delighted in the sufferings of his Son, or in the wickedness of the hands which put him to death, but in the infinite good which he designed thereby to bring to pass.

I know that the sentiment of a universal divine eficiency, does not prevail as extensively, as the belief of a universal decree. But those authors, who are afraid to adopt the doctrine of a universal efficiency, seem at times to feet the necessity of admitting such a doctrine. Mr. Scott, in his Notes on John xix. 19-22, speaking of Pilate's refusing to alter the superscription, says, "Which was doubtless owing to the secret power of God upon his heart, in order that this attestation of our Lord's character might continue." This secret power of God upon Pilate's heart did not produce any holiness, for he remained a totally depraved creature; his motive therefore must have been evil; but the pious author of the Family Bible, appeared to rejoice in God's efficiency upon the heart of a wicked man, in this instance, because he was struck with the holy design of God in exerting this secret power. Now why might not his mind, and the minds of all others be relieved, if they could only be made to understand, that there is always a perfect distinction between the agency of the Deity, and the action of the creature; and between His ultimate end, and that of the transgressor. With the doctrine of a universal divine agency in view, we can thank the Lord for all the good which we and others receive, even if a part of our favors are presented to us by the hands of graceless men. We can even thank the Lord for inclining the hearts of these men to show us favor. [See Ezra vii. 27, Neh. i, 1, and ii. 8, 18] With this same doctrine in view, we can see the hand of God in all our afflictions-whether our property be consumed by the fire of God falling from heaven, or be plundered away by the Chaldean bands, we can say, "The Lord hath taken away." [See Job i] Mr. B. in seeking to get rid of the force of Isa. xlv. 5, 6,7, so far as it appeared to militate against his scheme of doctrine, observes, "Plague, pestilence, sword and famine, are all the messengers of his vengeance which he sends upon cities devoted to wickedness. Every man ought to know there is a difference between moral and natural evil" p. 57. Mr. B. holds that it is con

sistent for God to bring natural evil upon a wicked people. Among the natural evils which he enumerates, we find the sword is one; and he could not consistently have omitted it. See Ezek. xiv. 17, 21. Now we know the sword is a harmless thing if it do not have a hand to carry it. We know also that the hand which God commonly uses to bring the sword on any people, is a wicked hand. This was always the case when the Lord brought the sword upon the land of Israel. Here then according to the implied concession of our opponent, the Lord can govern, manage and direct moral evil, as well as natural. He can send an army of wicked men, whose sole object is mischief, to punish us, just as consistently as he can send an army of locusts and caterpillars. And if he can consistently send, or bring this army, then there is no inconsistency in supposing that he should determine to send them to make this, which is, on their part, a wicked invasion. And this would remove all the difficulty which is supposed to attend the sentiment, That the Holy One of Israel decrees the sinful actions of his creatures, and brings to pass what he decrees.*

3. Mr. Bangs argues, that the doctrine of a divine purpose about every thing which takes place, is unjust, as it would in effect be condemning the innocent."Now," says Mr. B. p. 18, "if God from all eternity foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, he ordained the condemnation of part of the angels, of Adam and all

*Mr B. thinks me to be inconsistent in speaking of God as foreordaining moral evil and being the efficient cause of it, and then talking about sinners being given up to commit iniquity. I think I am justified in using this different phraseology in speaking on this subject, since I have the Bible for my example. Compare Deut. ii. 30, "But Sihon, King of Heshbon would not let us pass by him; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate," &c. with Psal. lxxxi. 12; "So I gave them up unto their own heart's lust." &c. See also Ex. iv. 21; Josh. xi. 20. compared with Rom. i. 24, 26. Infinite wisdom saw best to make use of both of these modes of speaking on this deep subject, and I cannot see how it ought to subject any one to ridicule for imitating so perfect a model. When God speaks of giving sinners up to their own heart's lust, it implies that they possess a wicked nature, and yet it does not imply, that when they sin they act indepen»dently of God.

