FROM THE PHÆ'DON.-ON IMMORTALITY.

Since it is not possible to know anything rightly while we are in the body, one of two things must be true. Either we shall never know anything, or we shall have true knowledge after our death; for then, and not till then, will the soul act independently of the body. And during life we shall ever come nearest to true knowledge if we have as little as possible to do with the body, which is not absolutely necessary; if we do not allow its nature to dominate over us, but keep ourselves from its taint till God himself shall liberate us from it. And then, purged from its absurdities, we shall be in the company, as I trust, of others who are in the same condition, and shall know the pure essence of things; that is, as I judge, the truth. But those who are not pure themselves cannot attain to what is pure.

It is right to bear in mind this, that if the soul be immortal it requires our care, not only during the time that we call life, but for all time and great is our danger if we neglect it. If death were the end of all, it would be a gain for the wicked to get rid of their body and of their wickedness at the same time, when their soul departs. But since the soul is immortal there is no hold for it except to make it good and wise, for it carries nothing with it into the other world but the preparations which it has received here.

FROM THE SYMPOSIUM.-IDEAL BEAUTY.

And the true order of going or being led by others to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps, along which we mount upward for the sake of the higher beauty; going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms; and from fair forms to fair actions; and from fair actions to fair notions; until from fair notions we arrive at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last know what the essence of beauty is. This is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute, a beauty which, if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold and garments and fair youths; which, when you now behold, you are in fond amazement; and you, and many a one, are content to live seeing only and conversing with them; without meat or drink, if that were possible.

But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty, the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed; not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human

life; thither looking and holding converse with the true beauty divine and simple; and bringing into being and educating true creations of virtue, and not idols only? Do you not see that in that communion, only beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, we will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities,— for we have hold not of an image, but of a reality,- and bringing forth and educating true virtue, to become the friend of God, if mortal man may? Would that be an ignoble life?

FROM THE PARMENIDES.-THE NATURE OF IDEAS.

Socrates. But may not the ideas be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite subdivision.

Parmenides. And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?

Soc. That is impossible.

Par. The thought must be of something?

Soc. Yes.

Par. Of something that is, or is not?

Soc. Of something that is.

Par. Must it be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all being?

Soc. Yes.

Par. And will not this something, so apprehended, which is always the same, be an idea?

Soc. From that again there is no escape.

Par. Then if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say, either that everything is made up of these, and that all things think; or that these are thoughts having no thought?

Soc. But that, Parmenides, is no more rational than the other. The more probable view is that the ideas are patterns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and resemblances of them; and that what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

FROM THE LYSIS. FRIENDSHIP.

But first of all I must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies. Some desire horses, and others dogs; some are

fond of gold, and others of honor. Now I have no violent desire for any of these things; but I have a passion for friends; and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world;—I would even go further and say, than a horse or a dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Dari'us, or even to Darius himself. I am such a lover of friends as that.-Jowett.

ARISTOTLE.

BORN 384 B.C.

Aristotle, the first of Grecian scientists, and sharing with Plato the loftiest place in ancient philosophy, was born at Stagi'ra, a Grecian colonial town in Thrace. His father was physician to Amyn'tas II, grandfather of Alexander the Great, and the practice of physic seems to have been hereditary in his family. Early education in this direction may have given him his future taste for dissection and other studies in natural history. Losing his parents in early youth, he is said by some to have squandered his patrimony in dissipation, though others assert that he became a pupil of Plato at the age of seventeen. It was not long before his vigorous intellect made itself felt, under the lead of this skillful teacher; so much so that Plato is said to have spoken of him as the "mind of the school," declaring that "Xenocrates needed the spur and Aristotle the bit."

He remained in Athens, under the instruction of Plato, for twenty years; but of his life during this period we only know that he set up a class of rhetoric in opposition to the celebrated orator Isocrates, whose teachings he seems to have attacked with great severity. It has been charged that he displayed jealousy and ingratitude toward Plato, but this appears to be not well substantiated.

After the death of Plato, in 347 B.C., Aristotle left Athens, retiring to Atarn'eus, in Asia Minor.

Here he

lived for three years in close friendship with Hermi'as, the ruler of that town. After Hermias had been betrayed into the hands of his enemies, the Persians, Aristotle proceeded to Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, taking with him Pyth'ias, the niece of Hermias, whom he made his wife. In the year 342 he was invited by Philip of Macedonia, to take charge of the education of his son Alexander, then thirteen years of age. He was received at the Macedonian court with great honor and respect, remaining the friend and tutor of the future conqueror until 334 B.C., the period of Alexander's expedition to Asia.

After this event Aristotle returned to Athens and opened a school called the Lyce'um from whose shady walks his sect received the name of the Peripatetic. His principal writings were probably composed during this period, though we know nothing of their dates. It appears to have been his habit, in his morning lectures, to instruct his more advanced pupils in the profoundest problems of philosophy, and to give popular instruction to a more general audience in the evening.

After twelve years thus spent the anti-Macedonian party obtained ascendancy at Athens, one of its first acts being to accuse Aristotle of impiety to the Gods. In order to escape a fate similar to that of Socrates he fled to Chalcis in the early part of the year 322. In this town he died in the autumn of the same year, aged sixty-two.

Aristotle left a vast number of writings, of which perhaps a fourth, but unquestionably the most valuable portion, has come down to us. They are, however, largely fragmentary in form, and often so confused and contradictory that it is possible we have only his oral lectures, as written down and subsequently edited by his scholars. These works may be classed under the various heads of rhetoric, poetry, politics, ethics, physics, mathematics, logic, and metaphysics.

The genius of Aristotle was as wide as Nature itself. He studied all things; both absorbing the preceding learning of the Greeks and extending the boundaries of knowledge on all sides until his works attained an encyclopedic extent. He not only treated on all existing subjects of thought, but created new worlds in the domain of science for his active mind to conquer. Thus logic may be said to owe its existence to him, and was so exhaustively treated that not until the present century has any addition been made to it.

In his philosophic conceptions he differs widely from Plato, keenly combating the theory of ideas and teaching that experience is the only true basis of knowledge, and that all reasoning must be founded upon the existing facts of nature. This theory of induction he has carried into practical effect in his great work on animals, in which he has gathered a large stock of genuine observations, and deduced from them a system of zoological classification which remains the groundwork of all modern systems. He has also written largely on the human body and mind, viewing man as the end to which all nature is constantly tending; while his studies in mental science remain valuable even at the present day.

In rhetoric and the principles of poetry he has given us the earliest philosophy of criticism, his views on these subjects being still studied. One of his greatest works is that on politics. It differs widely from Plato's Republic, being based on actual observation and historical study, he having himself collected one hundred and fifty-eight different constitutions of states, from which he deduced the just principles of existing politics, in contradistinction to the ideal system of Plato.

He has left, moreover, valuable treatises on physiology, metaphysics and ethics, being the originator of the first of these sciences, and in the last treating of virtue from