If you had the kind of chart I am thinking of, that ammunition one, in billions of dollars, where would that cut in there?

General STEWART. On ammunition we have just about $2 billion already funded in ammunition. That is, you have made the money available and we have applied about $2 billion against ammunition. Mrs. BOLTON. You have ordered the ammunition?

General STEWART. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. Is it in production?

General STEWART. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. And that is only 25 percent of your goal, what you expect to obtain. You are only asking for roughly about a quarter of a billion dollars for the future?

General STEWART. For this next year, yes, sir.

I think this chart partially answered the question you just asked. (A classified chart was shown entitled "MDAP, Value of Shipments by Country, March 31, 1953, Millions of Dollars.")

General STEWART. These figures on the left which I read off yesterday are the percent of the country program which we have actually delivered and the bars represent the value of those things we have delivered. You asked what to do about that portion we have got delivered. The information in the form of country programs and not in the form of individual items is shown here.

In the case of France, we have delivered 40 percent of the French program for 4 years. That is, the 1950 to 1953 program. Forty percent of it has been delivered. Because that is the biggest program, we have delivered a great deal to France.

For each of the countries I have exactly the same information.

Buried in these detailed books of statistics are the items and the value of those items as opposed to the total number of items that have been programed and funded.

Does that help at all, sir?

Mr. VORYS. How much of a chore would it be, for your orange and green chart, to have somebody go through and put on there deliveries of arms, vessels, and aircraft, right on those same bars? General STEWART. How many we have delivered?

Mr. VORYS. You have it in billions there. Here I have it before me in quantities. I say I have but it is your own publication.

For purposes of comparison, how hard would it be to have somebody go through and just mark how much in billions of those things have been delivered, so that we could see it all at once? That is what I have been looking for for 3 years.

General STEWART. I can get that on this chart this morning, if I send it back, sir. May I stop here and get that started, sir? Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. General, why do you have so little orange on that chart? Is it because you have not delivered a lot of it or you have not got a lot of it? I mean down in the ammunition. General STEWART. This is in the European area. From the previous funds, the funds that Congress has already made available, we have been able to finance-we have not delivered it yet but we have been able to finance reserve ammunition for all units up through fiscal year 1953. Now that varies a little bit from type to type and some of them are above that. (Discussion off the record.)

General STEWART. We have a large number of these small-type units but a lot of them are shooting units.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. BOLTON. When do you think you will have the actual ammunition?

General STEWART. Our ammunition deliveries have in recent months begun to climb, particularly the allocations.

Before we ship it we have to get our hands on it. Recent allocations have been very large, indeed. I doubt if the shipments show up in our statistics here. We have every prospect that tremendous quantities of ammunition will be shipped in the next 6 months. We are also just beginning-and it is a very small beginning-to get our receipts from offshore procurement of ammunition. When that starts rolling, we will get tremendous quantities of ammunition.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. BOLTON. Who designates the destination, Korea or Europe? And now with this Indochina program which some of us are not so enthusiastic about-we think it is a little late.

(Discussion off the record.)

General STEWART. We are shipping to them at a tremendous rate within their approved program. We are shipping nothing that is not on one of these. It is an MDAP program, you see.

Now who decides where it goes. Most of the ammunition and the only ammunition that is giving us any trouble, of course, is for ground forces and I would like to tell you how the Army does it.

Mrs. BOLTON. Not in too much detail because I want to get at something else.

General STEWART. Very briefly, there is a monthly meeting of a committee know as the Allocations Committee, Army, which works for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It takes these programs, the requirements of our own forces, the requirements of the United Nations forces in Korea, it takes the total assets and it takes the available items at that time, and working under priorities established by the President which are basically that those who may fight first should be served first, we allocate what is available.

Mrs. BOLTON. Now, on that basis, what proportion of your program has delivery? You say allocation, yes. Allocate what? Actual stuff or just paper?

General STEWART. No, ma'am. The allocation that I speak of is actual within 24 hours after that allocation is made a requisition is issued by the port of New York, on a depot, to start the shipment.

Now, the entire mechanics of shipping, making all the records, is about 90 days from the day that the allocation committee acts until that item actually leaves on a boat.

Mrs. BOLTON. Is there any way of speeding that up?

General STEWART. We have tried many ways. Actually when you get into this vast, tremendous supply system that exists and the records, and the various echelons that have to handle that.

Mrs. BOLTON. That have been handling it? It might be that they do not have to be quite so complex, might it not?

General STEWART. No one is more impatient than I am but I have been involved in that under combat conditions and you do have to exercise considerable care or the first thing you know you have a pile of stuff there and you do not know what you have got.

Mrs. BOLTON. I am sure of that, but I am sure also that you cannot shoot paper. It does not kill anybody. Unless it might kill a few around here!

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, did I understand correctly that these are the goals we hope to achieve with a supply of ammunition? Is Mr. Vorys' request going to be given to us, that the actual deliveries are going to be put on that chart?

Mr. VORYS. That is the rumor.

Mrs. KELLY. If we get the chart we are all right.

Mr. BENTLEY. General, would you explain the item third from the bottom on your orange and green chart.

General STEWART. That is concerned with aircraft production, I believe, in Europe.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question on that chart?

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Surely.

Mr. BENTLEY. Those are preproduction plant expansions in Europe? General STEWART. Yes, sir. It happens in this country, too, although MDAP has borne very little of it.

Mr. BENTLEY. That is going to Europe for preproduction plant expansion and construction costs?

General STEWART. Yes. It is for machinery and so forth, and not building a factory.

Mrs. BOLTON. Is any of this ammunition atomic?

General STEWART. No, ma'am. That is governed entirely by the atomic people. This program contains absolutely no atomic ammunition or weapons.

Mr. VORYS. I have one other question: Have you any chart any place so that you could put onto that one, or to any comparable breakdown, showing what our allies and friends have done for themselves?

We were told that we pay one-fourth of the expense of the buildup in Europe, although of course, we are paying 42 percent of the infrastructure.

It would be extremely interesting to see where the other threefourths that they spent would be added on. I appreciate that probably you would have columns where we do not pay anything like the "troop pay" account, or uniforms.

But there must be some equipment like aircraft, maybe electronics, motor transport vehicles and small arms where they have furnished it themselves.

General STEWART. I think I can get you something. I cannot get that immediately. I will have to work it up but I think I can get you something.

STATEMENT OF HON. D. A. FITZGERALD, DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether you wish. to interrupt the discussion now to answer Mr. Vorys' question. Chairman CHIPERFIELD. I would like to have Mr. Vorys' question answered.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I have some information that does relate to your question, sir.

Mr. VORYS. If the committee approves I would be interested.

(A classified chart was shown entitled, "Trend of Expenditures for Major Materiel, Selected Categories, European NATO Plus Germany.")

Mr. FITZGERALD. My name is D. A. FitzGerald, Deputy to the Director for the Mutual Security Agency.

This chart shows the trend of expenditures for major materiel in the Western European countries, ÑATO, plus Germany. This is expenditures, Congressmen.

STATEMENT OF HON. C. TYLER WOOD, DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

Mr. WOOD. You have that same chart produced in the chart books placed before you if you wish to follow it there.

Mr. FITZGERALD. This first section of the chart shows the expenditures by NATO countries and Germany for aircraft in the last 5 fiscal years starting in 1950 at $314 million.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FITZGERALD. These are paid in local currencies but we try to state them in dollar equivalents.

Mr. VORYS. Is the top little piece "all others"? It is, "UK, France, and all others"?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Yes.

In the case of ammunition, 5 years ago, 1950, the expenditures in Europe by Western Europeans was $94 million.

Transport vehicles, it is from $83 million. It is likely to drop off next year. Ships, from $156 million. Combat vehicles, from $44 million.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FITZGERALD. This is major materiel. We do have another chart on total European defense expenditures for the same 5 years. We can show it either now or later, as you wish.

Mr. VORYS. Do you have a chart that would show the thing I mentioned, what our expenditures have been on the same item. That is just exactly what I was asking about and that chart is just onehalf of the thing I was asking about.

Is there a chart available?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Which combines European expenditures and American?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. FITZGERALD. We do not have a chart on that, sir.

Mr. VORYS. What these countries are expending for their own defense is not small, according to that chart.

Mr. FITZGERALD. This, of course, is only part of what the Europeans pay. Major materiel is only a fraction of their total expenses. Mr. VORYS. Yes. As I understand it, the big expense and the one that is always the saving to us is their expenditure for maintenance of their troops, which costs so much when we do it for Americans. That is the big economic argument for this whole program. Mr. FULTON. May I ask a question on that chart? Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Fulton

Mr. FULTON. How much does that production fit into a joint defense plan? My question would be as to the ship program. First, are they combat ships for military services, and secondly, are they necessary for a NATO plan or are they made in addition to what NATO and SHAPE would schedule?

Mr. FITZGERALD. We will be presenting to this committee, sir, later on in the session, a comprehensive story of European defense production, which I think will answer the second part of your question.

The first part of the question I answer this way, Sir: This anticipates all European production for NATO as well as non-NATO contribution. The United Kingdom aircraft program, for example, includes the aircraft needed for its non-NATO forces as well as for its contribution to NATO.

Mr. FULTON. Then, the next question is, What in addition to a joint defense of Europe is there? That is what overlapping programs are there between these countries? Each country insists on certain programs regardless of necessity for a joint defense of Europe.

Mr. VORYS. Would that not be Egypt, Malaya for Britain, and Indochina for France?

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Fulton's question is, To what extent is there duplication or lack of integration of country programs in the total NATO area?

Mr. FULTON. What is the overlapping of this production that is actually unnecessary if you looked at it solely as a joint plan for the defense of Europe; that is, what countries are insisting on building ships anyhow whether they are needed or not in the overall defense of Europe; or what countries, for example, are insisting on an atomicbomb program when it is duplication?

Mr. FITZGERALD. There, unquestionably, Congressman, is some of that-this is a personal opinion, sir: My own opinion is that it is not very large.

In the case of all of this production, it is tied into General Stewart's program of end-item deliveries from the United States through the process of screening which he mentioned to you yesterday by which the MAAGS take into account all of this European local production in determining what the remaining deficiencies are to adequately equip the agreed NATO forces.

Now, I think there can be-and one of the efforts we will be discussing with you when we come to the offshore procurement program, sir, will be--more concentrated and more efficient Europeanwide production of equipment for NATO forces, so that each little country does not have an airplane industry of its own and does not produce all kinds of ammunition and everything else inefficiently.

Mr. FULTON. It looks to me like there is a distortion in production. For example, I cannot believe that we in the United States with all our surplus combat ships need an increase in ship production of 400 percent when in relation to the ships the combat vehicles in 1954 projected are only 25 percent in value, or, for example, that we need funds for practically double the number of combat ships produced in 1954 as we need for transport vehicles. In fact, the chart shows a reduction in the program of combat vehicles for the next year. For example, do we need so many combat ships to protect Europe when it is a program of exactly similar size in 1954, with the production of ammunition? Note that the cost of production of ships is two