RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TREATY

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The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of discussion and confusion, I would say, about the relationship of the treaty itself to the future proposals to furnish arms. I notice you say in your testimony that you think that each one of these instruments should be arately considered and treated on its own merits. Is that correct? Secretary ACHESON. That, I think, is substantially what I said, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I haven't got the point in the testimony right before

me.

Secretary ACHESON. It is on page 9, Mr. Chairman, of the mimeographed statement. The sentence that you refer to is right in the middle of the page, where it says:

I therefore earnestly trust that the Congress will see fit to enable this Government to carry out that aspect of its foreign policy represented by the proposed military assistance program. At the same time I urge that both the treaty and the proposed military assistance program should be considered separately and on their own merits.

OBLIGATION OF VOTING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AFTER

RATIFICATION OF TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. There is some argument and debate as to whether or not a vote for the treaty carries with it any obligation or duty to vote for the arms program at a later date. Is there anything in the treaty itself that binds the United States even to adopt the military program? I mean explicitly. The general phrase "mutual self-help" is that upon which I suppose they base their argument.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That question is one which it would be pleasant if one could answer "Yes" or "No." I think it requires a very clear understanding.

There is something in the treaty which requires each Member of the Senate, if you ratify this treaty, when he comes to vote on the military assistance program, to exercise his judgment less freely than he would have exercised it if it had not been for this treaty. No Member of the Senate, after the treaty is ratified, in exercising his judgment, can properly say to himself, "I do not believe in the principle of mutual assistance. I think that principle is silly and I will put it out of my mind." That should not be done, because by ratifying this treaty you accept that principle, and that principle exists.

However, when the Senator approaches the vote on the militaryassistance program, if his judgment is different from that which I have described as the judgment of the executive branch, if he thinks either that the United States is not able for financial, economic, or other reasons to help other countries, or if he thinks that it is not necessary to meet the situation as he sees it, there is nothing in this treaty which determines how he shall vote. The thing that exists in the treaty is that he must accept the principle of mutual assistance. He cannot repudiate that, and he must use his own best judgment within the confines of that principle to determine whether or not we can and we should, so far as the world situation is concerned, approve the militaryassistance program as a means of mutual assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true, though, that the Senator would be free, within his own conception of his duty, even though the treaty

does carry the clause of mutual assistance, to determine whether the exact measure which was proposed was within that general scope of mutual assistance that was necessary?

Secretary ACHESON. Of course, Senator Connally. There is no question about that,

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to make that clear, if I might, because some Senators seem to be bothered with that question. It seems to me that when we treat these two instruments separately that each Senator is under the duty of searching his own conscience and his own mind as to whether or not the provisions of any particular measure come within the obligations which we will assume when we ratify the treaty. There might be a wide divergence of view in some Senator's mind as to whether it was necessary to adopt any particular measure to meet the general clause of mutual assistance. There might be mutual assistance in other ways besides armed force. So that is your answer on that.

THE TREATY IS NOT AIMED AT ANY STATE

Now, Mr. Secretary, you brought out rather clearly--it won't hurt to reiterate it a little that this treaty is not aimed at any nation particularly. It is aimed only at any nation or any country that contemplates or undertakes armed aggression against the members of the signatory powers. Is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Connally. It is not aimed at any country; it is aimed solely at armed aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, unless a nation other than the signatories contemplates, meditates or makes plans looking toward, aggression or armed attack on another nation, it has no cause to fear this treaty.

Secretary ACHESON. That is correct, Senator Connally, and it seems to me that any nation which claims that this treaty is directed against it should be reminded of the Biblical admonition that "The guilty flee when no man pursueth."

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very apt illustration.

What I had in mind was, when a State or Nation passes a criminal act, for instance, against burglary, nobody but those who are burglars or getting ready to be burglars need have any fear of the Burglary Act. Is that not true?

are parties, and its obligations are binding upon us? Is that not true?

Secretary ACHESON. That is so. It is a treaty ratified by the Senate of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. And entering into a treaty like the United Nations is not a surrender of sovereignty but it is really an exercise of sovereignty.

Secretary ACHESON. That is very true, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. One other point, and then I will turn you over to some of the other committee members.

AUTOMATIC DECLARATION OF WAR

Is there or is there not anything in the treaty that pledges us to an automatic declaration of war in any event?

Secretary ACHESON. There is nothing in the treaty which has that effect, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are matters still residing in the discretion and judgment of the Government and the Senate?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Even after the occurrence of events, we would still have that freedom, would we not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true.

