problems persist, the threat of cholera, typhoid, measles, and other serious health problems has been largely controlled through the massive intervention of medical assistance, purified water, and emergency food-all airlifted to the remote mountaintop camps over the past 4 short weeks. It is an extraordinary accomplishment, even at substantial cost, and it could only have been accomplished through the intervention of an on-site military force which could be ordered to make it work.

VISITS TO CAMPS ALONG TURKISH BORDER

The subcommittee delegation spent 3 days in refugee areas along the Turkish-Iraq border during the first week of May, including: -Visits to two of the largest refugee camps (Cukurca and Yekmal), viewing conditions, interviewing refugees, and meeting with relief officials;

-Visits to a "way station" run by the French military for refugees returning from Isikveren camp;

-Visits to areas to which refugees are returning, including Zakho and Al Amadiyah; and

-Briefings with key military, United Nations, voluntary agency, and other officials involved in relief and security arrangements in Turkey and northern Iraq.

At the time of the delegation's arrival, roughly 2 weeks after President Bush's April 16 announcement, an estimated 500,000 Kurdish refugees were still located in the six major encampments along the Iraq-Turkish border, after an earlier peak population of about 750,000. Death rates had been brought down from over 1,000 per day to about 50, and were rapidly declining. Helicopter landing pads had been constructed in all the camps, and continuous helicopter runs of food, medicines, and other supplies were being made each day as long as daylight lasted.

Upon arrival in the Cukurca camp, it was immediately evident that a long-term refugee relief operation could not be sustained there. Over 100,000 refugees were perched along the sides of a high rocky mountain valley abutting the Turkish border. While coalition forces and voluntary agencies-primarily the French Medicines sans Frontieres-had ably brought the camp's catastrophic death rates under control, the camp still resembled a festering slum.

Everyone had tents or some shelter-unlike conditions just 3 weeks before-but they were crammed haphazardly along the long and steep mountain valley. The filth of human habitation was everywhere, with the prospect of decent sanitation minimized by the confining terrain in which the camp was located.

The conditions at Yekmal, however, were better. The population was smaller, numbering about 60,000 and the camp was located in a broader valley fed by a strong mountain stream. Just as with Cukurca, Yekmal had experienced high death rates of over 100 per day in the early period of the refugee crisis. On the day the delegation visited, the Canadian Red Cross doctors in the camp reported only five deaths, all infants associated with common maternity problems.

However, in both Cukurca and Yekmal, the most important deadline facing the population is the looming exhaustion of the camps' sole water source-the snow-fed mountain streams that will soon dry up with the approach of summer. Relief experts estimated at the time that this water supply would last only another 3 to 4 weeks. Thereafter, water would have to be brought in by helicopter and, to the limited extent possible, overland over poor and unreliable mountain roads.

Approximately 200,000 refugees still have to move off the mountain tops. Otherwise, death rates will likely climb once again. But their ability to move is dependent upon the adequacy of security arrangements for their return to the northern Iraqi lowlands and the international community's provisions for their assistance upon return-still under negotiation.

EXPERIENCES OF THE REFUGEES

The brutality which the Kurdish refugees have faced, both at the hands of Iraqi troops and the harsh weather during their flight,

was severe.

The towns which the refugees fled-Dahuk, Zakho, and otherswere encircled by Iraqi troops as the Kurdish rebellion of March began to fall apart. As Kurdish civilians in these cities were bombarded by Iraqi forces, they feared they had only a few hours to escape-a few hours before the Iraqi encirclement was complete and they would be targets for Saddam's slaughter or poison gas. So the flight was sudden and unplanned-sheer panic-and families brought few, if any, supplies with them.

The trip to relative safety in Turkey took 1 to 2 weeks for most Kurdish refugees. But the time of their flight coincided with some of the worst winter weather of the year. Winter rains and snow fell almost continuously throughout this period. Refugees-particularly children and the elderly-lost their lives by the thousands due to exposure. In fact, few families were immune to the death of at least one child during flight.

