tions. Nobody can put up any opposition candidates on his own. They write things that sound nice in the papers. I read these things in the original form and talk to Yugoslavs who can explain things I might not know.

Mr. JAVITS. Do you think it is possible to get the satellites to break away from the Soviet bloc? Do you think it is to our interest?

Mr. SMYTH. It is to our interest to get anybody away from the Soviet blocs. I base my opinion on 33 years of contact with Yugoslavs and from time to time I meet Yugoslav Communists. I will say that I practically never see them the second time because when they report the next day that they were with Symth, they get orders not to see Smyth.

Mr. JAVITS. The nub of your position is that you just do not believe them. You just do not believe their protestations or anything they are doing?

Mr. SMYTH. Not a bit.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bentley?

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Smyth, that is a very interesting statement. Am I correct in believing that you have not been in Yugoslavia since 1941?

Mr. SMYTH. No, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you here in the States, have much contact with anti-Tito-Yugoslav groups?

Mr. SмYTн. I do. I also read Tito's own papers published in Belgrade. I get those from time to time.

Mr. BENTLEY. I just wondered in some of this information you have contained your statement, that it might have been furnished by some of these groups.

Mr. SMYTH. The information in my statement is based on the result of talking-and naturally, I read the papers. Certain friends of mine get the Yugoslav paper from Prague. There is another one in Moscow and sometimes I see the ones from Belgrade. The party paper and the former leading paper of Yugoslavia which you could call the leading nonparty paper today are available in our libraries.

I read those things. I talk to whoever I can. Sometimes, as I say, I will talk to a Communist directly; sometimes I hear what somebody else has said who has been talking to one, but this is based on the best information I can get from all sources available to me.

Mr. BENTLEY. Now, do you believe that the June 1948 break was enuine?

Mr. SMYTH. As I stated in here, the June 1948 break came because of the fact that Stalin-this is just my opinion-thought that Tito was getting a little bit too big for his shoes. You see, Stalin always inisted that the people under him, leading his satellites, and everybody nder him, would just do what he wanted. He would say, "We want his done," and you'd say, "It will be done."

A very important thing for the Soviets would be to get across Yugoavian-Macedonia, to have their contact between Bulgaria and

Ibania.

You know they control Albania today.

One of the best-informed men I have met said that at that time 1948) Stalin wanted to make a deal to get a strip across Yugoslav

33064-53--63

Macedonia in exchange for some of Austria, in which there is quite a Slovene or Yugoslav population.

Tito was against that. So Stalin wanted to have a man who would do exactly what he wanted.

Then again about that time, or prior to that, a year or so before, Tito apparently had been cuddling up to Gorgi Demetrov, head Communist in Bulgaria and the former secretary general in the Cominform until it was dissolved in 1943.

One of the last things that Stalin wanted was to have the Bulgars and the Serbs get together and make a powerful Yugoslav state of Bulgarians and the Serbians.. Demetrov was invited to Moscow and died a natural death up there as many other people have.

Tito did not go there so he is still living.

I think that was the reason for the break. He wanted to get rid of Tito. As I stated in here, the three former secretaries general of the Yugoslav Communist Party all went to Moscow and died. Tito did not want to break with Moscow.

Zdanoff was head of the Cominform then. He was running it when they put Tito out. Zdanoff went back to Moscow and a few years later he died-also it may have been a natural death, but he died.

Malenkov, the man who nominated Tito to be Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1937-and Tito was put in there by the Cominform-Malenkov today is the No. 1 man in Russia.

It is a very good connection, there.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have two more brief questions and we have other people to hear.

What do you know of Yugoslavia since the June 1948 break? Has Tito retreated ideologically from the Soviet position?

Mr. SMYTH. I would say not in the least bit. All you have to do is read Tito's writings. People in the rest of the world did not believe Adolf Hitler when they read Mein Kampf. All they had to do was read it and it was there, his whole plan.

Everything Stalin did was in his book, but people do not want to read those things. Tito has constantly said, "I am a Communist, but I am a better Communist than the Soviets."

However, everything he has done has been right down the Moscow

line.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you know of any organized non-Communist resistance inside Yugoslavia?

