MAINTENANCE OF DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS OF COSIGNATORIES

The CHAIRMAN. These countries, even in their depressed state of their economy, have all had to maintain military establishments, have they not?

General BRADLEY. Yes. sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They have had their military budgets all along, and necessarily have to have them, not alone for defense against outside attacks, but for police powers within these countries.

Now, may I quote Secretary Acheson on this point? He was asked a question about how the recovery program and the arms program would go along. He said, and this is the Secretary I am quoting:

The first primary necessity is the economic recovery of western Europe. That has been made very clear in a number of statements that economic recovery has priority.

That means that there are very definite limitations on the size of the military forces which western Europe can maintain, because if you withdrew greatly increased numbers of men from production and put them into military service, you would impair recovery and would impair the very ability of these nations to resist and to remain as free nations.

Therefore, the recovery comes first. That means that under the military assistance program we have started with the forces as they exist in 1950 budgets of these countries, and we are trying to give better armaments to those countries. As Senator Connally pointed out, the great bulk of this effort is being undertaken by the European countries themselves—

and so on.

What I was trying to point out was that they have had to have their military establishments all along, they have had their military budgets. They could not be expected to strip themselves to the bone and have no armed forces, no armed establishment, not alone for their temporary defense but in the long run they have got to maintain that sort of an organization to ever have an army or armed forces ready for an emergency which may break upon them at any time. Is that not true? General BRADLEY. That is true. And they have to have a certain size force for maintenance of internal security, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. What the Senator has stated, of course, is enlightening. But what I want to know is, What they are to do to match the new effort we are going to make to help them? Is part of it to be considered as part of their regular budget, or are they going to add an additional budget at match what we are adding, additionally? General BRADLEY. I do not know, sir.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE SINCE END OF WORLD WAR II

Senator WATKINS. Two of those countries-France and Great Britain-received considerable equipment from the United States during the latter part of the war; all the way through the war for Great Britain, and the latter part of the war for France. Do you know what has happened to the equipment that we left with them that they now have?

General BRADLEY. They have some of it.

Senator WATKINS. Is it usable?

General BRADLEY. Some of it.

Senator WATKINS. As I recall, the statement has been made—I am not sure about this, General, you probably have the information, but it will give you an indication of what I am driving at and what I am trying to get information on-it was said that we sold to them, by Foreign Surplus Disposal, some $10,000,000,000 worth of equipment. Do you know anything about that? Can you throw any light on that? General BRADLEY. No, sir. I have no figures on that.

Senator WATKINS. We did sell them a lot of equipment after we pulled out? For instance, from England?

General BRADLEY. Yes. As I remember it we sold quite a number of things like trucks, tractors, and things that can be used in the peacetime economy, and in many cases they were pretty much worn, and it was a question of whether or not they were worth the expense of bringing home and storing.

We followed more or less the same policy here. We sold many things in this country to help the civilian economy.

Senator WATKINS. I understand that. What I have in mind is strictly what we disposed of overseas. As I recall, the figure I saw lately was about $10,000,000,000 of equipment at a mark-down price. The CHAIRMAN. You mean $10,000,000,000 of original cost?

Senator WATKINS. I do not know, Senator. That is what I am trying to find out, what it really meant.

General BRADLEY. I do not have those figures. We sold such equipment not only in Europe but all over the world. We sold surplus equipment of that type. You may remember that a couple of years ago Congress passed a bill which made use of part of that money for education in the Fulbright bill. That set up funds for 15 or 20 countries where we had sold such property, and the money was used for educational purposes.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know where we can get information on that rather accurately so we could know what happened?

General BRADLEY. I do not, offhand. But if I can find out exactly what you want, we will try to get it for you.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know what we furnished to members of this North Atlantic Pact, following the conclusion of the war, in the way of equipment that could be used for military work.

General BRADLEY. When you added the last clause on that I am not too sure.

Senator WATKINS. Then I will leave that off.

General BRADLEY. It may not be fit for military use any more, and might not have been at the time. It might have had limited military use. As I understand it, you want a list in money value of the goods turned over to the other 11 countries of this pact.

Senator WATKINS. In a general classification. I do not want you to give the detail of it, so many tractors and so much of this. I would like a general classification of what it was.

General BRADLEY. We will see if we can get that from the Foreign Liquidation Commission for you, sir.

[The committee has been informed that the Department of State is preparing this information for submission in connection with the proposed military assistance legislation.]

LOYALTY OF ALLIES

Senator WATKINS. In considering plans for conduct of a defensive war in Europe, of course you have to take into consideration many elements, including probably the loyalty of your allies who may be fighting along with you, with our divisions. How do you feel about the situation, for instance, in France and Italy, where it is said that every fourth Italian or every fourth Frenchman is a Communist?

I do not want to ask too pointed a question, but I wonder if you could throw any light on what risks we would be taking in rearming those two nations, or helping to rearm them, and what we can count on if we get into a fight?