One group interviewed in Cukurca was composed of the leaders of a clan of 500 Kurds, all from Dahuk. The clan included the president of the Dahuk Chamber of Commerce, two lawyers, a high school teacher, and other professionals. The entire clan departed together on March 29, and over an 8-day period coursed on foot through the Iraqi towns of Sersenk and Al Amadiyeh, before finally arriving in the high mountains bordering Turkey.

Every family unit in the clan lost family members along the way. One family of 23 lost 2 children and an elderly grandmother due to exposure and hunger. One Kurdish woman reported that she had miscarried in flight. When asked why she had risked her baby's life in the exodus, she replied it was because she had watched the Iraqi forces kill her husband and three sons before her

eyes.

ASSISTANCE AND TREATMENT OF REFUGEES BY TURKEY

The Government of Turkey has facilitated the refugee relief effort in many ways. It has opened its doors to one of the largest relief operations in history, permitting an extraordinary array of

organizations to base their relief personnel there-from the large coalition military forces to the many assisting voluntary_agencies. In addition, the Turkish Government and the Turkish Red Crescent Society has assisted in many ways, taking primary responsibility for one-the so-called Haj Camp-near Silopi.

But while Turkey is to be commended for these efforts, there have been a number of serious concerns regarding the actions of Turkish border guards and local officials.

Among the inhumanities faced by the refugees was the fact that most of the refugees report numerous instances of brutality at the hands of Turkish border guards. Many were forced to remain on the borders' edge in harsh conditions on mountain slopes. If the refugees had been permitted to cross the border-even by half a mile-to enter more hospitable Turkish valleys and facilities, some of the tragic loss of life could have been minimized during those desperate early days in April.

In addition, there have been unnecessarily long lines of relief trucks waiting for simple customs clearance at the Turkish border between Silopi and Zakho. Many of the relief convoys were held up by local Turkish customs officers soliciting bribes and requiring time-consuming and unnecessary searches of coalition relief convoys-often delaying the delivery of urgently needed relief supplies by as much as a day or more. During the delegation's visit, over 200 trucks were being held up at the border at Silopi because of the demand for bribes of civilian truckers hired by U.S. and alliance forces.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SAFE RETURN

By early May, coalition forces secured a corner of northwestern Iraq and refugees from those areas have begun returning by the tens of thousands. Return routes had been identified, secured and repaired by the coalition and the United Nations. And way stations with medical personnel, food and other supplies had been established. One route and way station observed by the delegation-the route from Isikveren-was well organized by French forces, and refugees were traveling down the mountains in large numbers on every vehicle known to man-cars, tractors, trucks, busses, even an odd sortment of garbage trucks.

Once down into the Iraqi plains, refugees have the option of joining coalition-run refugee camps, if they decide not to immediately return to their home towns. In the refugee camps in Zakho, most occupants came either for food and medical care or to await security arrangements for their specific towns-particularly Dahuk.

Obviously, much of the return of the refugees depends upon the current negotiations over Dahuk, a major Kurdish city which numbered over 400,000 inhabitants before the March rebellion. Refugee experts indicate that once Dahuk is secured, about 90 percent of those in camps along the Turkish border can return to their home

towns.

Clearly, this does not solve the problem of over 1.3 million Kurdish refugees in Iran. Most of that population came from the cities of Kirkuk, Arbil, and Mosul, which are not envisioned to be part of

the coalition zone-and most likely will not be ceded by Baghdad for that purpose due to their strategic importance and oil reserves. However, it appeared to the subcommittee delegation that there are a number of possible future security options which do not require the extensive, continuing presence of U.S. or allied forces under the feared "quagmire" scenario. Negotiations by the United Nations are underway and it should be possible for a comprehensive United Nations security presence to remain in northern Iraq in some form, including options which would permit Kurds, rather than only Iraqis, to serve as police and other civil authorities in predominantly Kurdish areas of Iraq.

III. CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

The delegation spent time in two cities held by the coalitionZakho in northwestern Iraq and Al Amadiyah in central northern Iraq. Zakho formerly had 100,000 inhabitants. A fourth of the population had come back by early May. During the day, many were in the streets and a sporadic shop was open here and there. But by nightfall, the entire city was shut down and completely dark.

Al Amadiyah, a town of ancient Assyrian origin, was still almost completely abandoned. Iraqi forces had been expelled only 5 days before the delegation's arrival, and the population had not begun to return. In the town, stores were either locked tight or viciously looted, and garbage was strewn on the main street. An estimated 400 people had returned to this town of formerly about 4,000 to 5,000 people.

Scattered throughout northern Iraq are the remains of former Kurdish villages, emptied and razed during Saddam Hussein's 1988 campaign to gas and expel Kurdish villagers and move survivors into new towns under Iraqi military control. Refugees returning from the mountain camps bordering Turkey must travel past these grim reminders of the history of brutality against them by the Baghdad government. These monuments to terror lend visible support to the refugees' fears of returning to the cities of Iraq without assurances for their safety.

CONCERNS ABOUT SECRET POLICE

A number of sources, including the United States military, voluntary agencies and the United Nations, remain concerned about the continuing presence of Iraqi secret police. In Zakho alone, it was estimated that 100 to 150 secret police continue to operate, often leaving the town at night, but returning during the day to monitor the population.

Ongoing security arrangements through the coalition and the United Nations are expected to avert for the foreseeable future the kind of large-scale assault against Kurdish civilians that the Iraqi army mounted in late March. However, the problem of the secret police will likely remain a troubling factor in northern Iraq-as well as the southern demilitarized zone along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border-for some time to come.

Currently, coalition forces are expelling secret police from the region as they are identified. But the activities of these police-the prospect of ongoing harassment, disappearances, et cetera-must

be the subject of continued monitoring and concern by the United Nations and the international community.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY

The scale of relief required, the logistical problems of the terrain, and the security problems in the area meant that only the military could successfully play the lifesaving role of providing relief for the Kurds. The U.S. military, together with coalition partners, not only met the demands of the job, but excelled in the task.

A total of about 8,000 coalition forces were involved directly in the relief effort, about half from the United States. These included Special Forces contingents, who in the earliest days used their unique training to scale the mountain terrain and provide emergency medical assistance to dying Kurds. They included the logistics experts, who coordinated the ferrying of relief supplies by helicopter, and the many pilots who put in extra hours to see that the maximum amount of relief possible was flown to the camps during periods of daylight and good weather. And they also included the civil affairs contingents-many of them reservists who had already served in "Operation Desert Storm"-who constructed camps and way stations in northern Iraq to receive refugees returning from the mountain camps.

While some voluntary agencies were quickly on the scene, and were performing remarkable service in the medical and other fields, even they could not have done as much without the assistance of the military. Military helicopters transported their personnel and equipment to the mountain slopes, and kept them supplied with medicines and other necessities. The allied military skillfully secured Zakho, Al Amadiyah, and the surrounding territory, without a shot being fired.

Through its able handling of this humanitarian crisis, the military has created a new mission for itself in similar disasters. Already, the United States has used this precedent to respond to the devastating cyclone in Bangladesh; only the military possessed the helicopters and amphibious craft needed to bring relief goods to areas of Bangladesh which were still unapproachable. Military engineers also have the training and resources to rebuild roads, bridges and other infrastructure essential to completing the task of relief.

The main assets which the military has to offer in future mass disaster situations are logistical, particularly helicopters and other air support, relief supplies, and personnel. The military also has food, tents, medicines, and other supplies on hand in different parts of the world which can be of use in disasters. However, as was discovered in the Kurdish case, the food delivered in the early stages of the crisis-the military's "meals ready-to-eat" or "MRE's”— helped thousands of suffering refugees, was not appropriate for persons suffering from acute diarrhea or other life-threatening conditions which are always present in times of disaster.

A future humanitarian role for the military should be encouraged and further refined to allow for needs which are particular to natural and refugee disasters. For example, joint planning between the Pentagon and U.S. AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance