The North Atlantic Treaty negotiations which went forward in the summer and fall of 1948 culminated in the signing of the treaty in April of 1949.

Directly after the treaty was signed by us in April of 1949, the other NATO nations followed suit, and I think the last one signed up in August 1949.

It might be useful at this point to put the NATO organization chart up there so when I refer to these committees they might be more meaningful.

(A chart entitled "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," principal agencies and United States members, was referred to.)

Mr. NASH. The North Atlantic Council, at the top, is composed of the foreign ministers, the defense ministers, and the finance ministers. The principal military advice to the North Atlantic Council comes from the Military Committee. That is composed of the Chief of Staff of each of the 14 nations that are now in NATO. General Bradley is the representative of the United States.

Mr. VORYS. Do I understand that the red letters on the right are the American representatives on those things?

Mr. NASH. That is correct. Mr. Dulles is our foreign minister; Mr. Wilson is our defense minister; Mr. Humphrey is our finance minister.

We have what no other of the NATO nations have, this Director of Mutual Security position, with Mr. Stassen, and then we have the so-called special representative in Europe for the Administration of Mutual Security and assistance matters, Mr. Draper.

The North Atlantic Council's permanent headquarters is in Paris. The Military Committee's permanent headquarters, if they had any such headquarters, would be in Paris, also. They meet ad hoc, but they have a permanent group called The Standing Group, which has its locale here in Washington.

The Standing Group is composed of three nations: France, United Kingdom, and the United States.

It has also in Washington the military representatives of all 14 nations. The Military Representatives Committee is a sort of board of deputies to the Military Committee itself.

The real working group, the one who works out the plans, is the Standing Group. They submit them, go over them with the military representatives. If agreed upon, they go on up to the Military Committee, and ultimately are submitted to the North Atlantic Council. General Bradley is our representative on the Military Committee and on the Standing Group.

He has a deputy who works at it full time. General Bradley has a lot of other duties, as you know, as Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vice Admiral Arthur Davis is General Bradley's Deputy on the Standing Group.

Now, the two commanders of the two principal field commands: SACEUR, headed by General Ridgway-those initials add up to Supreme Allied Command in Europe.

He succeeded General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower was the first one appointed in late 1950 and agreed upon at the Brussels meeting in December of 1950. He established SHAPE headquarters in April 1951.

This became operational with the establishment of General Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAPE in April 1951, which was just 2 years ago.

The other commander is the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Forces, a command set up later than SACEUR, and is presently headed by a United States commander, Admiral McCormick.

Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty came into being, in the spring of 1950, the Military Committee, working with its Standing Group, developed an overall strategic plan that has come to be fairly well known as the MTDP, meaning the medium term defense plan. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. The military task is a defensive task. It is a defensive mission. The job of the NATO military forces under the NATO treaty is one of deterring Soviet aggression, and if aggression should occur, despite the attempts to deter it, a force expected or hoped to be adequate to deal with the aggression.

It does not have an offensive mission. That is important in the way of the philosophy of NATO. It is a defensive organization. It was a defense against aggression. That was the underlying impression of this overall strategic concept that is the basis of all of our military force planning and military buildup that we are talking about this morning.

To take that strategic concept and translate it into specific numbers of divisions, airplanes, and ships. That was a task that went forward in the fall of 1950. Out of that was developed what is called MCmeaning Military Committee-MC 26/1. That is the identification of this military requirement study.

MC 26/1 is the present basis of our military force planning.

That, as I say, took the strategic concept of the MTDP, of May 1950, and developed it into military requirements-I emphasize the word "requirements."

It is what our military experts voice is necessary to carry out the mission, which, I repeat, is a mission to deter aggression and, if aggression should occur, to be able to defend and resist successfully.

After the organization of General Eisenhower's headquarters at SHAPE, in April 1951, he and his planning staff put together their own idea of what is required in the way of ground forces to carry out his mission as Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SMITH. That was in 1951?

Mr. NASH. This report was submitted by General Eisenhower in October 1951, 4 or 5 months after SHAPE Headquarters was established.

Mr. SMITH. As you recall, that was after the subcommittee from our committee was over there.

We were there in June, were we not Boyd?

Mr. CRAWFORD. June 1951.

Mr. PROUTY. How many planes is that?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. On the side of air requirements, as long as that question has been raised, the air requirements were developed initially in the spring of 1951, in Paris by the Air Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.

Those four. It developed what is called "the Paris plan." Both the so-called Paris plan which was developed in the spring of 1951 and General Eisenhower's plan which was submitted in the fall of 1951 were taken together with the Navy's recommendations-and I may as well round out the picture by giving the naval story. The naval requirements were worked out by five regional planning groups. They got going ahead of the air and the ground, they got going in 1950. Before the establishment of the two commanders, SACEUR and SACLANT, there were 5 regional planning groups, 1 for the Canadians, and the United States, 1 for the Atlantic, 1 for Northern Europe, 1 for Southern Europe and Western Europe.

Those five submitted their total Navy requirements and the total of those was the sea-power element which added to the air requirement developed in this so-called Paris plan and added to General Eisenhower's plan submitted in the fall of 1951, after being analyzed and reviewed by the standing group, and the military committee, came out approved by the military committee as MC 26/1.

MC 26/1 was approved by the Military Committee at Rome in the November meeting of 1951, and was submitted to the Council, the top body, the NATO Council of Ministers in February 1952.

This is a very important point. The ministers accepted MC 26/1 as the advice of their military advisers as to what, in the judgment of the military advisers, would be required to carry out the military

mission.

Namely the defense of Western Europe against aggression.

The task of the ministers was to determine what could be done to accomplish or fill the requirements developed by their military advisers. Their job was to set this concept that we call force goals.

I want to make the distinction between the concept of military requirements and the concept of force goals.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. How could you get hold of the thing? You could not do it all at once. How to make a start to, was the job of the ministers themselves, the representatives of the NATO partners.

So, in Ottawa, the NATO meeting in Ottawa in the last part of September 1951, established a committee which came to be known as the Wise Men, the Three Wise Men, chaired by Mr. Harriman of the United States. The other two countries being the United Kingdom and France.

The technical title of the committee was the Temporary Council Committee, the TCC, but colloquially it came to be known as the Three Wise Men.

Their job was to study the economic and political capabilities of the NATO partners to see how much of these military requirements the countries could undertake to raise, how to distribute these requirements, how many of these divisions is France to raise, how many of these aircraft is the United Kingdom to furnish, and in what increments year by year.

That temporary committee-let me refer to it as TCC, if I may, which is synonymous, or if I slip into it, as the Three Wise Menoperated right through January 1952.

What they did was to analyze the national gross income yield of each one of the NATO countries and to determine as best they could

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and they had a great deal of expert testimony-I appeared before them in November of 1951 to lay out the United States contributionwhat was the maximum defense effort that each of these NATO countries was capable of without unduly burdening its economy, because it would not be useful to go ahead and put on these countries a defense effort that would bankrupt them.

That is the tightrope that NATO has been trying to walk ever since it got legs to walk on.

How far could you go and how fast could you go-and I must keep emphasizing the time element in this thing-how far could you go and how fast could you go in building up the defenses of Western Europe without bankrupting the countries or without the United States having to take on an even bigger chunk of the load.

Now the recommendations of the TCC were laid before the NATO Council of Ministers in Lisbon in February 1952, and with modifications were approved as what the countries could be expected to do by the end of calendar year 1952, the so-called firm force goals; and further agreement with respect to what they should shoot for by the end of calendar year 1953, which were called provisional goals, to distinguish them from the firm commitments the countries took with respect to 1952 forces; and further, with respect to 1954, planning goals for those long lead-time items like aircraft, which if you wanted by the end of 1954, you would have to get under contract pretty early in 1952, because it takes 18 months to 24 months to build aircraft in this country and longer, of course, in Europe, where the industry is just beginning to get going again.

Now I come to the chart that shows the comparison of where they were before Lisbon and what they agreed to do at Lisbon.

Let me emphasize this again. What they agreed upon at Lisbon was that they would take on and permit their countries to raise a certain increment of this overall military requirment.

(Discussion off the record.)

(A chart entitled "Build-up of NATO Army Divisions" was referred to.)

Mr. NASH. Now in 1950, they had some forces. I want to point out two things on this chart: If you will note that we go through 1950 and 1951 in two classes of forces: D-day, and D-plus-90. D-day is the day that the fight begins. It is the day the balloon goes up. And forces listed as D-day forces are forces expected to be on the line, guns in hand, ready to shoot.

D-plus-90-day forces are so-called reserve divisions that have their equipment ready and they can be mobilized and brought up to the front line at various times during a total period of 90 days. İt would take 90 days to get them all up there.

You will note the 1950 and 1951 are in terms of D-day and D-plus90. But when we move over to the first year the countries made firm commitments on, 1952, they have shortened the time that the reserve divisions have got to get up on the front line and get firing.

D-plus-30. That is a very important qualification. If we were still on a D-plus-90-day basis, that red column, the third one, would be well above the top of the chart.

But, the D-plus-30-day concept is what we are going on in describing NATO forces as agreed on in Lisbon.

The second thing and most important to note in this chart is that there is a qualitative evaluation with respect to, the forces that have been attained as of the end of the calendar year 1952. That pink or whatever color you might call it at the top of that red column represents divisions that are in being by which General Ridgway by a personal inspection and evaluation does not regard as being fully effective.

They have not completed all of their training or they have not got all of their equipment or they have not in one way or another got themselves to where he would say they could get on the line in 30 days and be ready to fight.

There is no such qualitative evaluation with respect to either the 1950 or the 1951 forces.

So those two points are important in evaluating this comparison of buildup.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. PROUTY. When you refer to front-line troops, do you refer to the blue?

Mr. NASH. I refer to blue and red, the only difference being that the red ones are inactive divisions. The men are reserves that get called up on D-day and it takes them overall 30 days to get on the front line.

Mr. SMITH. Let us stop at this point. I think there might be ques

tions.

Mr. NASH. I am going on from here to the Air and then to the Navy so I think it would be well to speak to the division picture before we go on to the other two.

Mr. VORYS. Just to refresh my recollection, I got hold of our testimony in the last year.

I asked General Gruenther-now wait a minute. First, are these fiscal years or calendar years?

Mr. NASH. They are calendar years.

Mr. VORYS. In December 1951, a group of us from this committee were in SHAPE and General Eisenhower said to us,

As I stated to General Gruenther, I have 28 divisions, 24 ready to go. Under Montgomery's grading system that would equal 19.

He added that was not enough. Mike Mansfield was there, and Mrs. Kelly was there because she comes into this colloquy.

General Gruenther went on, and I am going to skip some of it. I am just trying to refresh my recollection and refresh my own confusion on it.

In the first place, in talking about 1951, without trying to read this over, General Gruenther did not say anything like 24 ready and 30odd at D-plus-90.

Mr. NASH. I thought that is just what you read. He said 24 or 26, which Field Marshal Montgomery evaluated 19 as being fairly effective.

Mr. VORYS. That was in the fall. That was General Eisenhower talking to us in December, I think it was, of 1951, and he said that we have about 24 that equal about 19.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. General Gruenther and General Eisenhower as of December 1951, were not talking about anything like 24 plus 30-odd divisions; were they?