The effects of the cold war on nonferrous metals markets must be weighed, however, against available alternatives which, in the long run, would undoubtedly create much greater demand for metals and minerals produced by mine-mill members. A general relief and rehabilitation program administered by the United Nations would promote industrialization of all Europe, thereby building up more stable and larger markets for nonferrous metals. A United Nations program would similarly open up vast new potential markets in eastern European countries, many of which are now attempting to develop their own basic industries. Money now used on armaments could be put to better purposes on such vitally needed programs as increased housing and coordinated river valley development programs, both of which would require much greater amounts of basic nonferrous metals. The known details on the effects of cold-war spending on mine-mill industries are presented below: Through March 31, 1949, the Economic Cooperation Administration authorized purchases of $304.5 millions of nonferrous metals with Marshall-plan funds. Of this total, $204.2 millions had been actually shipped up to that time. The greater bulk of Marshall-plan authorizations for purchases of nonferrous metals were to come from Canada and Latin America. The high lights on ECA authorizations and shipments of nonferrous metals are as follows: The total amount of shipments of nonferrous metals from the United States (38.8 million dollars) are less than half of amount spent on shipments of tobacco (85.6 million dollars). As declining purchases hit nonferrous markets more ECA purchases are being made in the United States at expense of Canadian producers (Northern Miner, May 5, 1949). These figures alone do not, of course, reveal what would take place under the alternative program of encouraging trade with all countries operating through a United Nations program. But it is clear that additional metal markets are being blocked off by the United States policy of denying shipments to eastern European countries. Our union is directly concerned with the expansion of markets for both United States and Canadian products. The United States News of January 21, 1949, reports: 66 ** ** United States exports to Russia and eastern Europe already are diminishing rapidly. Russia's share of United States exports, for example, are down from a monthly average of $12,400,000 in 1947 to $2,350,000 as a monthly average in 1948. Last year, Russia sold the United States about three times as much as the United States sold to Russia. United States exports to the Soviet sphere in 1948, as the chart shows, were far below the figures for 1947, lower still than in 1946 when the UNRRA was sending American aid to eastern Europe. "Question for United States businessmen is how much longer it will be worth the risk and the effort to handle American exports to the Soviet sphere, how much longer Russia and her satellites will sell more to the United States than they get in exchange." Similarly, Marshall plan objectives retard development of a staple European economy and promotion of a free flow of trade among European countries. A recent United States News World Report article "Dollars Stay Scarce Despite ERP" in the May 13, 1949, issue reports opinion of Swiss bankers on ERP operations: The Swiss assert that ERP countries tend to concentrate on imports that will make life easier, giving second billing to the things that will help to build up national economies. For example, they report that gasoline being brought in under ERP is being used largely for private automobiles rather than for major industrial uses. Emphasis, they argue, should be on imports of industrial equipment, not raw materials, semifinished or fifinished goods." On promotion of inter-European trade, this article also says: The trouble, as Swiss bankers size it up, is that there is more competition than cooperation among European countries. These countries scramble for United States dollars-the only currency that can be used in buying American goods. Little evidence is seen by these men that the ERP countries, as a means of opening broader markets, are getting together to lower barriers that prevent a free flow of money and of goods. The view of the ERP beneficiaries, as interpreted in Switzerland, seems to be that United States will go on putting up dollars to keep industry afloat, so why do all the changing that probably should be done?" The effect of trade barriers on sale of nonferrous metals was commented upon by the trade journal Engineering and Mining Journal in their February 1949 issue: "TRADE REVIVAL SLOW "Progress in reviving trade between countries in Europe that in the past have been important consumers of copper was painfully slow. As 1948 ended, is was apparent that currency depreciation threatened to further limit the movement of products containing copper from one European country to another. In fact, some of the increase in stocks of refined copper that occurred in the last quarter of the year could be traced to the chaotic economic situation that deepened with the unrest over establishing stable mediums of exchange." The ECA program, through its Strategic Materials Division, facilitates control of foreign sources of mineral supply by American monopolies thereby enabling these monopoly groups to play off colonial labor against American labor to their own advantage. In the long run, this can be one of the simple results of the cold-war program most injurious to our membership. That this is a realistic appraisal of the perspective we face is indicated by the functions of the Strategic Materials Division of ECA. These functions are: 1. To expedite transfer of materials from ECA countries and possessions to United States stock piles. 2. To use ECA funds to expand production of needed materials. 