his posterity while in a state of perfect innocence." Here let it be remarked; That it is no worse for God to decree a thing from all eternity, than to decree it one moment before it takes place; for he was as able to decree well then, as now; so that the decree being from all eternity, and " a decree, the date of which is lost in eternity," is nothing more against it than though it were but now determined. Here I might ask my antagonist, whether there is any inconsistency in this, That God should have determined before he made angels and men, that he would make them, and that he would make them after his own image, and that when they should exist in this perfect state, he would treat them according to their character? But would not this be justifying them as righteous characters, before they possessed such characters, i. e. before they existed? Yet I presume there is no difficulty attending the case stated; for God calleth things which are not as though they were. Let us now contemplate our world as all involved in apostasy, and let us suppose that God has determined to bring many of them to repentance and to glory. Does this imply that God justifies the wicked while they remain wicked; and that he takes them to heaven in their sins, because that while they are in their sins, he forms his determination to save them? There is no difficulty in the case which Mr. B. has started, any more than in the cases which I have now introduced, except that which relates to God's foreordaining the sin of men and angels: and this difficulty has already been considered.

4. The author of the Letters urges this argument against the doctrine under consideration; That it represents God as very weak and deficient in his understanding. "Here you reduce," says Mr. B. " the infinitely wise God to the level of an ignorant mechanic, who cannot see the end from the beginning without a prescribed plan. I conclude his own infinite mind is sufficient to guide him in all his multifarious works and ways, without any previously devised "plan or scheme." p. 21. I ask whether an increase of knowledge diminishes the use and necessity of a plan. It evidently makes it much easier to lay a plan. The knowledge may be so great, as to enable one to lay his

plan in a moment but without a plan, I think it must be as impossible for such an architect as Sir Christopher Wren, to build an edifice, as for the most ignorant workman ; and that, without a previous plan, it would be as difficult for such an accomplished architect, to build a regular cottage, as to build that spacious and noble edifice, St. Paul's Church in London. As far as we have any idea of wisdom in our world, it does not consist in acting without plan or system, but in laying a good plan, and then, as far as such a plan is good, in adhering to it. And when the scriptures speak of God as acting systematically, they manifestly speak of it to his honor. To this purpose suffer me to quote Isa. xlvi. 9, 10, " I am God, and there is none like me ; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure.'

Under the present objection against foreordination, we may introduce what is said against this doctrine on account of its sullying the glory of the divine prescience. "Another reason why your inconsistent doctrine sullies the glory of infinite wisdom is, that it supposes it im possible for God to foresee what will be, unless he predetermine it shall be. The doctrine espoused by us acknowledges, not only that his infinite prescience seeth what will be, but also all that may, and might have been." pp. 22, 23. Let this matter be candidly investigated. Mr. B. and his brethren, I presume, do not suppose that God foreknows what might have been, in the same sense as he foreknows what will be; i. e. he did not foreknow them both as events which would actually happen. But how came there to be any dif ference between the two; even so much difference, that one only might have been, and the other actually will be? Why did not the might be event actually exist? For an illustration of this matter;-God saw that the earth might have had two moons, instead of one; but he saw that it would actually have but one. But what was there to make the latter certain, while the other only might have been? It was not the foreknowledge of its certainty, for this foreknowledge of its certainty implies a previous certainty. It would be foolish to say, that the reason why the earth is attended

by one satellite, in distinction from two, was this; that the Creator foresaw that while it might have had two, it would actually have but one. Is it not more intelligible, and much more honorable to God, to say, that the reason why the Creator foresaw there would be one, and only one, was this; that he determined to make one, and no more. He saw he could make two, or ten; but he saw that it would be best to make but one.

