier, when he was talking about the Allies and how they were brought into it and the increased emphasis on Allies. I have one short question. If we are thinking these Allies are very important-and we are talking about their esprit de corps-why were they not included in the Honolulu Conference-the Australians, New Zealanders, and Koreans who are fighting with us in Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that just as a practical matter, it was preferred to have a discussion between the President and the South Vietnamese. The more individuals or nations you have at a meeting the less you get done per unit of time.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you were Secretary of Defense of one of those nations, wouldn't you be put upon if you were not asked to come? Secretary MCNAMARA. We took the precaution of informing other governments, beforehand and afterward.

General WHEELER. I can add something to this. The main thrust of the Honolulu Conference was not military at all; it was on the economic, political, and psychological side. So there would not have been any real reason to have representatives of other governments there.

Mr. ANDREWS. General, people think that any military conferences that take place would include these people who are our allies.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes; although we frequently meet with the South Vietnamese without South Koreans or Australians present, we keep our free world allies informed of what we are doing.

COMMITMENT TO SPAIN

Mr. ANDREWS. One other thing was mentioned. This is what you get for being the anchorman. You pick up all the questions along the line. We were talking about Spain and our commitment in Spain and the fact that we have some this year to go in there for military aid. How does that square away with the talk that Spain is inviting us to slowly move out of there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is not.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, this H-bomb incident has not changed the atmosphere?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the H-bomb incident was an unfortunate one and that it certainly did not improve our relations with Spain. Neither did it destroy them.

Mr. ANDREWs. So we are fine there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Incidentally, what about the bomb? Do you have it up yet?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No; unless we got it today.

REPLACEMENT OF BASES IN FRANCE

Mr. ANDREWS. I have two more questions. In the case of French bases, will these bases be replaced, and if they are-I mean the bases we are being invited out of-if they are, will military aid and assistance under this program be needed to replace them wherever you choose?

Secretary MCNAMARA. If they are to be replaced, the cost of replacement will not be from military assistance appropriations, but from the basic Defense budget.

SHIPMENT OF MILITARY CARGOES TO VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. I have one final question. We got into this subject briefly. The ability to transport cargoes to Vietnam is of military importance. In fact, it is of prime military importance. We get into this whole problem of cargo preference and what is going to be shipped where and do we have the ability to ship military materials as well as our normal commercial goods.

The other day we had men from the Export-Import Bank here and I questioned them on grain shipments because we are interested in shipping wheat from our area to Italy, a cash customer, and also under Public Law 480. We kept finding that whether it is a cash sale or Public Law 480 we had to contend with this export requirement of shipping in American bottoms. This is a Presidential order, as you know. It is done, I am told, in order to maintain the fleet for its military role. From a military standpoint wouldn't we perhaps be better off if we went into an outright subsidy program of the merchant marine as an arm of our military, because what we are doing now is kind of playing cat and rat, because the rates are high we do not ship that way. So (1) we do not get the shipping that would maintain the fleet, and (2) the people in this country, particularly those in agricultural areas, do not have an opportunity to market their goods, and we are being completely outmaneuvered