that trend. Impetus was given it, I believe, when we decided to help Greece and Turkey. It attained historic proportions when we joined in the European recovery program. It is now being advanced by our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. Our devoted support of the United Nations has immeasurably strengthened that trend.

INCREASING UNITY OF NON-SOVIET WORLD

The increasing unity of the non-Soviet world is being demonstrated in the United Nations. Two years ago there was a widespread tendency to regard major differences simply as a conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the voting was mixed and marked by a large number of abstentions. The actions and attitudes of the Soviet Union, inside and outside the United Nations, have altered that situation. Today, most major issues are recognized as a conflict between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Abstentions are fewer; the majorities are larger, and the minority is usually the six voices and votes controlled by the Soviet Union. These majorities run between 40 and 50; 43 to 6, with four abstentions, is an example which we frequently have. We are now witnessing in the United Nations the unity that is progressively making aggression and obstruction less attractive and less feasible; that is, the unity of those countries outside of the Soviet group. They are growing more and more to act like one world. I don't mean to say that they always vote in a bloc. There is a variation which is represented by perhaps the factor of five or six votes among these countries that are outside the iron curtain.

It is difficult for the meaning of facts like these to penetrate the isolation which the ruling class of the Soviet Union has created for itself behind the walls of the Kremlin. But slowly it penetrates even there. The Soviet rulers have seen that we cannot be driven out of Berlin, and they are learning that the European recovery program cannot be defeated; that free nations will no longer permit themselves to be submerged one by one; that the Charter of the United Nations means what it says, and that the overwhelming majority of the nations are determined to uphold and defend it. While this process continues, we hopefully keep open the door to cooperation. Time after time we reiterate the invitation to this group to join with us. You realize that in some of our organs they will not even sit at the table with us.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND THE TREATY

Now, I would like to speak of economic recovery and the treaty. I have divided this paper up into chapters, because it is more convenient for me to think this matter out that way from the point of view of the United States Mission to the United Nations. And that is the characteristic of this testimony. I am trying to present the view of our mission to the United Nations.

The claim has been made that economic recovery should be our primary objective in the North Atlantic area and that the treaty may endanger that objective. The premise is correct, but the conclusion is not. Economic recovery is the surest defense against the spread of totalitarian tyranny, but that recovery requires security and

confidence.

The treaty would not have come into existence if there had not been a real need for it. The last two World Wars raged across the lands of the European signatories of this treaty. We share with them the desire to remove the miscalculations which could invite a similar tragedy.

This community-that is to say the North Atlantic communitywith its bridgeheads on both sides of the Atlantic, is engaged in a great cooperative effort to attain economic recovery and the blessings of political stability and social progress. The United States is assisting on a very large scale because we know that a healthy Europe is a strong force for peace, a vital element in a strong United Nations and a friendly partner with the United States in its efforts to establish greater security for all.

SECURITY AND RECOVERY

The nations of the North Atlantic area have learned that they must stand together and make plain in advance that they will do so. I believe that they knew it as far back as February 1946, just after the Organization had been set up in London, for I find in one of the speeches of the Honorable James Byrnes, who was then Secretary of State, remarks which plainly showed that. I would read parts of it if you ask me to, but otherwise I will not take your time. In that speech, Secretary Byrnes forecast this situation, and he makes perfectly plain that, if we are going to have greater security for all, we must ourselves be strong and we must be ready to contribute our part with the neighbors in the North Atlantic area to prevent or to suppress these attacks from outside upon this area.

The preservation of the freedom and independence of any one of them is of vital concern to all of them. An armed attack upon one is considered an armed attack on all. The treaty is intended to remove the feeling of insecurity which hinders economic recovery in Europe by establishing a needed preponderance of moral and material power for peace. I say "preponderance"; I would like to emphasize it.

SOVIET ATTACK ON THE ATLANTIC TREATY

Now I would like to talk with you just a moment about the Soviet attack on the North Atlantic Treaty in the General Assembly. It does throw light upon what the treaty means to them.

As we expected, the Soviet Union has attacked the North Atlantic Treaty in the General Assembly. The nature of that attack exposed the awareness of the Soviet group to the intimate relationship between the treaty and the United Nations.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL VETO AND THE TREATY

Every member of the Soviet group spoke against the treaty in attempting to defeat a resolution aimed at correcting abuse of the special privilege of the so-called veto in the Security Council. The Soviet Union, which has used the veto 30 times-some of those times in cases to which the founders of the United Nations did not intend the veto to apply, for they said so in establishing the Charter-realized that the treaty might endanger objectives which it can use the

veto to protect. Consequently, it introduced discussion of the North Atlantic Treaty as germane to the then pending question, which was the problem of voting in the Security Council. No member state other than the Soviet bloc criticized the treaty, but every one of these six argued that the treaty violated the Charter.

The Soviet delegate claimed it violated the Charter because it organized a bloc outside the United Nations. He said this bloc was being organized "because the approval of such actions is impossible in the Security Council, where the concurrence of all the great powers is required to adopt decisions on all important questions involved in the maintenance of peace." Thus he revealed the bearing that this treaty had in his estimation on the privilege he has exercised 30 times; that of the veto.

If, indeed, the North Atlantic grouping should render possible the security of members which is now impossible because of the veto, then the treaty ought to be put into effect promptly.

INCLUSION OF PORTUGAL AND ITALY

Mr. Gromyko claimed further that the treaty violates the Charter because it contains among its signatories two states not members of the United Nations-Italy and Portugal. References to article 51, he said, were and I am quoting his words "groundless" because "only an armed attack against a member of the Organization gives the right to take action in self-defense."

