Mrs. KELLY. No.

Mr. NASH. Mind you, Mr. Vorys, that the red includes also the blue. By that I mean you have not got one on top of the other.

Mr. VORYS. You have not?

Mr. NASH. No, sir. You did not have 25 blue divisions and then 50 red divisions. I think the chart is misleading in that respect. Mr. VORYS. It certainly is to me.

Mr. NASH. That chart is misleading in that respect. The total number of divisions set for Lisbon were 50 divisions. That would come out there at the last column. The effort here was to try to make this important distinction between front-line divisions on the day the battle breaks out, D-day.

Mrs. KELLY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mrs. KELLY. I think the red that you are speaking of there, D-plus-90, in 1951, I believe that was the 25 goal he was speaking of, then, and the D must have represented the actual 19 he was talking of.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. The trouble with all this thing in the previous testimony is failing to make a distinction between a D-day division and a D-plus-30. If I do nothing else this morning I would like to drive that one home so we know what we are talking about.

The 50-division concept at Lisbon was never made clear to the public, that half of those divisions were supposed to be ready to fight right now-active divisions in being right now-and the other half would be able to fight within 30 days of the beginning of war. I am sorry that the chart is misleading and that you thought the blue was added to the red. The red includes that number of divisions and as Mrs. Kelly suggests it would be better if we carried the blue line right across. We will make that change for any future use of the charts. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. They did not break it down into jet aircraft and piston aircraft.

How did they come out at the end of 1952? I pass over July and December 1951 of what aircraft they had. There is no qualitative evaluation of those aircraft and it is just to give you some order of comparison with the buildup in 1952. I think from here on we would do well to see just where we stood at the end of 1952 and prepare to build up from then on, because we do not have any firm data. There was not any SHAPE organization to evaluate what these countries said they had on hand in terms of worthy aircraft really able to fly; did they have the pilots and mechanics to keep them in the air? We do not have that information as of the earlier years, 1950 and 1951. But we do have a critical evaluation of their effectiveness at the end of 1952. We have the same evaluation made for the air as I have just explained to you was made by General Ridgway for the ground forces.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. Do you have handy there a chart of total NATO aircraft against which this aircraft of 2,698 shipped would apply? Mr. NASH. Could I see that chart a minute, Mr. Vorys? The 2,698 represents total Air Force aircraft shipped as of January 31, 1953. It

includes both piston and jet types, and transport and training aircraft in addition to combat planes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. What I wondered was about the statement of things being shipped there. It is 2,698.

I just wondered whether we could determine what that was a contribution to.

Mr. NASH. This includes all types of planes. C-47's, and the great bulk of them. F-84's.

This speaks of January 31, 1953. It speaks of shipments and we are talking about planes on the front line. I do not have with me any chart that would show just where all these other planes that have been shipped actually are. They are in various stages of being worked into active forces.

Mr. VORYS. Some of them may be broken up or worn out and everything else.

Mr. Nash. There has been attrition on some.

I would be glad to try to break that down for you. It takes a long time to take a delivered aircraft and have it be a front-line aircraft with a trained crew.

Mr. VORYS. The chart is entitled "Key MDAP Statistics." I thought aircraft shipped was an important item. However, when we go over it here it is of no significance because we cannot find out where it fits in at all.

Mr. NASH. What we are trying to address ourselves to here is what forces we have to meet the enemy if the balloon goes up today. You are talking about apples and pears.

We also have a number of planes that have been shipped to Indochina and Formosa and a small number to Latin-American countries. It can be broken down for you if you want a reconciliation of the figures but what I am addressing myself to this morning is how close we came to effective units not just furnishing the equipment. You have to have bases, men, and equipment in order to have effective forces.

We will turn to the Navy now.

(A chart was shown entitled "NATO Naval Forces Build Up (Less Greece and Turkey)".)

Mr. NASH. The overall total of vessels we spoke of as being the Lisbon goal has to be broken down between major and minor vessels. Otherwise you get into the old story of rabbit stew, 1 horse and 1 rabbit.

What we have here is major vessels, we mean by that everything from aircraft carriers down through destroyer escorts. We classify as a major vessel from a destroyer escort up. Minor vessels includes smaller vessels of the greatest importance, such as mine sweepers, mine layers, motor torpedo boats, and patrol craft. I might underscore the importance of the mine sweepers as being one of the most important parts of our program. The furnishing of mine sweepers. (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. You can look over at the earlier columns by way of seeing what has come in in the way of buildups since 1950 and 1951. I want to emphasize that there again there is no qualitative evaluation.

You see the column of D-plus 180 is higher than that set at the Lisbon goal but those are in reserve. They are all kinds of cats and dogs and in various states of ability and what Lisbon set was effective vessels and those that could be made effective at D-plus 180. That includes bringing in existing vessels and getting them properly fitted out, rehabilitated, and manned. New ship construction does not figure materially in the buildup of these major combat vessels. There has been some slight buildup in the minor vessels but it takes quite a long time to build even a small vessel, like a mine sweeper. It takes 2 years. Are there questions on that, Mr. Chairman?

Then we can take the last chart, the minor vessels.

(A chart was shown entitled "NATO Naval Forces Build Up (Less Greece and Turkey) Minor Vessels".)

Mr. VORYS. With regard to the major vessels, the goal has been met?

Mr. NASH. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. CARNAHAN. I would like to see the ground chart again just briefly, please.

(Chart No. 1 entitled "Buildup of NATO Army Divisions (Less Greece and Turkey)" was referred to.)

Mr. NASH. Is there any question on this?

Mr. CARNAHAN. No; I just wanted to see those Lisbon goals again. Mr. NASH. If there are no questions as far as I have gone, Mr. Chairman, the last point that needs to be stated to give the complete picture of what was accomplished in 1952 has to do with the problem of what is called by this fancy word "infrastructure." I do not want to bore the committee by going into a long dissertation on infrastructure, but I do want to emphasize that for too long a time people did not pay enough attention to the importance of having the facilities, bases, barracks, communications, signals, jet fuel lines, all those things that you need in the way of physical facilities.

Mr. SMITH. Who do you mean by "people"?

Mr. NASH. Everybody. But I am speaking principally of the NATO members. I am speaking now of a point that has had a good deal of publicity about it, particularly at the December meeting, about the difficulty that the ministers had in negotiating a cost-sharing program-what it costs to build these facilities. It was a problem at the Ottawa meeting in September 1951; at the Lisbon meeting in February 1952; at the Paris meeting in December 1952. We hope it will be less of a problem at the April meeting that is coming up next month and we hope at that April meeting to have pretty much gotten it completely on the track.

Here is why it has been a problem. The cost sharing of infrastructure has come up for the ministers' determination at a time subsequent to the fixing and voting by NATO parliaments of defense budgets, and in their planning they did not put into their budgetary requests of their various parliaments what they would need in the way of funds to finance this construction work. It has always been a case of trying to squeeze out of a budget that is already pretty tight, enough funds to take care of that very prime requisite of the construction work necessary to provide the facilities.

Now at the December meeting, the ministers addressed themselves to that problem eloquently and at length, in terms of dealing with first

things first. It is no use building aircraft and training pilots if you are not going to have a requisite number of bases to fly from. It is no use having divisions deployed throughout Europe if they do not have the requisite communications to communicate with one another. It is no use to have the aircraft if you do not have jet-fuel-supply lines, and so on.

I need not go into that further.

You have to provide-and it has a long lead-time factor in it-it takes a long time to build a telecommunications system or a pipeline or an airbase, and you have to plan for it in advance.

(A chart was shown entitled "NATO Infrastructure-Military Construction".)

The whole infrastructure program has been presented in slices, bite by bite, as have the forces: The total military requirements in terms of forces are dealt with in terms of an annual increment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. What we will do at the NATO meeting in April, what we started back in December, will be to see how much of a further bite in forces can be accomplished by the end of 1954 or 1955. And we hope next fall at still another NATO meeting they will determine what bite they want to take to have accomplished by the end of calendar year 1955 or 1956. They have done the same thing with respect to infrastructure. Infrastructure has been presented in terms of three slices. You will find on the chart a first, a second, a third, and a fourth slice. The first slice of infrastructure was something that those 5 countries that formed the Western Union in March of 1948, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg took on in common. The United States was not in the picture at that time because NATO had not yet come into being.

That first slice came to $92.4 million and those 4 countries bore the cost of that. It consisted mostly of airfields. A number of the airfields were in existence, but had to be rehabilitated from World War II.

The first time the United States came into the picture of infrastructure was at Ottawa in September 1951, and there the program consisting principally of more airfields in Germany and in the NATO countries-principally France and a telecommunications system in France, came to a total of $221 million. The cost-sharing of the $221 million second slice was split up between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Canada, and BelgiumLuxembourg.

Mr. VORYS. Does cost sharing include the cost of the land?
Mr. NASH. No, sir.

Mr. VORYS. In no case?

Mr. NASH. In no case does the cost sharing include the cost of land or the cost of utilities connected with the land-roads and sewers and gas lines and whatever it may be. They are already there in place. The so-called host country, the country where the facility is being constructed, has to furnish that and bear the cost of it and this is an important thing to bear in mind because this is mostly not Government property that is being used for these facilities; it is privately owned property that has to be taken under what we would call "eminent domain," and it has to be paid for by the Government who takes it. That second slice, $221 million, added to the first slice of $92 million comes

to a total of $313 million and the United States of the first 2 slices, the United States agreed to take on the cost of $106 million. That came out at 34 percent, computed on the total cost of the first and second slices. And looking only at the cost of the second slice alone, it came out at 48 percent.

Mr. VORYS. How was that?

Mr. NASH. The first slice of $92 million, the second slice of $221 million comes to a total of $313 million and of that $313 million the United States agreed to pay $106 million, which percentagewise is 34 percent of the cost of the first 2 slices; it is 48 percent of the cost of the second slice alone.

At Lisbon, the third slice-and I emphasize again, it comes along in annual increments; it comes to us from SHAPE. SHAPE lists its requirements, what it thinks it is going to need in a year or 2 years hence for the forces expected to be in being at that time.

The standing group of the military committee review it, screen it, and cut it down, and then submit the figure to be chewed up by the ministers in the way of cost sharing.

What they chewed up at Lisbon was a third slice which is shown on the chart there, of $425 million. That was split up among all the NATO countries except Turkey and Greece who had just come in there at Lisbon for the first time and Portugal who had no infrastructure.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. NASH. In the $425 million, the United States agreed to take on $182 million, or 43 percent.

The fourth slice negotiated at Paris last December, broken down, is in 2 pieces: $230 million to which the ministers addressed themselves at Paris in December and left an additional $187 million to be agreed to subsequently. The United States agreed to take on $92 million of the $230 million agreed upon at Paris, or a percentage of 40 percent.

Now where we stand therefore as of the present time is agreed cost sharing for a total of $968 million. Of that total the United States has agreed to pay $380 million and that percentagewise comes out at 39.2 percent, rounded off at 40 percent which is the percentage that we stand on for negotiating purposes and intend to continue to stand on. No more than 40 percent.

On the side of physical construction, I think in terms of a general statement it is fair to say that over the 3-year period-2-year period, really, speaking of the program starting with the establishment of SHAPE in April 1951-we are from 10 to 12 months behind.

The construction of the airfields got off to a slow start for a number of reasons. It took an awful long time in some cases to get the land that we wanted. Usually you want the land that is the choicest. Frequently its location for strategic purposes puts it right in the center of some of the best agricultural land-in Europe people hate to give up land as you well know and it is always a difficult proposition to get the precise site that you want.

Secondly, we ran into the difficult problem of taxes. The imposition of taxes by these NATO countries on our construction work, on our materials and so on was something that we addressed ourselves to a year ago December. This is one of the things I would like to brag about a little-not personally, but I mean in terms of an effort of the United States.