MINORITY DOMINATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The CHAIRMAN. I was interested in your statement that in the United Nations or any other international organization there was the possibility that a group within that organization would have designs that could be very destructive and detrimental to the organization. There is evidence, to my mind, not necessarily to yours, that such possibilities are already in existence at the present time-that there are little groups who vote together and act together with an objective, I think, of hampering and disrupting the international organization. There is nothing of that kind in this treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir. What I was referring to was the difficulties which faced the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary ACHESON. And I was pointing out that I thought it was not, as one commonly hears it said, a defect in the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is not because we do not have a better Charter; it is not because we do not have world government that this difficulty arises. It would arise in any organization, no matter how perfectly devised. The difficulty comes in the attitude and the actions of this powerful minority group, and it happens that the same thing happens in a trade-union or a church or a club or a political body, that when some of the members of it undertake to use the principles and procedures to frustrate the functioning, then the organization just won't work.

THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed in the press-I have no direct diplomatic information on the subject-that at least one great country is denouncing this treaty and complaining about it because it does not

approve of it. This country is not a signatory and it was not concerned with the treaty.

Is it not true that since the war that same power has formed alliances and arrangements with a number of the Balkan countries without asking anybody's advice or anybody's agreement, and most certainly without consulting the United States of America?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, Senator Connally. And I think all of those treaties have been printed in the document which the Senate has had prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Containing very strong obligations on the part of those nations.

UNITED NATIONS' ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY

The United Nations, as you have pointed out, has not been effective in some respects, because of frustrations and delays and obstructions of this group, so that by reason of that we feel the necessity of entering into and signing or ratifying the present treaty. Is that true? Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing in this treaty that is in anywise hostile to the purposes or plans of the United Nations? They are supplementary, are they not?

Secretary ACHESON. That is entirely right, Senator. The purposes of this treaty are to accomplish the very purposes of the United Nations. This is an ancillary method, within the provisions of the Charter, for accomplishing the purposes of the Charter.

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COOPERATION PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The CHAIRMAN. The treaty is really a concrete implementation of the resolution that the Senate passed, in which the State Department collaborated throughout the preparation and the consideration of the objectives set forth in this resolution, is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That resolution has been the constant guide of the negotiators of this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one other point that I would like to bring out, and that is this: Is it not true that during the preparation of the present treaty consultations were held frequently between the State Department and members of the Committee on Foreign Relations as to the exact text, the use of words here and there, and things of that kind? Is that not true?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no secrecy on the part of the State Department, no attempt to keep from the Committee on Foreign Relations or from the Senate, for that matter, the provisions of this treaty as they were being formulated?

Secretary ACHESON. Not the slightest.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to commend that course in the future. I think we will get along much better under that procedure than by the Senate being handed a treaty or a convention with the words "Here it is; take it or leave it." If the members of the committee that are interested in these matters might be consulted-and I am not complaining-prior to the final act of adopting or ratifying or agreeing to a treaty or convention.

Secretary ACHESON. I think it is a very wise course which you suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

As I view the treaty, and I will ask you whether or not you agree with me, one of its chief merits is that there would be a deterrent effect on any nation that contemplated an armed attack or an aggression because of the knowledge by that nation that such an attack would arouse the opposition of the whole group and the resistance of the whole group.

Secretary ACHESON. That is the first dominant and overwhelming purpose of this treaty. As the Senate Resolution pointed out, as the President stated in his inaugural and other addresses, the only really effective way to deal with the threat of war is to prevent wars from happening. Anything that you do after the war has happened is an aid to national survival, but the disaster has occurred, therefore everything that can be done to prevent a war from happening is to the greatest possible benefit not only of the United States but of all the rest of the world, including the nation that might be foolish enough to think of aggression, because in these days both the aggressor and the nations against whom the aggression takes place suffer terribly in the course of a modern war.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not also true that it would have a deterrent effect on the practice that is growing up of one nation reaching out and grabbing little nations one at a time, and incorporating each into its system, when it knows in advance that to do that would arouse the hostility and resistance of all the nations that are parties to this treaty?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That is a very great part of the effectiveness of this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. A great and powerful nation without that situation in mind could just reach out and grab some little wobbly and weak nation and incorporate it, and then go on to the next one and the next one and the next one, until it had picked the roost clean. Secretary ACHESON. That is true, sir.

ACTION IN CASE OF AN ARMED ATTACK

The CHAIRMAN. One other point. Article 5 of the treaty provides that an armed attack against any one of the nations shall be considered an armed attack upon all of them. It further provides that in the event of such an armed attack, each of them will take individually and in concert with the other parties whatever action it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, including the use of armed force. With regard to the language "including the use of armed force," is it not true that that does not require the use of armed force, but armed force is merely one of the means, among other means, which it may adopt to perform its duty of helping maintain the integrity of the Atlantic area?

Secretary ACHESON. That is true, Senator, and of course, whatever means would be employed would be appropriate to the gravity of the attack.