State Department political desks is attributable to the larger workload required of an operating agency. The political desks are concerned with making policy, and the TCA country branches are concerned with following through on the many details involved in program action. TCA looks to the State Department political bureaus for basic policy determinations on political, security, economic, public affairs, and other matters related to the general conduct of foreign relations with the countries where TCA functions. Under the guidance of such policies the TCA country branches undertake a program of action as follows: 1. They participate in program planning with the various country directors of technical cooperation. They assist the country directors by furnishing information on the availability of technicians in various fields, lead time for the procurement of supplies and equipment, and current policy determinations with relation to grants, loans, investments, and basic materials. They inform the country directors of fiscal and financial policy as well as general political policy, as these relate to plans for technical progress and development.

2. They deal with the technical agencies of the United States Government in the review of project proposals and the recruitment of technicians. They also deal with the embassies of foreign governments in this country, with the politi cal and economic offices of the Department of State, and with the financial agencies, both United States and international, on program and operational matters.

3. They negotiate contracts for technical services with private organizations that can contribute to the program. They follow through on all program matters requiring action in the United States in order to accomplish the work in the field. They determine the point of action and they keep the field informed of action progress.

4. They act as representatives of the country directors on matters of funds, technical services, personnel, equipment, supplies, and other support in the United States.

5. They initiate activity authorizations inaugurating new segments of the work to be done in the field.

PROGRAM DIRECTION

Originally, overseas personnel recruited directly by TCA were listed as "program direction," in accordance with regular State Department practice, whereas overseas personnel recruited directly by the backstopping agencies were listed as "technicians." This practice resulted in an apparent excess of positions labeled "program direction" because a high proportion of the chiefs of technical staffs recruited directly by TCA represented the key technicians concerned entirely with planning and directing particular technical activities.

Last fall TCA undertook to correct this classification and instituted measures to transfer from "program direction" to "technicians" those individuals who were in fact discharging technical functions. Before this could be fully accomplished, however, the Director of Mutual Security ordered a somewhat different classification in order to attain maximum uniformity between TCA and MSA.

The final outcome has been to establish the general principle for TCA that all field personnel spending more than half of their time directly on technical functions, together with their immediately supporting personnel, are listed as "technical staff." Those devoting more than half of their time to program direction, planning, and general administrative services are included in the administrative budget as "program direction staff." The attached table shows the numbers in each of these two categories, by regions, for fiscal years 1952 and 1953, and the numbers planned for fiscal year 1954. All of these are shown in terms of the present definition, which is believed to be the most realistic and useful one available.

With regard to the rate of recruitment of technicians, actual recruitment has fallen considerably below original expectations. It is estimated that on June 30, 1953, technicians in permanent or temporary field positions plus selected technicians being processed will somewhat exceed the revised 1953 program goal of 1,837, but the number will be appreciably less than the approximately 2,180 technicians who, on the basis of present definitions, constituted the targets initially authorized for fiscal year 1953.

The proposals for fiscal year 1954 involve an average increase of less than 10 technicians per country over the original 1953 authorization. Most of the total increase for fiscal 1954, in fact, represents technicians whom other govern

ments have already requested and about the nature of whose work specific discussions have in many instances been held.

Although replacement needs will be somewhat greater in fiscal 1954 than in 1953, the technician goal seems reasonable, particularly when viewed in the light of the following factors which are more favorable than they have been: 1. Personnel reductions in other overseas programs and in Washington will greatly increase the availability of experienced technicians ho are particularly well qualified for many TCA projects. For example, the Bureau of Reclamation alone is releasing some 1,400 people of whom about 100 may be potential candidates for TCA programs.

2. Other governments are constantly becoming better able to size up their needs and what they want to do about them. Simultaneously they grow more familiar with TCA procedures, so that less time is required for projects to reach a stage where TCA can begin to recruit technicians. For instance, a large number of requests for technicians, particularly from the Near East and southern Asia, are now on hand for which it was not possible to recruit earlier.