3. To assure United States capital fair treatment in buying of materials or development of new sources of production. This is accomplished through requiring ECA recipients to negotiate schedules of minimum materials available to the United States, and also through pledges by these countries that American enterprise will receive equal footing with their own nationals in the development of new sources. ECA countries are also required to pledge to expand their mineral production and commit portion thereof to United States. But, as the Engineering and Mining Journal for September 1948 bluntly puts it: "Exactly how do you go about assuring that a given nation will direct output of its mining industry so as to fulfill that obligation and yet not impose undesirable controls on private enterprise." The official 14.3 billion dollars plus 1.5 billion dollars more for Atlantic Pact countries to be spent on armaments purchases in the next fiscal year will, of course, mean use of fairly substantial quantities of nonferrous metals. The exact amounts to be so employed is not known to us. Significantly, however, it should be noted that these large outlays for armaments have been unable to prevent serious recession developing in those industries which would normally be expected to benefit from such expenditures. For example, the brass industry which would normally be expected to be producing various types of armament materials is now at the lowest level of production since before the last war. EFFECTS OF A POSITIVE PEACE PROGRAM ON JOBS AND PRODUCTION IN MINE MILL INDUSTRIES An alternative to our present cold-war program would necessarily involve the following features: A UN program for relief and rehabilitation of distressed countries. A program for better living at home involving a large-scale housing program, development of regional valley authorities, increased rural electrification, as well as numerous social security, health, and welfare benefits. Such a program would obviously mean more to the workers in mine-mill industry in terms of jobs and employment (not to mention other obvious far-reaching benefits) than the present cold-war program. While exact estimates, in terms of actual figures are difficult, it is fairly obvious that: A UN program that covered all the countries of the world would promote increased use of metals through greater industrialization. Such a program would obviously open up larger markets for metals through inclusion of eastern European countries. A 2,000,000-homes-per-year housing program would mean, roughly, 785,000 tons of copper alone, or the equivalent of what would go into 523,333 bombers (these estimates are based on an average of 785 pounds of copper for a model 6-room house, including all appliances, as estimated by the president of Anaconda Copper before the TNEC, and on estimate of 3,000 pounds per bomber). Similar equivalents to housing use of copper can be worked out on the basis of the following rough estimates: One B-17 Flying Fortress uses 2,968 pounds of copper. One 45,000-ton battleship uses 3,058,000 pounds of copper. One aircraft carrier uses 2,861,000 pounds of copper. An expanded rural electrification program would vastly increase consumption of copper, lead, and possibly aluminum (to the extent that aluminum was used instead of copper for wiring). Similarly, a comprehensive regional development program through creation of river valley authorities would require huge quantities of nonferrous metals, particularly copper, for transmission lines, power stations, etc. Again exact estimates on this are difficult, but rough calculations can be made on the basis of these approximations: One mile of high voltage transmission lines uses 31,378 pounds of copper. STATEMENT OF JOHN GILMAN, MILWAUKEE, WIS. Senator Toм CONNALLY, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Building, Washington, D. C. MILWAUKEE, WIS., May 23, 1949. DEAR SIR: Here is the statement which I would have given to your committee had it been early enough to testify in person: * * I am opposed to the North Atlantic Pact as a veteran since the pact is without doubt an aggressive pact ** a pact which directly threatens the Soviet Union with force of arms should the President interpret any event which takes place among the signatory nations or its colonies, an act of aggression. I fought for almost 9 months against Nazi Germany as a machine-gunner and was awarded the D. S. C. and Silver Star. I didn't fight, I'm sure, to make money for the international cartelists. I didn't fight so that we could prepare ourselves to fight Russia. I fought because I felt that it was in the best interests of our country. However, this pact is a war pact and is not in the best interests of our country. An uprising in French Morocco can be interpreted as an act of aggression on Russia's part * * * internal aggression * * * as the pact infers. This pact is similar to the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis in that it is out to smash bolshevism. Actually, the Axis was interested in smashing not bolshevism but any and all phases of democratic procedure as we know it. And so it seems that the creators of this pact are hell-bent on doing the same thing. I am opposed to the pact because it is violating the entire foundations and spirit of the UN. The pact is not a regional pact but an international pact cov-ering several regions the Mediterranean region * dinavian region western European region * the the Scanand the American region. The UN at San Francisco specifically defined regionalism and this pact is exactly what the UN didn't want done. And lastly, I oppose this North Atlantic Military Alliance because I am opposed to automatic declarations of war. Congress would have little to say if the signatory nations decided that an act of aggression took place. It would be committing our Nation to war under the terms of the pact. Why don't you creators of blood-money profits and destructible conflicts spend your hard-earned salaries so that the National Association of Manufacturers can accumulate enough profits without sending us boys into war? Why don't you suffer as I and thousands like myself by staying up 24 hours per day working together with Russia instead of working for war? I swear by God Almighty that if that pact goes through and if