could offer more inducements to people who now feel they have to trade with the Red bloc? In my opinion, what is sold to Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, is just as effective as what you sell Communist China. It may be less glamorous, but it is just as effective. Is it not a fact if we afforded better alternatives, we would really be doing a telling job insofar as cutting down what is called normal trade, which is fortifying their economy? Mr. STASSEN. That is correct. Mr. JAVITS. And therefore, that is a very major additional argument to all of the arguments which the President and the administration are already making on that score; is it not? Mr. STASSEN. That is correct. Mr. JAVITS. Which would be very helpful to us. For example, I notice that power equipment is on the strategic list. It is highly strategic, is it not? Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Mr. JAVITS. Yet when somebody tries to sell us power equipment cheaper than we can buy it, even in the United States, we do not buy it. We had a recent example of that. Mr. STASSEN. The Buy American Act which was passed in 1933, and which has been on the books ever since, came into effect in that transaction. Mr. JAVITS. Is it not so that those who cry the loudest about how we have to bear down on the Communists, have to allow some leeway on this question of our domestic imports restrictions if we are going to be equipped to do it effectively? Mr. STASSEN. I would be the last to say that any member of Congress has to give any ground. I would say it is a matter of his own consideration of the total situation in the reaching of his own conclusions. Mr. JAVITS. I did not mean he would yield anything, but there has to be some compromise in policy because of these other considerations. Mr. STASSEN. You cannot separate an attitude on east-west trade controls, for example, from an attitude on United States trade. You cannot separate the two and still be logical. If that is your point, you are entirely correct. Mr. JAVITS. Thank you. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Dr. Judd. Mr. JUDD. Is there available to us anywhere a list of the countries that are cooperating and a list of the countries that we have sought to get to cooperate, but which have refused? You mentioned for example, Poland, and we would expect her not to cooperate, but is there available either to the committee or to the public, anything regarding countries on our side? I think the public of America, ought to know which countries are playing ball and which are not. Mr. STASSEN. Well the Ceylon case is well known and is one of the most important ones. Mr. JUDD. We know of certain instances, but why should it not be known to our people all of the countries which are cooperating and those from whom we have sought to get cooperation and for some reason they have refused? Mr. STASSEN. We have rather thought that the increased cooperation is mounting so rapidly in these last three months in the approach of the new administration, that we ought to make certain whether or not they will cooperate with the new policies before we expose them to any public irritation over the situation, and thereby perhaps decrease the opportunity for future cooperation rather than otherwise. I would say if we reach a point where we feel there is a serious lack of cooperation in spite of our best efforts to present the facts and persuade them, then we may reach a point where we would discuss pubhely some of these situations. Mr. JUDD. I am glad to hear you say that because that is a middle ground between just merely friendly representations on the one hand, and coercion on the other. Mr. STASSEN. Yes. Mr. JUDD. There are other measures short of coercion or blockade which are forms of pressure, but which it seems to me, are not only justifiable but necessary when there is refusal to cooperate. Mr. STASSEN. That is a very wise observation, but I hope you would agree that we in effect, should give a new opportunity to the new administration to see how far they can go, especially since they have been making such rapid progress, by the normal diplomacy before we take other methods. Mr. JUDD. If it is being pursued vigorously as you have assured us this morning it is. Mr. STASSEN. Yes. Mr. JUDD. Now the question of blockade. Up until Korea, the Chinese Government on Formosa was maintaining a fairly effective blockade of the mainland. One of our admirals over there told me it was up to 85 or 90 percent effective. When Communists were not at war with us, they were blockaded. As soon as they went to war with us, we forced the Chinese Government on Formosa to stop the blockade so that the Communists could get more weapons and munitions to shoot at us. Is it possible to say that the blockade by the Chinese Government on Formosa has been reinstituted to some degree? Mr. STASSEN. It is proper to say that to some degree. I