ing the oranges, the system of packing has swept the country and do not have to brag about what we are doing and what they are doing, those people that is the little people; that is not the big government man-that is the technical job.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is what we consider to be point 4.

Mr. ANDREWs. That is what was done.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I will not pursue this further.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Andrews, I think it would be well to put now before this committee your general statement about the point 4 program― what it consists of and what its objectives are in this area, and then answer any questions they may have about the specific details of it. That seems to me the thing to do.

Mrs. BOLTON. We have a great many things we want to ask and get cleared up before we are finished with these hearings.

Mr. ANDREWS. In a broad way, the amount of money for the Middle East and African program of technical assistance is $43,792,000— that is the technical assistance plus the supporting supplies. The supporting supplies will run on about the same ratio of 3 to 3 and 1/2 to 1, as they have in the past.

We have 564 technicians in the whole area. We have coming from that area, in the various training programs, about 484 people in the technical-assistance program.

Broadly speaking, in the broad area, they are making attacks in this program that revolve basically around agriculture and the development of the natural resources of the country.

We are in a technical way supporting the development of the Latonia, the development of the Yarmouk, and various other rivers and irrigation projects in that area.

We are not putting in American money in the the sense of any capital investment. We are doing the basic engineering to find out whether you can build a dam there or not, to find out whether you can build up a case for a loan at the International Bank and the other banks and for local financing on that.

The feasibility engineering is a big part of that.

There is also some exploration in the mineral development. For instance, out in the Jordan, the Dead Sea, there is a group of technicians there working for a contracting firm figuring out ways to take some of the rare metals as well as potash and phosphate out of the waters of the Red Sea and developing fertilizer in those areas.

There is the establishment of technical laboratories, of medical and health centers in all of these countries. Basically, water problems take the big part, methods of trying to spread water, to utilize what drops of water you have there to get the biggest crop, at the same time along with the business of getting better wheat, getting better types of grasses, better livestock, developing a food supply for the livestock they have; reforestation of some of the hills through that area, and generally trying to start with the basic developments in that country essential to it.

About 30 percent of the effort money wise and personnelwise goes into agriculture.

About 20 percent goes into public health and about 10 percent into the educational side, and the rest goes into the development of indus

try, the development of processing plants, the developing of the marketing system and that sort of thing that has to do with the general economy.

That in a very, very broad way is what we are trying to do in those

areas.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Are there any questions?

Mr. JAVITS. What is this 32 to 1 figure? Is that the figure of supplies to actual technical assistance?

Mr. ANDREWS. And the program for next year runs about 1 to 1. The 1954 program will run about 1 to 1.

Mrs. BOLTON. 1 to 1 what?

Mr. ANDREWS. $1 spent for supplies to back up the $1 spent for technicians.

Mr. WOOD. That does not include the special economic assistance which Mr. Gardner has discussed, the $140 million for the area. It is just related to the regular technical progress and development. Mr. VORYS. That is, the $140 million would make it just about 10 to 1; would it not?

Mr. ANDREWS. I am not speaking to that point at all.

Mr. VORYS. Now, Mr. Chairman, I suggest this: We are undergoing what may be a sort of transition period during the hearings on this bill. By Reorganization Plan No. 7, it is proposed that, from now on, the technical assistance and the economic aid will all be administered under the new Foreign Operations Office, so that, insofar as this committee is concerned, it does not do us any good to refer to the past, since it is all before the committee and all comes out of the same taxpayers' pockets, to say, “Well it is economic aid in the country but it is running two divisions."

Now, for the future it is all going to be put in together. There is not much point to our hearing about technical assistance, what the supplies are in the technical-assistance program, if $140 million of supplies is to go into the same area, or country, in the same program. These two things are now to be administered, together.

Mr. MORANO. Under the new reorganization proposal, there will be constituted a Foreign Operations Administration?

Mr. VORYS. Foreign Operations will include massive economic aid and technical assistance. Both of the things that are being presented as two programs, here, are all to be in the same administration next time. They have always been in the same bill before us.

Mr. MORANO. When you refer to economic assistance, do you mean defense-support payments?

Mr. VORYS. Defense support and developmental and progress money, and all the different kinds of nonmilitary spending.

Mr. MORANO. What is your idea that we should lump it all together in these hearings, now?

Mr. VORYS. They have always been before us in the same bill. They are to be put together administratively. It is of no help to the committee any more to say "Well, these are two different things." At least it seems to me that way.

Mr. Javits. I would like to finish my questions, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

You said something about $43 million for this area being 312 to 1, and then you say the 1954 program is 1 to 1.