Our answer is this: By international law, every state has the inherent right of self-defense. The Charter does not exclude nonmember states from the inherent right referred to in article 51.

The application of article 51 to existing arrangements such as the Arab League and the Act of Chapultepec was precisely noted. At the May 23, 1945, meeting of committee III/4 the delegate of Egypt observed that "the principle involved in the new text should certainly extend to the League of Arab States." The text of the league agreement, signed at Cairo March 22, 1945, was before the committee, having been made an official committee III/4 document as of May 4, 1945. Two of the signatories of the pact of the Arab League, Transjordan and Yemen, were not represented at the San Francisco Conference. To be sure, years afterward Yemen was admitted to the United Nations, but Transjordan, though having applied, has not yet been admitted to the United Nations.

I refer this committee to a document already in its files. This document is so important that I shall refer to it again later. It is entitled "Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations." This document is so important that it seems to me to be worthy of being printed as a Senate document. has been a very useful document in making a careful study of the origin of article 51.

It

And now I say that on the basis of reason, on the basis of current interpretation by the founders, and on the basis of experience, it is clear that Mr. Gromyko's claim that the North Atlantic Treaty violates the Charter because of the memberships of Italy and Portugal is without any foundation whatever. In a word, the Charter recognizes the inherent right, growing out of international law, not out of the Charter, of Italy and Portugal to join with member states for col

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lective self-defense. This document to which I refer elaborates this reasoning. I shall not take your time to read all of that.

And now I come to another chapter: Article 51 and Regional Arrangements.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE TREATY

Mr. Gromyko has made another charge.

The North Atlantic Pact

he said

cannot under any circumstances be called a regional arrangement because it comprises states located in two different continents-America and Europe. Thus these states are united not according to the regional principle.

What we say about it in the United States mission to the United Nations is this:

This claim that the treaty is in conflict with the Charter because it does not create an arrangement according to the regional principle is without probity. First, it does create an arrangement according to the regional principle. History shows that the Atlantic Ocean is a bridge linking America and Europe. Second, even if the treaty did not do so, it creates a group for collective defense under article 51 of the Charter.

It is not necessary to define the organization of the North Atlantic community as exclusively a regional arrangement, or as exclusively a group for collective self-defense, since activities under both article 51 and chapter VIII are comprehended in the treaty. It is our opinion that the provisions of the Charter relating to each such activitythat is, when applied and if applied, if undertaken-will apply to that activity. But you do not have to departmentalize the treaty. It is significant that no difinition of regional arrangements, or regional organization, was contained in the Charter, or the Senate Resolution 239, or the North Atlantic Treaty. Each of these contemplates both regional action and collective self-defense.

HISTORY OF ARTICLE 51 OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Light is thrown on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations by reviewing the origin and then current interpretation of article 51. At the San Francisco meeting, representatives of states of the Western Hemisphere, who had participated in establishing the Act of Chapultepec, actively opposed being subordinated completely to the United Nations. They had developed a system of hemispheric self-defense based on the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. The question arose as to how the legitimate operation of such a regional system was to be fitted into a general global system.

It was obvious that autonomy of the Western Hemisphere system would be in conflict with the primacy of the universal system which the Charter sought to establish and which all American States recognized. It was necessary to reconcile the operation of both systems. This was done by inserting article 51, which was not in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, providing that nothing in the present Charter-—what sweeping terms: nothing in the present Charter!-shall impair the

inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

This very comprehensive language overrides any other part of the Charter that might stand in the way of this special right of selfdefense until the Security Council has acted effectively. In any case whatever, it is my opinion that article 51 is not concerned with "enforcement action"; it is concerned with self-defense.

COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Chapter VIII, which prohibits taking enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, does not apply to collective action for self-defense under article 51. The objection that the North Atlantic Treaty does not create a regional arrangement contemplated by articles 52 and 53 does not hit the treaty. It does not apply to the treaty. This arises from the fact that the authority recognized in article 51 is not limited to regional arrangements. This point was clearly established in the hearings conducted by this committee when it was considering ratification of the Charter. I am sure all who were sitting then will remember. There is an important exposition of the meaning of article 51 on page 304 of the published testimony. This exposition resulted from an exchange between Mr. Pasvolsky of the State Department and Senator Vandenberg. Senator Vandenberg's views with respect to article 51 are of utmost significance because he was a member of the subcommittee dealing with this question and the principal negotiator in the formulation of the text of article 51.

FORESHADOWING OF ATLANTIC PACT DURING THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER

In that exchange it is established that the phrase "collective selfdefense" contained in article 51 not only relates to regional but also to any group action that may be taken for purposes of collective selfdefense. This view is corroborated in other statements made before this committee at that time. I would cite to you particularly the statement made by Mr. Stettinius, which you will find at page 210, and that by Mr. Dulles, at page 650. To the same effect are statements by representatives of France, Australia, Egypt, and the United Kingdom in 1945. See the document in this committee's files to which I have already referred, entitled "Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of States Not Members of the United Nations."

There is one brief passage here from Paul Boncour which I want to read. I hope you will pardon me for doing this. I know you can read just as well as I can, but it fits the occasion very well, as I see it. After he had paid Senator Vandenberg a great compliment he went on to give the characterization of what article 51 would do for the future, showing that article 51 contemplated entrance into such a treaty as the North Atlantic Treaty. I would not speak of this if I had not met and encountered the claim that the Charter of the United Nations did not contemplate this treaty. I say it did.

Senator PEPPER. When and where was that speech made, Mr. Ambassador?