would hesitate to describe the degree. Mr. JUDD. As far as we are concerned, we are no longer prohibiting their doing what they can? Mr. STASSEN. No. You will remember one of the first and important foreign policy actions the President took was to change the orders to the United States 7th Fleet. Now in appraising what the Chinese Nationalists can then do, you have in mind that the strength of the Chinese Communists in the air has changed from 2 years ago, so that what the Chinese Nationalists can effectively do now is somewhat influenced by the matter of the counter-strength that has been developed by the Chinese Communists. Mr. JUDD. But the Chinese Nationalists are still not hesitating to stop Polish or Czechoslovakian or other vessels if they have the capacity to? Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Mr. BURLESON. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. BURLESON. You do not mean to say, Dr. Judd, that the Nationalists were controlling the coast of China to the extent of 85 percent before this happened? Mr. JUDD. Certainly they were. Talk to the admiral in charge out there, of the Asiatic Fleet. Mr. BURLESON. Did they say what they were doing it with? Mr. JUDD. They were doing it with vessels which we gave them by act of Congress shortly after World War II. Mr. BURLESON. Where are the vessels now? Mr. JUDD. Most of them are there, but we forced them to quit using them against Communist China. We did not want to offend the enemy. Mr. BURLESON. Four old destroyers, two frigates, a few landing craft and sampans? Mr. JUDD. Yes, and about 130 other vessels, as I recall. Mr. BURLESON. They were controlling over 2,000 miles of the coast of China and blockading it effectively to the extent of 85 percent? Mr. JUDD. There were only 2 or 3 major ports where vessels were going in. They did not call it a blockade, but a port closure. That operated effectively because up until the British and the Indians and some other countries recognized Communist China, the Nationalist Government was in control, officially and legally of its own ports, and it closed its ports of Shanghai and so forth. It was 85 to 90 percent effective. You do not need to argue with me. I was not there. I suggest you consult the admiral who was in charge of our Asiatic Fleet. Mr. BURLESON. I would like to ask the Governor what he thinks. Mr. FULTON. Is this public information, I should ask? Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Judd has said it 100 times. Mr. FULTON. I mean officially. Mr. JUDD. Certainly, and I am going to keep on saying it. Mr. FULTON. There is one thing between official statements and statements of a Congressman not speaking on behalf of the administration, now. Mr. JUDD. This was away back in 1949 and 1950. Mr. ZABLOCKI. We ought to have Governor Stassen verify or deny Dr. Judd's contention of the strength of the Nationalists. Mr. JUDD. That is right. Mr. LECOMPTE. Even after the Nationalists retired to Formosa, they still controlled the coast to the extent of 85 percent? Mr. JUDD. That is right. Mr. STASSEN. You are referring to 1950? Mr. JUDD. Certainly. Before the Korean war broke out. Mr. STASSEN. At that time I was president of the University of Pennsylvania and I did not see the intelligence reports at that time, so I really do not know the answer. Mr. JUDD. Of course, I did not ask you that question. I asked you to what extent the blockade had been restored. You answered my question before the gentleman from Texas asked me to yield. If he wants to ask further questions, I will be happy to yield. Mr. BURLESON. No, I just wanted to make sure my ears were not deceiving me. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The previous administration did not agree with Dr. Judd. Perhaps the new administration will. Mr. JUDD. Mr. Stassen, you used the word "munitions" instead of "ammunition" when you were reading your statement, at the bottom of page 3. Was that intentional? "Munitions" is a much broader word than "ammunition." Mr. STASSEN. It is broader than ammunition. It is really anything that falls within the usual definition of munitions. Mr. JUDD. When you say "The countries of the free world, without exception, refuse to ship arms and munitions," you mean all the materials regularly classified as munitions? Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Mr. JUDD. I appreciate that broadening of the word. Pursuing the point that the gentleman from New York was making about the necessity of some of these countries having markets for their commodities and the decisions that Members of Congress would have to make on that issue, we saw a very good example of that in Karachi. There are miles of bales of cotton which Pakistan cannot sell unless it is to Communist China and Communist China wants it and will give grain for it, at the cost of starvation of Chinese people. We do not want Pakistan to sell cotton to help Communist China. Yet Pakistan has to sell it where she can, or get assistance from us, originating in this committee, or else have internal disorder. It is a vivid illustration which those of us who were there saw, the hard realities that many of these people are up against. It is one thing for us to lecture them and tell them they must not ship it, but when they have no alternative, survival comes first for them, the same as it would for us. I think one more Now you said we must not coerce other countries. thing could be said about that. I am willing to make the prediction that if the British were doing 95 percent of the fighting against the Chinese Communists, they would blockade the China coast whether we liked it or not, and the fact of the matter is, we would like it. They have not hesitated to do, whenever they felt it necessary, those things that were in their vital interests. I think that if anything, we have leaned over backward farther than was necessary in our effort to avoid any charge of imperialism or coercion. If the shoe were on the other foot and a lot of these countries were in the position we are in, they would take vigorous action, and I do not think there would be too great repercussions. Of course it may be true that a minority can use coercion with less difficult and kickback than a majority can. Mr. BATTLE. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. JUDD. Yes. Mr. BATTLE. Along the line of compulsion, the Battle Act has a little bit of compulsion in it, in that it says if certain shipments are made, that all military, economic and financial aid will be cut off. I am wondering if you think the Battle Act is too tough? Mr. STASSEN. I think it can be restudied and you and the other Congressmen and we might be able to make it more effective by some modification, but I would not describe it as being too tough. Mr. JAVITS. In World War II, we had an Economic Warfare Board which outbid our enemies for wolfram in Spain, for example. With regard to this rubber in Ceylon, do we have any money to outbid the Communists for Ceylon's rubber? Mr. STASSEN. There are two problems there. Of course the transaction was closed on a long-range basis before our administration came into power. The second thing is that it would become then not just a matter of buying rubber from Ceylon but of buying all the southeast Asian rubber at a price above the market and selling it back at a lower price so it would be very, very substantial and I am not certain that we would have that kind of very substantial money available to us from Congress to do that kind of an operation. Mr. JAVITS. Is it the sort of thing which you are inventorying as another way to give this policy teeth? Mr. STASSEN. There are instances in which we can do such buying, with any limited resources to prevent something moving to the Soviet Union. Mr. JAVITS. But you will review that? Mr. STASSEN. The rubber situation we have studied pretty carefully. It would involve such a tremendous amount because of the productive capacities. If you once set a policy that you would buy rubber at a certain price to keep it from going to the Soviet Union, they would expand the rubber production so fast that they would give you a lot of trouble. Mr. JAVITS. I only urge, Governor, that it is the sort of thing that I hope your Department is looking into. Mr. STASSEN. May I say there are instances right now in which we are using or contemplating using preclusive buying, but they are the very specialized situations. Mr. JUDD. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. JUDD. Of course, it comes down to definitions. You said when there is a war, then everything is of assistance to the enemy. Well, I thought there is a war. There are all shades of opinion as to the seriousness of it. During the last war we bought all kinds of stuff from Spain at terrific prices to prevent its falling into the hands of her allies, Hitler and Mussolini. I think it was money well spent. I think the temper of the Congress on this issue would be inclined to go further, rather than less far, to prevent stuff getting into the hands of the enemy-because there is a war. Now let me say right along this line of coercion: The gentleman from Alabama, the author of the Battle Act, who not only sponsored it, but has ridden herd on it since enactment, has had this kind of experience, and so have some of the rest of us, that when we read in the paper that such and such a thing was going to such and such a place, and we called up or sent a letter to find out whether it was true or not, or what could be done about it, maybe 2 weeks later we got acknowledgment of the letter and maybe a month later we got some information. But if certain members of the other body who do not hesitate to use coercion call up and say, "What's going on," they get an answer the same day. It is one of the reasons they resort to those methods. |