what agreements we are going to make with the Japanese in this matter? They are not joining with us, are they? I mean this is bilateral insofar as the Japanese and the United States is concerned? Mr. NASH. This is wholly bilateral, but I know of no British antagonism or opposition to the idea. Mr. SMITH. Is that so? Mr. NASH. Yes, sir. STATEMENT OF KENNETH T. YOUNG, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. YOUNG. The British Government is in favor with our position, a gradual development of Japanese defense forces. The only people concerned are the Australians and New Zealanders, for obvious reasons. They think back to 10 years ago and they emphasize to us that they would like to be kept informed and they would like to be sure that Japan does not too rapidly get the major means of aggression-that is, strategic bombers and aircraft carriers, but that is so far in the future it is not necessary to think about it. Mr. BENTLEY. What are the treaty limitations on the Japanese armaments industries? Mr. YOUNG. I do not believe there is any. Mr. BENTLEY. They can manufacture anything in the way of war materials they care to? Mr. YOUNG. Yes, sir. (Discussion off the record.) Chairman CHIPERFIELD. If we go down there and say we are arming the Japs again, watch out. Mr. Woop. I think you can say that we are planning to request aid for the arming of the Japanese safety force under the MDAP. Mr. NASH. The terminology is important. You have to explain what you want the money for. Mr. WOOD. That can be said publicly, can it not? Mr. YOUNG. May I explain this just very briefly, Mr. Chairman: The words that the Japanese use are very important. They may seem irrelevant to us, but the Japanese use the phrase, "self-defense," or "defense army," when they refer to the national security forces of 110,000. When the Japanese use the word "rearmament," both in the press and general conversation, they are thinking of an army of 500,000 or a million, and aircraft carriers-the old army that they had, the old Imperial Army. That is the kind of rearmament they do not want. We use the word "rearmament" inspeaking of rearming our own country or Great Britain or France or something like that, but I think it can be said on the floor that we are talking about a defense force for Japan and the home island. Mr. WOOD. May I suggest we get up a statement which will be unclassified and which can be used on the floor in discussing this question. Could you undertake that, Mr. Young, and put it in the record of the hearings of this committee? Mrs. BOLTON. And anything you can give us on some of these other secret areas. Mr. NASH. The Middle East, I think we have to do the same thing. Mr. WOOD. I think we have to do the same thing on all of these. I quite agree and we will undertake to do that. (The information requested is as follows:) Of all the Far East nations, Japan possesses the most advanced industry and the greatest reservoir of technical skills and commercial experience. Thus, she is in position to contribute positively and substantially not only to the strengthening of the security of the free nations of the Pacific but also to the raising of living standards in that area. United States policies with respect to Japan are directed toward the following objectives: An independent Japan, politically stable, economically viable, and capable of contributing to its own defense and that of other free nations of the Pacific. During the first year of its independence the Japanese Government has consistently held that Japan's foreign policy is based on cooperation with the United States and other free nations. The primary factors supporting Japan's continued cooperation with the United States and the free world are the awareness of both Government and people of the danger of Communist subversion and aggression, the stability and conservative character of its political and social institutions, the close political, economic, and cultural ties with the United States, the development of constructive relations with other free nations in the Pacific area, and its active interest in participation in international organizations. As the Secretary of State pointed out in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Mctual Security Program on May 5, "Japan is one of the prime targets of Communist expansion in the Far East." The security treaty between the United States and Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, recognized the threat of possible aggression against Japan and Japan's inability at that time to providə adequately for its own defense. The treaty therefore provided for the stationing of United States forces in Japan. The treaty also expressed the expectation that Japan would “increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense.” The Japanese have gradually been taking steps to assume part of this responsibility. The development of Japanese defense forces were initiated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers during the occupation when he authorized the establishment of a 75-000-man Japanese National Police Reserve in July 1950. On October 15, 1952, following Diet approval, the National Safety Agency was established, bringing within one organ the National Safety Force (formerly the National Police Reserve) with an authorized strength of 110.000 men, the Coastal Safety Force, and the Maritime Safety Board. The National Safety Force has been provided on a loan basis with equipment by the United States. The United States has also trained the National Safety Force in the use of this equipment. The United States Government is presently making available on a loan basis to the Japanese Government for the use of the Coastal Safety Force 18 patrol frigates and 50 landing craft in accordance with