3. Security investigations have recently required less time than they did in the early months of fiscal year 1953 when the Civil Service Commission was first staffing up and taking over the work from the FBI. Fewer technicians are therefore likely to be lost because they tire of waiting and accept other jobs. 4. TCA is constantly increasing its use of contracts, thus drawing directly on the staffs of colleges, universities, research institutes, engineering and other firms, and voluntary agencies. During the past year the dollar amount of such contracts nearly quadrupled.

5. Initiation of a number of specific projects was delayed in fiscal year 1953 because funds were not apportioned to TCA until October, November, and December.

1 Excludes 3 temporary employees who are accounted for in the program figures.

2 Excludes 33 temporary employees who are accounted for in the program figures.

3 As of Apr. 30, approximately 220 selected candidates were in the pipeline, and about that number should also be in the pipeline on June 30.

Excludes Burma,

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. Let us proceed with another witness or

some part of this program.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, I would like now to call on Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Loftus, who will deal with the special economic assistance and the regular technical progress and development program, assisted by Mr. Andrews, in the south Asia area.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, could I make a request-and I hope the committee will join: I would like to have you bring to the committee all of the pamphlets or booklets or brochures that you get out that you have been publishing.

Mr. ANDREWs. Since the Dworshak amendment or before?

Mr. VORYS. Since the Dworshak amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS. There are only two, sir, and that is one of them. We have also the amount of money we spent for it.

Mr.VORYS. Please bring that in.

Mr. WOOD. May I say one word, Mr. Chairman, before calling on Mr. Kennedy: I am concerned about your question about the (deletion: secret] military aid in the Middle East. If there is a real problem about that, I would ask the privilege of having a further discussion of that at some point prior to your going to the floor on this bill.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. There is going to be a real problem about it; I can assure you of that.

Mr. Wood. If that is true, may we have the privilege of going into that further, because as Mr. Dulles particularly mentioned yesterday, and Mr. Stassen too, this is a matter of very great importance in this particular area of the world.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. And the (deletion-secret).

We will go into that, too.

Mr. Wood. May we have a special session with the military representatives present on that, again, perhaps during the period of the markup, or whenever you can find time to do it? This is a matter of the greatest importance, Mr. Chairman, as indicated by the Secretary of State and Mr. Stassen, yesterday.

Finally, I think we have talked in a somewhat confused way about this area of the Near East this morning. I think we have to take part of the blame for that confusion. However, I would like to point out that if we are going to get on with attempting to solve these problems in this particular area, which Mr. Stassen and Mr. Dulles so eloquently laid before you yesterday, we cannot do it by sitting back and doing nothing. We have to do something about attempting to improve conditions and bringing people together in this area. It is this aspect of the special economic assistance and the regular technical progress and development work that should be kept in mind, even though you may pick out many individual errors in the work that has been done by people trying to get something important done. It would be a miracle if some mistakes had not been made in dealing with so difficult a task.

The Congress itself and the executive branch have decided there is a way in which we can attempt to deal with these problems. However, if we are not given the tools to do this job in a way such as we have described, we have no hope of solving these problems.

Excuse me for making a speech, but this is an important and serious area of the world.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. There is no question about it, Mr. Wood. I would like to have your witnesses make a statement in orderly fashion and afterwards we will ask questions.

We have been jumping all over the place this morning. I suppose I should use this gavel a little bit and try to proceed in an orderly fashion. I hate very much to cut out any questioning, but I feel that we must proceed.

Let us have a statement on this special economic aid and then in an orderly fashion we will ask questions and proceed.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kennedy I know has a statement which I suggest, and I think he was going to suggest, he place in the record. I do not think it is necessary to have a further discussion of the political situation in the south Asian area. Then since time is going on rapidly, I will suggest that Mr. Kennedy be available to answer any questions on this subject and that it will be perhaps most useful if we then proceed to discuss the program in India, which is the largest program in this area. Mr. Loftus is here for that purpose and I will ask Mr. Loftus to describe as briefly as possible the situation we are facing in India and what it is proposed should be done about that situation through special economic assistance and regular technical progress and development programs.