This posterity while in a state of perfect innocence.". Here let it be remarked; That it is no worse for God to decree a thing from all eternity, than to decree it one moment before it takes place; for he was as able to decree well then, as now; so that the decree being from all eternity, and "a decree, the date of which is lost in eternity," is nothing more against it than though it were but now determined. Here I might ask my antagonist, whether there is any inconsistency in this, That God should have determined before he made angels and men, that he would make them, and that he would make them after his own image, and that when they should exist in this perfect state, he would treat them according to their character? But would not this be justifying them as righteous characters, before they possessed such characters, i. e. before they existed? Yet I presume there is no difficulty attending the case stated; for God calleth things which are not as though they were. Let us now contemplate our world as all involved in apostasy, and let us suppose that God has determined to bring many of them to repentance and to glory. Does this imply that God justifies the wicked while they remain wicked; and that he takes them to heaven in their sins, because that while they are in their sins, he forms his determination to save them? There is no difficulty in the case which Mr. B. has started, any more than in the cases which I have now introduced, except that which relates to God's foreordaining the sin of men and angels: and this difficulty has already been considered.

4. The author of the Letters urges this argument* against the doctrine under consideration; That it represents God as very weak and deficient in his understanding. "Here you reduce," says Mr. B. " the infinitely wise God to the level of an ignorant mechanic, who cannot see the end from the beginning without a prescribed plan. I conclude his own infinite mind is sufficient to guide him in all his multifarious works. and ways, without any previously devised "plan or. scheme." p. 21. I ask whether an increase of knowledge diminishes the use and necessity of a plan. It evidently makes it much easier to lay a plan. The knowledge may be so great, as to enable one to lay his

plan in a moment but without a plan, I think it must be as impossible for such an architect as Sir Christopher Wren, to build an edifice, as for the most ignorant workman ;-and that, without a previous plan, it would be as difficult for such an accomplished architect, to build a regular cottage, as to build that spacious and noble edifice, St. Paul's Church in London. As far as we have any idea of wisdom in our world, it does not consist in acting without plan or system, but in laying a good plan, and then, as far as such a plan is good, in adhering to it. And when the scriptures speak of God as acting systematically, they manifestly speak of it to his honor. To this purpose suffer me to quote Isa. xlvi. 9, 10, "I am God, and there is none like me; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My, counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure.'

Under the present objection against foreordination, we may introduce what is said against this doctrine on account of its sullying the glory of the divine prescience. "Another reason why your inconsistent doctrine sullies the glory of infinite wisdom is, that it supposes it im possible for God to foresee what will be, unless he predetermine it shall be. The doctrine espoused by us acknowledges, not only that his infinite prescience, seeth what will be, but also all that may, and might have been." pp. 22, 23. Let this matter be candidly investigated. Mr. B. and his brethren, I presume, do not suppose that God foreknows what might have been, in the same sense as he foreknows what will be; i. e. he did not foreknow them both as events which would actually happen. But how came there to be any dif ference between the two; even so much difference, that one only might have been, and the other actually will be? Why did not the might be event actually exist? For an illustration of this matter;-God saw that the earth might have had two moons, instead of one; but he saw that it would actually have but one. But what was there to make the latter certain, while the other only might have been? It was not the foreknowledge of its certainty, for this foreknowledge of its certainty implies a previous certainty. It would be foolish to say, that the reason why the earth is attended

by one satellite, in distinction from two, was this; that the Creator foresaw that while it might have had two, it would actually have but one. Is it not more intelligible, and much more honorable to God, to say, that the reason why the Creator foresaw there would be one, and only one, was this; that he determined to make one, and no more. He saw he could make two, or ten; but he saw that it would be best to make but one.

"To say, that his prescience depends on his predetermination, is to suppose a time when the Almighty did not possess infinite knowledge." p. 23. Let this objection be examined: There is a difference between knowledge and foreknowledge. Every thing belonging to the Supreme Being is eternal. We read of "his eternal purpose." His eternal foreknowledge is implied in that passage, Acts xv. 18; "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world;" or from eternity, as the Greek might be rendered. "His understanding is infinite," and of course, it is eternal. The knowledge, foreknowledge, and purpose, are from eternity, yet they possess such a relation to each other, that one must be conceived of as existing in the order of nature, though not in the order of time, before the other. First we must conceive of a Being of infinite understanding, employing this understanding to discover the best manner of operating; to see what system would bring most glory to the Creator, and most good to the creature. Here we may conceive of all possible systems passing before him By all possible systems, I mean all the systems which he had power to originate, provided he saw fit to originate: them; and not that it was possible that any one of them should exist, without he saw fit to give it existence. His infinite knowledge was fully able to make a selection from all possible systems of that which was best. This system which his knowledge saw would be the best, his infinite goodness constrained him to choose. He did freely choose it. He said, Let it be! It was his will that it should come into existence. This is what the scripture calls the counsel, decree, purpose, or determination of God: Next in the order of nature, we conceive of his prescience, or foreknowledge of the existence of this system, and of every part of it, in that