Public Law 467. The Charter Party Agreement defining the terms of this arrangement was approved by the Japanese Diet. The Japanese Government appropriated the equivalent of $500 million for defense for their fiscal year 1952-53 (year ending March 31, 1953). This was approximately 20 percent of the total national budget. Included in this appropriation was the yen equivalent of $155 million for support of United States forces stationed in Japan. Only about $300 million of the funds appropriated for defense were actually obligated during the year, the balance being carried over into the current fiscal year. About two-thirds of the unobligated defense funds were for construction of facilities for United States forces, contracts for which were delayed by the difficulties of locating appropriate sites and negotiating contract terms. In addition to the yen appropriated for the use of United States forces, the Japanese Government made available real estate and facilities with an annual rental value of approximtely $30 million. It is estimated that funds to be made available for defense for this year, including the carryover funds from fiscal year 1952-53, will again be on the order of $500 million. Thus we believe that the Japanese Government and people have made the basic decision that they have a national responsibility for their own defense. and they have already assumed a substantial rart of the cost of that defense. We have undertaken to assist them, to date, through providing military equipment and other assistance under Department of Defense appropriations. How ever, it is desirable, now that Japan has regained its independence, to bring our military assistance to Japan into conformity with the global pattern—that is, through the Mutual Security Program. The provision of such military assistance will not foster a revival of Japanese militarism or aggression. The forces envisaged under this program are purely of a defensive nature, directed exclusively toward contributing to the defense and internal security of the Japanese homeland. The development of forces of this nature cannot be described as "rearmament" with the implication that such forces would constitute a revival of the militaristic clique, the loss of civilian leadership, and embarkation on the course of aggression. This force is small, purely of a defensive nature, and subject to civilian control. To date, the establishment of the National Safety Agency, the receipt of equipment from the United States, and the training of men in the use of such equipment have raised no constitutional problem in Japan. However, it is possible that at some point the extent and nature of these forces may create certain constitutional problems for the Japanese. We are confident that they can meet this problem adequately in their own way. The proposed inclusion of Japan in the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1954 is designed to place us in a position to be able to continue to assist Japan in the development of a self-defense force through the provision of additional military equipment which cannot be financed by the Japanese Government. The provision of such assistance is based on the premise underlying the Mutual Security legislation: That through mutual effort the security of the free world can be insured. It is natural that the Japanese are interested in developing their capacity for self-defense. However, the development of this capacity for self-defense is in the interest of the United States and the other nations of the free world as well. The strength of the free world is dependent on the strength of every member. In more practical terms, the assumption of increasing responsibility by the Japanese for their own defense relieves the United States of the financial burden which is involved in stationing its forces and their dependents in a foreign land. In addition, the development of Japanese defense forces will permit the gradual withdrawal of United States forces, thus eliminating the friction which always exists when foreign forces are stationed in another sovereign country. In this connection it is also important to note that in the treaty of peace with Japan the Allied Powers recognized that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective-security arrangements. The free nations support the idea of Japan taking measures to develop its capacity for self-defense so long as these measures are not directed toward a revival of Japanese militarism or aggression. Mrs. CHURCH. Last week when the question of Japan came up, Mr. Nash, there were some of us disturbed about the intellectual dishonesty of rearming behind the backs of the Japanese people. Do you feel the Japanese people themselves want this, or is it a bilateral agreement with Japanese leaders that we will do something if they do something and then attempt to sell it to the Japanese people? Mr. NASH. Mrs. Church, when you were out we went into that in some detail. The Japanese people have to be sold the proposition that as a matter of national pride-they are a very proud people-they want to take on or should want to take on their own defense. They do not want the United States to be there, assuming we settle the Korean thing, which I hope to God we can, but we will have to keep a strong defense of Japan even if we do come to terms in Korea. The Japanese people, I think, would rather, because of their own pride, take care of their own security interests, and certainly would not want us to be occupying them, as we would be, for the next 5 or 10 years. Mrs. CHURCH. I am not interested in the semantics behind all this. What do the words cover? Do we have an agreement with anybody in Japan now that if we appropriate this money they will start to do this? Mr. NASH. We will have to have a bilateral agreement with Japan just as we do with any other country under MDAP. Mrs. CHURCH. Do we have that now? Mr. NASH. No, we do not. Mrs. CHURCH. Have we taken preliminary steps toward getting it? Mr. NASH. Yes, we have. Mrs. CHURCH. You spoke of changing the name. Why should they not change the name? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. NASH. Semantics are important. However, this is basic: The defense force in Japan is all that we in the Pentagon are urging the Japanese to develop. As Mr. Young says, Australia and New Zealand do not want to see strategic air, battleships, and atomic missiles developed in Japan. There is no need for that. We want to develop in Japan an army just the size that we think is necessary for that long stretch of islands that they have to defend. Such an army can honestly be called a national security, or police, or safety force. We do not want any navy of combatant ships for Japan. We want a small navy of the dimensions of our Coast Guard with an augmentation in the minesweeping field because this is a serious thing that will lock the harbors of Japan if it is not provided for. (Discussion off the record.) Mrs. CHURCH. When will the Japanese economy be able to take over the full burden of this defense police force? Mr. NASH. I am in a field where I do not know enough to estimate the years. The riddle of Japan's economy is industrial outlets. If we can find the markets for Japan, in places other than Communist China, Japan has the potential of building up a gross national income that could easily support this. See what she supported in the way of a much greater force that they threw at us at Pearl Harbor. Mrs. CHURCH. I think you are the best artillery we could take to the floor, Mr. Nash. Mr. NASH. Ma'am, I would like to go. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Nash. We have Mr. Kersten at 1: 45 and then you people at 2:30. (Whereupon, at 12: 40 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 1: 45 p. m., the same day.) AFTERNOON SESSION Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will be in order. We are glad to have you here, Mr. Kersten. I see that you have a statement. Would you care to proceed with your statement? STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES J. KERSTEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN Mr. KERSTEN. I would, Mr. Chairman, if I may. Ladies and gentlemen, I deem it a great honor and privilege to appear before this great committee of the House which for the past several years has had and presently has such heavy responsibilities regarding the security of the United States. I would like to confine my remarks to that portion of section 101 (a) subsection (1) of title I of the Mutual Security Act pertaining to escapees which provision, as you know, it was my privilege to sponsor in 1951, when the bill came before the House, and on which occasion. it was heartily supported by members of the committee on both sides and by the House when it was presented. Primarily for the self-preservation of the United States and also in behalf of the free world there are two compelling reasons why we must adopt a vigorous and comprehensive policy to aid the liberation of the slave world. These reasons are: 1. Masked by the smokescreen of a worldwide peace offensive the U. S. S. R. is digesting its fabulous conquests and is welding the Soviet and satellite peoples into a military force meant for aggression. 2. The Soviets have acquired the atomic bomb and they have the power to deliver it upon Ainerican cities. It is this military force under Soviet control, therefore, that is the sole reason for the Mutual Security Program, almost all of the 73 percent of our defense budget which the President told us about last night, the NATO program and most of the economic strictures of the free world. More than that, this same military force mortgages the lives of your youth and will continue to mortgage their lives for many yearsmany decades-and if we follow the path of history this Communist military power will ultimately be locked in battle with free world armies in world war III. Who can deny that we are now engaged in an unprecedented arms race and that we are approaching the crescendo of a world siege that cannot long remain quiescent? Behind this Soviet military force we know there is a comparatively small but extremely efficient group of evil men who intend to use it to destroy civilization as we know it. Without this military force these evil men would be powerless to effect their designs against mankind. They say that one of the reasons for the great power of His Satanic Majesty is that many otherwise intelligent people refuse to believe he exists. Certain it is that the Communist conspiracy gains enormous power because far too many people simply refuse to believe the reality of its incredible malice. This is understandable because normal and good people rarely understand the workings of the clever criminal mind because they rarely come in contact with it. But, by virtue of their congressional duties, a number of men in this Congress and certainly on this committee have come in direct contact with it and they have come to know the Communist apparatus and its dedicated members for what they are. They have come to know how Communists act when they come to power. President Eisenhower, in his great speeches last fall at the WaldorfAstoria Hotel in New York and also before the last American Legion National Convention, demonstrated that he, too, knows the Communists for what they are. This tremendous military force, therefore, is the weapon in the hands of men of boundless injustice, boundless violence, and boundless lying and deception which gives them their abominable strength. 33064-53--67 |