"To say, that his prescience depends on his prede termination, is to suppose a time when the Almighty did not possess infinite knowledge." p. 23. Let this objection be examined: There is a difference between knowledge and foreknowledge. Every thing belonging to the Supreme Being is eternal. We read of "his eternal purpose." His eternal foreknowledge is impli ed in that passage, Acts xv. 18; "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world ;" or from eternity, as the Greek might be rendered. "His understanding is infinite," and of course, it is eternal The knowledge, foreknowledge, and purpose, are from eternity, yet they possess such a relation to each other, that one must be conceived of as existing in the order of nature, though not in the order of time, before the other. First we must conceive of a Being of infinite understanding, employing this understand ing to discover the best manner of operating; to see what system would bring most glory to the Creator, and most good to the creature. Here we may con ceive of all possible systems passing before him By all possible systems, I mean all the systems which he had power to originate, provided he saw fit to originate them; and not that it was possible that any one of them should exist, without he saw fit to give it existence. His infinite knowledge was fully able to make a selection from all possible systems of that which was best. This system which his knowledge saw would be the best, his infinite goodness constrained him to choose. He did freely choose it. He said, Let it be! It was his will that it should come into existence. This is what the scripture calls the counsel, decree, purpose, or determination of God. Next in the order of nature, we conceive of his prescience, or foreknowledge of the existence of this system, and of every part of it, in that

very order in which he saw it was best it should come into existence. There never was a time when the in finite Mind had not this knowledge, this purpose, and this foreknowledge; and yet we cannot conceive of them except in this order, without confusing our ideas of the subject. Certainly we ought not to conceive of God, as determining to bring a system of creation and providence into existence, which he did not see to be a good one, yea, even the best which could exist. And certainly we cannot conceive of God as foreknowing that a certain system, in distinction from all other possible systems, would actually go into operation, without conceiving of him as first determining, that this very system should be brought into operation.

It is far from giving a more exalted conception of the Most High, to represent his prescience as independent of his purpose; for it seems to go upon the supposition, that there was from eternity some other being, or thing, to give certainty to the existence of a world, and to the existence of the various events which should happen. We can foreknow things which we have not predetermined, and concerning which we have no purpose, because there is a Being above us, whose purposes will not be broken off. These pur

poses he can, if he please, reveal to us, as he has done with respect to the reign of Christ on the earth, the fall of Babylon, the day of judgment, &c. Now we have a foreknowledge of these events which are to happen. But if there were no being in the universe, who had purposed that there should be a Millennium, and a day of judgment, then no being in the universe could have a prescience of these things. It is just as absurd to say that God foreknew there would a world come into existence, independently of his determination to create one, as to say, that he foreknew that thing would be, which would never be. Nor is it any less absurd, to suppose that he foreknew what events would occur after the world was made, without having laid a plan for the government of the world.

Mr. B. and other Arminians suppose, that the predictions of the scriptures are wholly built on the divine prescience;-that God has no plan concerning future events, but only foresees what those events will be. Let

us consult a few of these predictions, that we may determine whether they are mere manifestations of intellectual strength in the Divine Being. The prophecies which went before the coming of Christ; were they mere displays of foreknowledge? Did they only prove that God foresaw there would be a Saviour?" But unto you that fear my name shall the sun of righteousness arise, with healing in his wings." Mal. iv. 2. “I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren like unto thee." Deut. xviii. 18. So the predictions concerning John the Baptist, appear to be some-. thing more than foreknowledge: "Behold I send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me." Mal. iii. 1. When in the 46th chapter of Isaiah, Jehovah is asserting his real divinity, in opposition to all the idols of the heathen, he brings forward this as one proof; that he declared the end from the beginningand then proceeds to say, "My counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure: calling a ravenous bird from the east, the man that executeth my counsel from a far country: yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it." From this it appears, that the end, which the living and true God declared from the beginning, was his counsel, and was that counsel which was to be executed by the ravenous bird from the east :--It was his purpose, and what he would bring to pass. Much the same language is used, Isa. xiv. 24; "The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand." We have a specimen of the language of divine prediction in Ezek. xxxviii. 16; "And thou shalt come against my people of Israel, as a cloud to cover the land, it shall be in the latter days, and I will bring thee against my land, &c." These and numerous other prophecies of the Bible, are couched in language which implies, that God has a purpose to accomplish by the events which are foretold.

5. It is objected against a divine predetermination about every thing, that it gives us diminutive views of the high and lofty One. This is implied in a sentence which I have already quoted from p. 15. "If every event which comes to pass is brought to pass by God's