war comes about, I shall pray day and night that every Member of Congress who votes for it shall be its first victims. I'm disabled and can hardly stand on my feet from the results of the last holocaust. If there should be another war, may God see to it that every Member of Congress who is whooping it up for another war by talking demagogically about "peace," may He see to it that they suffer and die as I and the boys who I saw die on the battlefield. It's easy to sign papers committing us little people to die for someone else's profits. But it's not so easy to convince us that we are dying for America. I love my country more than any one of those war creators will ever love this country. I was willing to die for it and proved that I was willing to die for it. How many of you can say the same thing? Service Crosses * Distinguished Purple Hearts I've got them. But they will mean only medals awarded by big business for bravery in earning blood profits if you recommend this pact to Congress. * * * Silver Stars Sincerely yours, JOHN GILMAN, Staff Sergeant, Thirty-ninth Infantry Regiment, PROGRESSIVE PARTY, New York 19, N. Y., May 10, 1949. Hon. Toм CONNALLY, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: Mr. Wallace who is now on the west coast has asked me to return the enclosed transcript of his testimony before your committee with several corrections noted thereon. At the time of his appearance, in response to a question from Senator McMahon, Mr. Wallace stated that he would present the committee with documentation for the purposes of the record, in support of his statement that between the date of the Russian offer to lift the Berlin blockade on March 21 and the date when that offer was disclosed by Tass on April 25 "the State Department was filling the press and radio with stories about Russian aggressiveness, intensifying the atmosphere of fear and hostility which it evidently thinks necessary to assure the ratification and implementation of the Atlantic Pact." Mr. Wallace has asked me to transmit to you the following very partial chronicle of acts and declarations of an official character in support of that statement: March 24 President Truman officially welcomes Winston Churchill upon his arrival in this country at a formal dinner in Blair House (N. Y. Post, March 24). March 31 Winston Churchill addresses the Mid-Century Convocation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and says, among other things: "The failure to strange Bolshevism at its birth and to bring Russia, then prostrate, by one means or another, into the general democratic system lies heavy upon us today. It is certain that Europe would have been com munized and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States" (N. Y. Herald Tribune, April 1). March 31 Senator Connally, in a press interview, speaks of "an open Russian plan and design 'to impose upon the civilized world their plan of government and economy'" (N. Y. Times, April 1). March 31 Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in an address before the United States Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, deplored the "discouraging, disagreeable, frustrating role" played by Russia and referred to the "terror and international intimidation" of eastern Europe (N. Y. Times, April 1). April 4 In an address made at the ceremonies accompanying the signing of the Atlantic Pact, President Truman referred to the pact as "a shield against aggression" (N. Y. Times, April 5). April 5 Speaking at an Army Day ceremony before the Jewish War Veterans in New York City, General Bradley discussed the Atlantic Pact at the invitation of the State Department saying: "Strategically, the North Atlantic Pact would enable free nations of the Old World and the New to funnel the great strength of our New World to the ramparts of the Old, and thus challenge an enemy where he would transgress." He further referred to Russian protests against the pact as "the expressions of angry resentment from jackals denied their plunder" (N. Y. Times, April 6). April 6 Speaking before the new Members of the House and Senate, President Truman declared: "Now I believe that we are in a position where we will never have to make that decision (to drop atom bombs) again, but if it has to be made for the welfare of the United States, and the democracies of the world are at stake, I wouldn't hesitate to make it again" (N. Y. Times, April 7). April 9 General Walter Bedell Smith, former United States Ambassador to Moscow, speaking before the Military Order of World Wars, stated that Russia * * "is pointed behind its iron curtain with a formidable military entity, preying on the fears of the free peoples of Europe 串 It is typical of Communist cynicism that while they administer liberal doses of fear, at the same time they press their so-called peace offensive" (New York Times, April 10). April 9 The House Appropriations Committee released the testimony of "top air of ficials" that the air force "now plans to keep flying supplies into the blockaded city (Berlin) indefinitely" and that "they did not expect war during the year starting July 1-although, they added, it was a posssibility at any time (New York Times, April 10). April 12 A report from London that announces facilities "necessary to the United States Air Force for atomic bombardment have been prepared in this country by agreement between the United States and British Governments." The correspondent added that: "The mutual responsibility of the two governments in such defense has recently been highlighted by Winston Churchill's statement that western Europe owes its liberty solely to possession by the United States of the atomic bomb and to President Truman's declaration that he would use the bomb again if it became necessary" (New York Times, April 13). April 12 In his message to the Senate requesting ratification of the North Atlantic Pact President Truman referred to "the rights of small nations, broken one by one and the people of those nations deprived of freedom by terror and oppression” (New York Times, April 13). |