That approach, it seems to me, will give the committee an example of the problems we are dealing with and what our programs for dealing with these problems are like in south Asia. We can then go on to Pakistan or anywhere else you wish and Mr. Kennedy can come in with answers to any questions about the political problems there. Is that satisfactory?

STATEMENT OF DONALD D. KENNEDY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. KENNEDY. It is proposed that we provide technical assistance and economic aid to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal during fiscal 1954 amounting to $139.5 million. This total includes special economic aid to India and Pakistan of $94.4 million. Other outside resources available to these two countries, such as aid from Commonwealth countries under the Colombo plan and loans from the World Bank, do not suffice to meet the essential need for immediate funds for economic development.

A brief indication of the importance and significance of the south Asian area (which includes India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal) will highlight and provide background for the economic program which is being proposed.

The committee has the benefit of the report of the Special Study Mission to Pakistan, India, Thailand and Indochina under the chairmanship of Mr. Chester E. Merrow.

I would like to add that Mr. Merrow and the members of the mission-Messrs. Judd, Carnahan, and Zablocki-undertook an arduous task under very unfavorable climate conditions.

As the report of the Special Study Mission states, South Asia is the most important area of that part of the great Asian land mass which is not already under Communist control or under direct Communist attack.

More than that, these countries have about 450 million peoplebetween one-fourth and one-fifth of the world's population. They command the Indian Ocean and are assential elements in the line of communications between the Mediterranean and the Pacific. They

possess important strategic and other raw materials which are available for the use of the free world.

India and Pakistan became independent only in 1947, and they are determined to the best of their ability to remain free and independent. All four governments face grave and vast problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy. They are presently non-Communist and part of the free world, but they need help to maintain their position of leadership in their countries and to strengthen the democratic institutions they are trying to bring to maturity.

These countries have 2,000 miles of border with the U. S. S. R. and Communist China-that part of the border which lies between Iran on the west and Burma on the east. The people of this area, and they constitute about 60 percent of those being helped under the technical assistance program, are experiencing the new nationalistic spirit and breath of freedom now running throughout Asia. They will no longer accept resignation as the guiding principle but instead are impatient and demanding for progress.

In the case of India the move for independence was led by the Congress Party. This party is now in power under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru.

Having thrown off foreign control, the people of India demand the progress which they have been led to expect. To meet this political as well as economic need the Government of India has developed a 5-year plan, and 2 years of the 5 have already elapsed.

India has adopted a democratic constitution, has had free and democratic elections, and is following constitutional processes in its daily life. By the end of 1956 or in early 1957 new national elections will be held at which time the present leadership will be tested.

At that time the people of India will be subjected to the most extravagant claims and promises of Communists and other extremists against which they will weigh the accomplishments of their present leadership. If those accomplishments are substantial and provide the hope for future progress, the basis will exist for the rejection by the people of India of these false claims.

The period between now and the next election then is the time during which United States aid should have its greatest effectiveness. The natural question will be: "Has the path which the Indian people followed been the right one?"

Or, would authoritarian, totalitarian methods be better. Democracy is being tested now and during the next 2 or 3 years. It would be a catastrophe if lack of assistance which we could provide should contribute to failure. The rest of Asia is watching this test.

Pakistan's need for assistance is correspondingly great. This country is part of the same geographic area as is India, and in fact for generations was indistinguishable from the rest of the subcontinent of South Asia.

It gained independence at the same time as India and it must make economic progress in the next 2 to 3 years to provide the base for political stability. It has still graver problems than those India faces, among them being the thousand miles of separation between east and west Pakistan.

Because of this and other problems it has been unable to develop and adopt its own constitution and has just recently gone through a governmental crisis. The new Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, former