Mr. CHATHAM. We had that complete earlier.

Mr. JAVITS. I withdraw the question.

Mr. CHATHAM. We have these experts here and, if we are going to argue items of highest policy and propaganda, and so forth, I cannot waste my time. I want to hear what these men have to say.

Unless we are going to listen to that, I will just have to be a reader and not a listener.

I want to make that explanation to the chairman.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Chatham, I am trying my best to try to proceed as rapidly as possible with this program. Mr. Andrews, I believe has completed his statement. If there are no further questions, we will proceed with whoever Mr. Wood has next.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think it would be well for the committee to put this bunch of tables in the record which does give all of the breakdowns of the money in the countries.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Without objection, that will be done. (The tables referred to are as follows:)

TABLE 1.-Technical cooperation and special economic aid-Summary, all TCA

1 Includes $4,595,800 proposed as a supplemental estimate for fiscal year 1953. Of which $30 million for Palestine refugees is requested only as an authorization. It is not planned to request an appropriation for this $30 million at the present session of Congress.

TABLE 2.-Bilateral technical cooperation programs under the Act for
International Development

TABLE 3.-Technical cooperation and special economic aid, worldwide-Comparative summary of obligations by major project category

1 Includes $4,596,000 proposed as a supplemental estimate for fiscal year 1953.

2 Contribution to UNRWA for Palestine refugees.

* Wheat grant to Jordan.

♦ Wheat loans to Afghanistan ($1.5 million) and Pakistan ($15 million). Requested for Palestine refugees as an authorization only.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION-1954 BUDGET SUBMISSION

General introduction

A. Technical cooperation__.

Bilateral

Multilateral, United Nations and Organization of Amer-
ican States___

$130, 984, 500

117, 234, 500

13,750,000

Technical assistance is an essential part of the United States effort for building up the strength of the free world. It is a basic instrument of United States foreign policy.

In the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America nearly a billion people— two-thirds of the free world-are struggling to find new ways of life that will raise them above the poverty, ignorance, and disease of many generations. Their aspirations are rooted in normal instinctive desires-for sufficient food, healthier bodies, and a chance for their children to have better things than they themselves could enjoy. The appeal of communism, especially in underdeveloped areas is the promise of better food and rising living standards for the masses. United States policies must take the initiative from empty Communist promises and slogans by joining with other peoples in tangible cooperative development programs which will visibly bring steady improvement in living conditions and build confidence in free economic institutions.

The principal objective of the technical cooperation program is to share with the peoples of underdeveloped areas the knowledge and skills they need to develop their own abilities and resources. This is done by sending United States and other skilled experts into the cooperating countries to train the native peoples, and by bringing selected local leaders and technicians to the United States for advanced training. To be convincing, teaching must be backed up by results. Consequently, limited supplies and equipment are provided to insure persuasive results from each project.

United States technicians work side by side with the ordinary people of other countries. They teach by demonstration and example. Their aim is to improve the skills and understandings that local workers use in their daily activities. The fruits of such technical cooperation multiply by geometric progression, starting slowly and gaining momentum as more and more people learn to help themselves and in turn teach others. Once the door to the productive capacities of a people is unlocked, economic and resource development tends to proceed at a constantly accelerating pace. Outside assistance is needed less and less. B. Special economic aid for critical areas_.

Near East

South Asia__

$264, 400,000

170,000,000 94, 400, 000

In some underdeveloped areas, however, poverty and unrest among large numbers of the people dangerously expose political and economic institutions to the planned aggression of organized communism. In these less stable situations, pressures are great and time is short. Extra effort is required.

In most countries, under more favorable circumstances, initial capital for development of natural resources is normally furnished by private investors, local taxation, or other regular sources of national and international credit. But where political and economic instability are great and the needs of the people urgent, these sources may not be enough. The modest economic assistance that goes with technical cooperation may need to be stepped up and supplemented by special United States financial aid.

Technical cooperation and special economic aid for critical areas are in general closely related, yet distinct, devices for encouraging economic development, free and democratic institutions, and improved international understanding in underdeveloped countries. Where this emergency aid is necessary, it must be closely integrated with technical cooperation. Special economic aid need not change the essential character of technical assistance as a program of self-help and selfdevelopment. Instead it should serve to increase the effectiveness of technical assistance by providing additional opportunities for the people to make use of their new and growing skills. Such special economic aid is recommended in certain strategic regions of the Near East and South Asia, because of conditions that are immediate, compelling, and urgent.