Mr. STASSEN. It is like the old question of the community chest in the community. I mean, how much should the man with the greatest means contribute to the community chest? Or it is like the matter of a joint venture of another kind. It is a matter of judgment and a careful reflection as to how far you want to go.

I think the Congress at times has put certain ceilings on-has specified that American funds should not be used beyond a certain percentage in a certain program. I think there is merit to that kind of approach.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would we be able to get the percentages on these five various organizations?

Mr. STASSEN. We will get them up for you. (The information referred to is as follows:)

UNITED STATES SHARE OF MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS

MULTILATERAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION

United Nations Technical Assistance Program

It has been the practice of the executive branch to limit the United States pledge to the United Nations expanded program of technical assistance for each of the first three financial periods of the program to approximately 60 percent of total pledges. The figures appearing on page 109 of the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1954-Basic Data Supplied by the Executive Branch refer to pledges for calendar year 1953. The United States pledged $12,767,145 toward this total, subject to the appropriation of the additional amount of $4,595,812 previously authorized but not appropriated. This pledge represents 60 percent of the total amount pledged by all governments for 1953.

The United Nations technical assistance goal for contributions for 1954 will be set by the General Assembly later in this calendar year. The goal set for 1953 was $25 million, and it is assumed that governments will be asked by the United Nations General Assembly to contribute toward a total goal for 1954 of about the same magnitude. Governments have pledged a total of $21,278,575 toward the 1953 program. Based on the assumption that pledges from other governments will be approximately the same for 1954 as for 1953, the fiscal year 1954 bill requests $12,750,000 as the United States contribution to the calendar year 1954 program. This amount represents 60 percent of anticipated minimum pledges of $21,250,000 for 1954.

Organization of American States (OAS) Technical Cooperation Program

It has been the practice of the executive branch to limit the United States pledge to the OAS Technical Cooperation Program to 70 percent of total pledges. Of the $13,750,000 requested in the fiscal year 1954 bill for multilateral technical cooperation, the executive branch proposes to pledge $1 million to the OAS Technical Cooperation Program for calendar year 1954, with the above limitation. This amount represents 70 percent of anticipated pledges of approximately $1,428,000 for 1954.

INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S WELFARE WORK

During the 1950 session of the United Nations General Assembly, a decision was made to extend the activities of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) through calendar year 1953. United States contributions to the current UNICEF program are being made under a legislative provision which stipulates that these shall not exceed 33% percent of contributions from all governments, including contributions made by governments for the benefit of persons located within territories under their control.

At its fall session of 1953, the General Assembly will consider the future status of the Children's Fund and determine the nature and substance of any new international children's welfare program for the period beginning January 1, 1954. Since it is not possible at this time to anticipate what the new program, either in terms of content or financial needs, will consist of, the proposed United States contribution of $9 million cannot be related to a specific program total. The amount of $9 million being requested does, however, represent an approximate continuation of the level of United States financial support to UNICEF over

the past 3 years, if the Congress appropriates the remaining $9.8 million of authorized funds for the current UNICEF program.

UNITED NATIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY (UNKRA)

The United Nations authorized an initial program for UNKRA which called for a budget of $250 million to be met by voluntary contributions in cash and in kind from interested governments. The United States pledged $162.5 million toward this program, an amount which is 65 percent of the total initial budget. The pledge was made subject to the availability of funds as appropriated by the Congress. As of June 30, 1953, the United States will have contributed approximately $51.5 million of its pledge to UNKRA, leaving a balance of approximately $111 million. This latter amount is being requested ($71 million in cash and $40 million in pipeline supplies) for possible payment in the fiscal year 1954, during which year it is anticipated that UNKRA will complete its initial program. As of March 31, 1953, other governments had pledged $43,220,806 toward the initial program, and had contributed $12,860,631 of this amount. Additional payments approximating $6.5 million are expected from other governments during the last quarter of fiscal year 1953.

MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS

The expenditures of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) are divided into two major categories, administrative and operational. The ICEM budget for calendar year 1954 has not yet been set by the Committee. It is estimated, however, that it will be approximately $40,400,000, of which $2,400,000 is for administration and $38 million for operations.

Contributions to the administrative expenses of the Committee are based on a scale agreed to by the governments concerned. The United States share is 33 percent, which amounts to $799,200 in 1954.

Contributions to the operational expenses consist of the following categories: (a) Cash contributions to subsidized movements of migrants and refugees, the costs of which are not reimbursed to the Committee or are only partially reimbursed.

(b) Cash payments in the form of reimbursements by governments or other bodies in full or partial reimbursement for movements which have been effected. These payments are sometimes made in advance against reiumbursements payable at a future date.

(c) Credits to governments for services performed in the processing and reception of migrants, the expenses of which are borne directly by the governments. Emigration countries are credited at a rate of $55 per migrant processed for movement, and immigration countries $20 per migrant.

The total amount which the Committee must obtain from the above 3 sources in order to meet anticipated operational costs, covering the movement of approximately 140,000 migrants in 1954, is estimated at $38 million. Of this amount the United States would have available for contribution $9,200.800. The executive branch has administratively set the condition that the United States share of the operational expenses, up to the maximum availability of the contribution, will be proportionate to the actual movement of migrants accomplished as compared with the total provided for in the plan of operation and reflected in the operational part of the budget.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much, Governor, and godspeed on your trip.

Mr. STASSEN. I want to thank the committee and commend its members for their very intelligent and probing questions. We will endeavor to follow these specific details through and furnish these reports.

I also do want to say this final word to you. We have been going into this program very thoroughly with the President, and of course you saw his message of yesterday, and I would like to emphasize in closing that, while we are making important cuts, I do believe that our policies can be carried through successfully with the amount we have requested if we manage it carefully and get the cooperation of other countries and do not hit any very serious, unexpected situation.

If you wish, I will look forward to reporting back to you when we come back from the Near East and from South Asia.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Vorys wants to ask one question.

Mr. VORYS. It is not a question. I just want to say this. I find that in the European Study Committee, everything they had to say about infrastructure, has been marked secret. We have a very brief paragraph in this book on infrastructure.

Before you leave town I hope you will plead with the military that if they want to get some infrastructure they had better get us into shape to be able to tell more about what it is about, how it has been doing, and so forth. So far it is so secret that it will be difficult to explain it.

Mr. STASSEN. We will ask the military to declassify as much as they think that they can. Of course I do hope that you feel that we should be very careful on publicizing plans on airfields 2 or 3 years ahead.

If you make too much public the other side begins to figure, "Well now, how does that affect us in the future and how do we put in some interceptors and radar to offset that?"

With regard to amounts as contrasted to geographic locations, I think the Department of Defense could give you much more as to what is involved.

I would say in this whole picture that it is tremendously important that we do not underestimate the capabilities of the Soviet Union as a military threat, and it is also of great importance that we do not underestimate the capabilities of military strength on the part of the free world.

There are very substantial military capabilities in our own country and in our own great defense program and on the part of our friends. It is with a sort of a pose of confidence and determination that we can move forward together with some brightening hope, I feel, of coming through without the tragedy of a third world war.

Mr. JUDD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope that Mr. Stassen and Mr. Dulles will, among all the other things you have to do, keep this constantly in mind: How to offset the Soviet's moves in one place by countermoves in other directions and places.

Here in Indochina we are being sucked into the same old game of dancing to their tune, running around trying to put out fires they start. We hastily put up $400 million extra, to put out a new fire in Southeast Asia that we knew was coming all these years, and we are not ready for it and we do not react elsewhere.

Isn't there some way that once in a while when they strike in one place the United States can find some way of promptly putting on pressure somewhere else?

I think we should have opened up in Korea. That would have stopped advances in Laos.

We go around bleeding and bleeding and trying to retrieve something after it is half lost.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to remind the governor that Dr. Judd and I are both anxiously awaiting the reevaluation of the Far East intelligence reports.

Mr. JUDD. That is right. You will never get it.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5: 10 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Thursday, May 7, 1953.)

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT EXTENSION

THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1953

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, D. C.

The committee met in executive session, pursuant to call, in room G-3, United States Capitol, at 10: 40 a. m., Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield, chairman, presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order.

We are glad to have you here, General Bradley. I understand you have a statement. You may proceed in any way you desire.

STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, with the permission of the members I will read this statement and then I think we can cover most of your questions.

Representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am supposed to furnish you a strictly military viewpoint on the Mutual Security Program. (1) As to the military situation in the world, to the best of my knowledge and belief, there is no indication of any kind that the Soviet and Soviet-satellite military capabilities have diminished in the past year. On the contrary, there is every indication that the Soviets continue vigorously to develop and modernize the forces that they could throw against the free world.

We believe that their atomic capability is rapidly improving. I know of no intelligence which reveals any change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union or which would give us any reason to diminish, or slow down, or stretch out our preparedness effort.

It may be of interest to you to know that the military chiefs of the 14 NATO nations are of the same opinion. No evidence was offered at the recent NATO meeting of any reduction of the Soviet threat. The risk continues to be great. The possibility of war is still with us. Both conditions will exist as long as our defenses are relatively

weak.

(2) The military aid part of the Mutual Security Program is all important to the collective security of the free world. For several more years our allies-which we sorely need right now and in time of war if it occurs will not be able to mobilize effective ground, naval, or air forces without a strong, continuing support, through a program of mutual security. To a large extent our security is dependent upon their security.