Mr. SMYTH. There certainly is.

Mr. BENTLEY. Are you assuming there is or do you know about it?

Mr. SMYTH. I know something about those things and this is not the place in a public meeting to talk about them.

Mr. BENTLEY. I am just asking you, yes or no?

Mr. SMYTH. If you people would like to hear my idea about what we should do, please invite me to a closed hearing. My name is Smyth and I am sorry to say that a very fine gentleman, a professor at Princeton University prepared a beautiful report on the atomic bomb and it was available to the whole world. We spent billions of dollars to develop the atomic bomb, then we put out the report and the Soviets could come along and for $10 or $20 buy it.

I do not want to be the second Smyth who gets his name on something like that.

Mr. BENTLEY. I have enjoyed your statement. Many of your facts have been corroborated by our mutual friend, Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane. Mr. SMITH. Mr. Griswold, please.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE GRISWOLD, EDITOR, PUBLISHER OF BACKGROUND FOR TOMORROW (FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS)

Mr. SMITH. Will you give your name and your occupation and address for the record, Mr. Griswold?

Mr. GRISWOLD. Mr. Chairman, ladies, and gentlemen of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my name is Lawrence Griswold. I am the editor and publisher of Background for Tomorrow, a weekly subscription service of forecasts and analyses in the field of foreign affairs, with offices here in Washington.

At several times during the past quarter century, I have visited and lived in the Middle East. During 1948-49, I was an observer with the Iraq Army in Palestine and afterward an observer with the Arab Legion.

During this period, as well as after the truces, I spent several weeks in the investigation of refugee camps with a view toward making a documentary film of them for the International Red Cross.

In 1951 I spent another 2 months in Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon and again visited the refugee camps. Deterioration in morale was marked.

I should say at this point an Arab is not a Communist and could not be an Arab and a good Communist together. The Arabs as a usual thing believe that communism is completely unacceptable, as being both godless and antihuman.

Communism, which was unknown in 1949, was rampant in 1951. The Arab refugees were hostile and belligerent instead of bewildered and pathetic. They appeared frustrated to the point of exasperation and their minds were made up that the United States was responsible for their position.

I must admit that I am in full agreement with them. And for this reason, I am convinced that before the United States can again deal amicably and successfully with any Arab nation, the dilemma of the Arab refugees must be solved.

Moreover, in order to benefit from any solution, the United States must provide it, implement it, and accomplish it. Otherwise it will be time and money wasted. The Arabs are not angry at the United Nations, but the United States.

Fortunately, there is a solution. It is neither cheap nor simple. It must involve the cooperation of one or more Arab States. However, after careful investigation, I am convinced it can be done.

The plan proposes the use of Arab refugee in the rehabilitation of the ancient irrigation system of Iraq, and in the construction of the dams at Behkme and Yusuf Pasha in Iraq and Syria respectively.

The irrigation canals of Iraq date back to the fourth millenium before the Christian Era. Utilizing the fact that the bed of the Euphrates river is approximately 35 feet higher than that of the Tigris, and taking advantage of the roughly parallel course of both great rivers, the early inhabitants of Al Iraq-the land between the rivers simply connected the two water courses by ditches and farmed the land made fertile along the banks of the canals.

Thus the waters from the Euphrates River flowed through the irrigation system into the Tigris which became a drain. When the Tigris was in flood, catch basins held the overflow until the summer heat evaporated it.

Due to this agriculture, Iraq was known as the eastern extremity of the Fertile Crescent, that great arch of vegetation which arose in Palestine, curved across the Jezirah of Syria and finally descended between the twin rivers to the Persian Gulf.

In the times of the Abbasid Caliphate, Iraq was said to have contained a population ranging in estimates betwen the figures of 16 million and 25 million. When the Mongol hordes of Hulaku Khan and those later scourges of Tamerlane and the Ottoman Turks destroyed and redestroyed the canals in the 13th, 14th, and 16th centuries, Iraq became a vast desert and its population declined to about a tenth of the former figures.

Nowadays, it contains somewhat under 5 million inhabitants. Baghdad, alone, has an excess over 1 million.

The difference lies in the ability of the land to feed its people. If the canals were again opened, a job which has already been plotted during the British mandate, Iraq could absorb many times the number of refugees now driven out of their homes in Palestine. The projected Bekhme Dam, near Mosul, underscores this optimism.

In Syria, there are two lesser projects. The Yusuf Pasha Dam, along the upper Euphrates, east of the Jezirah, and the Ghorb drainage project in west central Syria. Syrian authorities estimate that 200,000 refugees could be employed in the work of dam construction and drainage work and could afterward be settled on the land reclaimed.

The major portion of the refugees would, however, find a more practical haven in Iraq. Waves of convoys from the refugee camps will have to be organized so that as one area is reclaimed and ready for settlement, another will be prepared, by the construction of housing, barracks, commissaries, and so forth, for the next wave, each of which should be the maximum number practicable.

Within 18 months from the first resettlement wave, 2 waves should be on the ground, 1 farming the revived soil and the second working on the canals. A third wave should be in the process of selection at some predetermined staging area in Jordan, or Syria.

The project could be outlined, more or less, as follows:

(a) This committee could appoint a commission to go to Iraq and Syria for the purpose of informal conversations with the Iraqi Parliament and a Syrian commission appointed by that Government. The purpose would be to explore the technique of resettlement and to gain the greatest cooperation possible from these Arab bodies, for example, trucks, carpenters and lumber, commissary supplies, and so forth.

(b) A commission comprising Americans and members of host nations should explore the different refugee camps to drain off points. of greatest tension by selecting such camps for the first wave.

(e) A staging area should be provided for the organization of convoys. This must be guarded since the Arab refugees are largely contaminated by Communist doctrines and it will be the responsibility of the resettlement commission to prevent this from spreading to the nationals of the host countries.

(d) Working with each nation-Iraq and Syria-engineering parties should partition the areas in Iraq to be reclaimed as well as those in Syria, which shall be allotted to the natives of the host country.

By this, I mean to say that each host country should have some area of the reclaimed land allotted to its own citizens for exploitation.

It should be noted at this time that in the Middle East, all land belongs to someone, and that even the most desolate areas are generally portioned out among the tribes in hereditary grants and grazing rights.

These rights must be honored and perhaps the most simple solution is to allot a certain percentage of reclaimed land to each government for distribution to its owners.

(e) When the above preliminaries are disposed of, quarters for the first wave must be erected and made ready. These people will probably arrive without necessary furniture or cooking equipment or even adequate clothing, although the staging area should be equipped to issue rations of much higher caloric content than those issued in the camps, as well as such clothing as will be needed by the worker and his family who will accompany him.

(f) Finally, when the arrangements are complete, truck convoys will collect the first groups, estimated at a minimum of 10,000 monthly, transport them across the Great Syrian Desert to designated work camps on the land to be reclaimed.

(g) According to my information, there is already money earmarked for such resettlement, amounting to about $250 million. This should be adequate for the projects noted above. Estimates for the rehabilitation of the Iraq irrigation system range from $100 million to $150 million. The Syrian Yusuf Pash and Ghorb projects range between 60 million and 75 million. At the most, then, $225 million would be expended upon the work and materials of the projects, leaving $25 million, for administration, and other expenses.

The end products should be of tremendous advantage to everyone. Iraq would be an exporter of food in an area where chronic shortages exist. Even the climate of Iraq would be improved. Power would be more plentiful and cheaper.

The same advantages would accrue to Syria.

For the United States they would be prepared for renewed amity with the people of the most vitally strategic area on earh, and the most imporant obstacle to an agreement on a Middle East defense pact would have been removed.

And, so far as communism is concerned in the Middle East, the above plan could halt it in its tracks.

I think that covers the broad skeleton of the solution I suggest and I would be very happy to answer any questions.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Vorys, any questions?

Mr. VORYS. I defer to the specialists in this area.

Mrs. BOLTON. Yours has been a very interesting presentation, Mr. Griswold.

What is the attitude of the people in Iran?

Mr. GRISWOLD. I think there is great resistance to be overcome. However, this resistance is predicated upon two assumptions, first that the wave of migration coming into Iraq from Palestine would remove employment possibilities from people already on the ground.