sess. Are not these as good and substantial proofs of our free agency, as we could desire?

Let us now see what proof there is of our entire dependence on God; I mean dependence on him when considered as free moral agents; i. e. that our will is dependent on his agency. The scripture asserts this dependence, and reason can discover no other consistent way. Paul tells the Philippians, that it was God who worked in them both to will and to do. In the close of the epistle to the Hebrews, he prayed that the God of peace would work in them that which was pleasing in his sight. This implied, that if they had any thing in them which was pleasing, that is, any good moral exercises, God himself must produce them in their hearts. The apostle James, speaking of the new birth, says: "Of his own will begat he us." And Jesus Christ taught that men were born of the Spirit. And God says in the prophecy of Ezekiel, "A new heart will I give you." There might be innumerable quotations made from the scriptures, to prove that men are dependent on God for their moral exercises. And if the inspired volume had not taught this, reason could not teach us any other scheme, for we cannot conceive of any independence in created beings. To us it appears as absurd as to talk of eternal created beings.

Here then are two things proved from the Bible; so fully proved, that there can be no mistake: why then should we deny either of them? What right have we to say, that if we are dependent on God for our exercies, then we are not free? We well know that the things which we make, and which are dependent on us for their motions, (as a clock or a watch,) are not free agents. But does it follow that the Almighty cannot make a free agent, so that he shall begin to exist in the exercise of freedom, and continue to exist, both free and dependent? Does God operate at all on the heart, at any time; so that the good exercises of the heart are in the least degree the effect of such operation? But few will deny this. But if complete dependence on his operation, destroy freedom, then a small degree of dependence, must at least impair it.

Although Mr. B. says very much against our dependence on God for our volitions, representing such volitions as having

Now my antagonist manifestly takes this ground, that if the Lord directly operate on the heart of a christian, to produce the most fervent love, such love is not of the nature of holiness, any more than the shining of the sun, or the flowing of the water: Or in other words, if it be God who makes me holy, then I am not holy-If it be God who creates in me a clean heart, then I have not a clean heart-If he uphold me by his free spirit, then I do not stand. Why might we not as well say, If God cause the sun to shine, then the sun.

nothing in them of a moral quality, any more than the motion of the pen in his hand, or of the ship before the wind; yet there is a place in his book, where he speaks of the grace of God as influencing the will. The place to which I refer is p.. 83. "We freely grant," says Mr. B. "that the sinner does not take one step towards salvation, until divine grace moves. him thereto, by enlightening his understanding, and by influ encing his will." What can be meant by God's influencing the will, in addition to his enlightening the understanding? It is obvious that my opponent has here made a distinction between the understanding, and the will; and between enlightening, and influencing. But what did he mean by influencing the will! Did he mean no direct operation of the spirit of God, giving the heart a right disposition? If he did not mean as much as this, he could mean no more by influencing the will, than by enlightening the understanding. There are only these two ways in which we can conceive of rational creatures being moved and drawn to their duty the one, by light (i. e. knowledge of truth and duty,) communicated to the understanding; the other, by direct influence upon the will, giving it an inclination to comply with duty. Now, if Mr. B. meant, by influ encing the will," any thing more than "enlightening the understanding," he must have meant that for which we contend,. viz. a direct divine influence on the heart. But we do not see how he can consistently plead against us, that we entirely destroy the free agency of man, by representing him as altogether de. pendent on God for his exercises of heart, while he acknow. ledges some of this dependence, and yet believes in man's entire freedom. If divine influence upon the will of man had any tendency to destroy his free agency, then a little of this influ ence would partly destroy it. It is so with external force ap plied to the body. If I am, in this sense, resisted in a small degree, my natural liberty is, to just as great a degree, impaired. If therefore divine influence on the will operated in the same way, to abridge moral liberty, or free agency, the least influence would impair it. And we do not see but there would be the same kind of inconsistence in impairing,, as in destroying the free agency of the creature.

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does not shine. If God make the light, then light is not light. But it will be said, the light has no moral qualities, and is no more worthy of praise than dark. ness. It is acknowledged that light and darkness have no moral qualities, but it is not because they are made, that they are destitute of them. Things have just such qualities as the Creator has given them. He has not given light and darkness moral qualities, but he has given them different properties, and by these different properties they are distinguished. He has made men free agents, and therefore they are free agents. He has made his angels holy spirits, and therefore they are holy. It is as certain that angels and saints are what the Creator has made them, as that the sun and moon are what the Creator has made them. Is not this a singular mode of reasoning, to say, If God made things so, then they are not so. In the account which Moses gives us of the work of the Creator in the first chapter in the Bible, we are taught, that from day to day he formed one and another part of the creation, and it qvas 80; i. e.. as he willed it to be, and as he made it, so it was. This was as true of the sixth day's work, as of the work of any other day. On that day he made man after his own image; he made a moral agent, and he made him with a character, even a holy character; else how could it be said, that he made him after his own image? And who will say, that if God made him holy, then he was not holy; or that his holiness did nothing towards rendering him worthy of the complacency of his Maker? Who will dare to say, on supposition, that the Creator formed Adam's holy charac ter, as much as he formed the sun, that then there was nothing more of a moral nature in the light of holiness in Adam's heart, than there was in the light of the natural sun? And if Adam could come into existence with a character for which he was entirely dependent on his Creator, there is no absurdity in supposing such dependence should be continued, and he continue to possess a character. The idea is this; that it would be no more inconsistent for God, after he had created him,. to continue to work in him both to will and to do, than to bring him into existence with a will, and with a choice in favor of holiness..

We all do well to remember, that God is greater than man. His ways are above our ways as the heavens are higher than the earth. We cannot originate

any existence, no, not the least particle of dust; but shall we argue hence, that God cannot do this, when we see that he has originated a world? From materials which the Creator has put into our hands, we can form many curious pieces of mechanism; but we cannot form any thing which shall have reason, or approach towards it; but the Creator has made an innu merable multitude of rational creatures, who are endued with all the faculties necessary to constitute them free and accountable agents. If we act upon a fellowcreature, to cause him to move, we destroy the freedom of his action; for we cannot act upon his will, to cause him to choose; but God can act upon our heart with as much ease as upon our body; he can work in us both to will, and to do.*

This part of our subject will reflect light on the case of "the stern judge," introduced by Mr. B. pp. 19, 20, 21. He has endeavored to make our doctrine of Divine Decrees, and Divine Agency in executing the Decrees, appear to be glaringly absurd, by introducing a criminal who stands trembling before the bar of a stern judge, expecting to be condemned for committing a murder, which the judge himself had planned, and which he secretly influenced him to execute. To remove this seeming difficulty, let us remember, there is an infinite disparity between God and man in this thing. In the treatment of a character already formed, the resemblance is great between a human judge, and the Judge of all the earth. The Supreme Judge is bound by his holiness, to pass sentence according to his law, and according to the character of his creatures. He is no respecter of persons, and is a perfect pattern for all who sit in the judgment seat to pass sentence on their fellow men.

But with respect to creating rational beings, and determining and forming their characters, there is no resemblance be tween a human, and the Divine Judge. It is no part of the: work of a human judge to create rational beings, and form their characters: Yet the Supreme Judge claims this as his prerogative. Concerning one he says, "I will harden his heart" and to others he says, "I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh." As far as men are said to do any thing towards forming a wicked character, it is meant, that they take the part of wickedness. Thus it is said concerning Jeroboam the son of Nebat, that he sinned, and made Israel to sin. His feelings, his laws, and his example, were all in faver

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But some man will say, it is not my choice, unless I choose this choice. To this it may be replied: This plan will make you no more free, unless you had a previous choice, which chose this choice. On this

of idolatry. But nothing like this is intended, when the Divine Being is said to form evil characters. When he is said to harden the hearts of men, we do not obtain the idea that he has any hardness in his own heart; or that he has made any laws, or given his creatures any examples, in favor of wickedness. Still he is represented as having a design and agency in forming the character of his creatures, as much as a potter has in giving shape and size to his vessels.

We have already intimated that there is nothing among men, which can be compared to the great I AM, in giving existence to moral agents, and in governing that agency itself; yet the impropriety of our finding fault with our Maker for forming our character as he has, is forcibly inferred from the shocking idea which would be excited in our minds, by hearing the child complain to his parents for bringing him into existence such a child; or the thing formed complain of its former for making it thus. "Wo unto him that striveth with his maker: let the potsherd strive with the potsherds of the earth: shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands? Wo unto him that saith unto his father, What begettest thou? or to the woman, What hast thou brought forth?" Isa. xlv. 9, 10. The same ideas are very fully expressed in the following passage: "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto me, Why doth he yet find fault for who hath resisted his will? Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? Rom. ix. 1821. What can give a more striking idea of the absolute dependence of created intelligents for all their devices conceived and executed, than the following interrogations: axe boast itself against him that heweth or shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it as if the rod should shake itself against him that lifteth it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself, as if it were no wood." Isa. x. 15. The Assyrian monarch who is here represented by the axe, the saw, and the staff, was as completely in the hand of God, as these tools are in the hand of the workman. If he died with the same character which is ascribed to him in this chapter, he will stand as a trembling criminal before the bar of the su preme Judge. Murder, wilful murder will be proved; not the murder of one man, but of "nations not a few." (See v 7.) The Judge will not pretend that this man did not depend

"Shall the