General BRADLEY. Of course any country which tries to fight a war with any considerable percentage of her people disloyal, is working under a handicap. However, I do not believe that any percentage of people considered disloyal now can be taken as anywhere near accurate of the percentage that will be disloyal in the event of war.

A lot of people talk one way until the test comes, and then you find that they are loyal and patriotic citizens. I might cite as an example, a few years ago we had in this country a movement by the Veterans of Future Wars in which a lot of youngsters said they would not fight, yet when I got to Africa I found one of the ringleaders of that group on my staff, and he was decorated several times for bravery. It may be that a lot of these people included in the 25 percent that we talk about now would be loyal to the country when the test came.

Senator WATKINS. However, at the present moment they indicate, if you can judge by the expressions of some of their leaders, that they would not fight on the side of the United States in the event of war. General BRADLEY. Undoubtedly there would be some such people. Senator WATKINS. At least they would not fight with their own countries to in any way assist the United States.

General BRADLEY. If that percentage caused too much trouble, I would guess that the country concerned would have to take a realistic view of the matter and take such steps as may be necessary to cope with it.

Senator WATKINS. Can Italy be of any real assistance to us in a future war?

CONTRIBUTION OF ITALY

GENERAL BRADLEY. I would like to answer that, in general, I think they can. Specifically, I would not want to answer it here.

Senator WATKINS. I wondered in view of the past record whether or not they would be of any particular good, particularly in view of the treaty which was entered into between Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Republics, as we have limited their armament very materially, and to what is now very obsolete armament. That is one thing that prompted my question. Do you know any way whereby we could rearm them and keep within the law?

General BRADLEY. I would rather not go into that. If I might answer it in a general way, in my opinion, even under those treaty

restrictions, they can contribute something to the Atlantic Pact. However, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular country does not fall in the province of the military. That was decided on a very high government level, and the State Department decided for our Government that it was proper that they be included. Militarily I think that they are in general an asset.

Senator WATKINS. You could not anwser it one way without violating security?

General BRADLEY. I would rather not answer it here, sir.

SENDING OF UNITED STATES TROOPS ABROAD

Senator WATKINS. I have noticed from time to time statements by some people who are more or less responsible, that a part of our program contemplates the sending of considerable detachments to members of the Atlantic Pact not only for the purpose of instruction but also to bolster their forces. What can you say about that, General? General BRADLEY. If any decision has been made as to sending any particular size group and for any purpose to these nations, I do not know about it.

Senator WATKINS. It is not contemplated at the present time?
General BRADLEY. It may be on some levels-

Senator WATKINS. I mean as far as you have been advised.

General BRADLEY. Certainly we have not been in any planning for sending any particular groups. Certainly if you furnish arms aid then somebody has got to go over and see that they are properly received and distributed. But that does not come into this particular thing.

Senator WATKINS. I think, General, that this concludes most of the questions that I want to ask you. There are some that I do not know if I will be permitted to ask at someplace where you can answer, that involve security. But I want to thank you for the very gracious way you have answered my questions. I appreciate your cooperation. I want to assure you that I was trying to get information that would help me, as one Senator, to make up his mind.

General BRADLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General Bradley, the committee thanks you for your presence here and for your very able and clear statement of the issues involved in the treaty. On the questions that are outside of the treaty at the moment, on arms and so forth, we think you have made a very comprehensive and able statement. We very greatly appreciate it.

You have gone directly to the point at issue, with a great degree of clarity, and perspicacity. You have enlightened the committee, and I hope have enlightened those who are here by our courtesy. This committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. At that time Mr. John Foster Dulles will be the first witness.

(Thereupon, at 1:20 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., May 4, 1949.)

APPENDIX

Production data showing industrial capacity of the North Atlantic Pact powers1

The question has been raised whether the North Atlantic Treaty, since it envisages the use of armed force as a last resort for the suppression of acts of aggression, is a military alliance.

Throughout the course of history there have been military alliances of every conceivable type. Some have been high-minded in intent; others have been cynical steps toward aggrandizement. Some have been purely defensive in motive; others have been offensive. Some have been automatic; others have depended on the judgment of the parties. All traditional military alliances, in the accepted sense of the word, were designed to advance the respective nationalistic interests of the parties, and provided for joint military action if one of the parties in pursuit of such objectives became involved in war.

Most traditional alliances of the past, while piously denying aggressive or expansionist intentions, nevertheless made it clearly evident that the parties anticipated military action in contingencies other than defense against armed attack. Sometimes the parties to such arrangements were in a position themselves to provoke the anticipated crisis, or casus belli, if it did not otherwise arise. Typical among such treaties are the following:

1. The Act of the Holy Alliance (September 26, 1815)

This act provided that the parties "will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance."

2. The Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) May 20, 1882 "Article 4: In case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally." [Italics added.]

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