might enable the military to quickly deliver anti-diarrheal oral rehydration salts, water purification tablets, and other standard relief supplies in future disasters.

IV. IRAN: UNMET NEEDS

As the refugees on the Iranian border number three times those on the Turkish border, the subcommittee delegation had also hoped to visit Kurdish refugee camps along the Iranian-Iraqi border, and it deeply regrets that the Iranian Government denied it visas. Due to the difficult relations with Iran, the United States has not assisted the Kurdish refugees in Iran in any direct significant way. The Germans, Europeans, and international humanitarian organizations are making laudable efforts to cope with the crisis but the scant reports available make it difficult to judge conditions in the Iranian camps.

Unfortunately, both the United States and the Iranian Governments have let politics stand in the way of providing the massive relief efforts needed for the Kurds in Iran. The United States Government should have offered massive direct assistance and, if the Iranians refused, we should have channeled a much larger amount of assistance through the international agencies and European governments assisting Iran. The policy of leaving the Iranian half of the crisis to the Europeans was not a sufficient response to the overwhelming need.

The subcommittee will continue to seek visas to visit the refugee camps in Iran and to hope the Government of Iran will consider its request for permission as well as those of American voluntary agencies to travel to Iran. These missions are purely of a humanitarian nature and such visits could assist in the efforts to alleviate the plight of the Kurdish refugees in Iran.

Meanwhile, the United States should provide a much higher level of indirect assistance to the international agencies and governments currently aiding Kurdish refugees in Iran. The administration should continue to do as much as possible to provide lifesaving assistance through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross. We should continue to offer direct assistance publicly and on a large scale. It should be made clear whether it is the Iranians or the United States who is preventing massive direct aid.

V. CONDITIONS IN KUWAIT

The delegation travelled to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border to review the refugee situation in that region. Of the approximately 40,000 refugees in southern Iraq, the vast majority were in the process of relocation to camps in Saudi Arabia and Iran. An estimated 25,000 have been relocated to Saudi Arabia and another 2,000 to Iran.

The delegation visited three refugee sites along the Kuwait-Iraq border-the Abdali refugee camp, the town of Safwan and "Camp India." The camps we visited were clearly overburdened by the large and sudden arrival of so many refugees fleeing Iraq, though relief workers were coping ably with the need. The basic needs of the refugees were met and the quick response of the international community is to be commended.

The presence of several international humanitarian organizations in the camps created some bureaucratic confusion as one organization had not been designated as the lead.

The threat of secret police reprisals throughout the region continues to be an issue of concern. While large scale attacks by Iraqi forces was not an issue of serious concern, many refugees told the delegation of their fear that Iraqi secret police would infiltrate the camps and border towns and harass and intimidate the population. The fear of reprisal was evident in the border town of Safwan. At the time of the delegation's visit, the residents had already begun to paint over anti-Saddam graffiti with pro-Saddam graffiti in an effort to avoid retribution by the Iraqi security forces and secret police. The international community should continue to be concerned about the safety of individuals throughout this region.

There remain an estimated 2,000 refugees in the Abdali II camp and the demilitarized zone. The population is made up of: -Iraqis who lack proper identification or chose not to seek relocation in Iran or Saudi Arabia,

-Stateless individuals referred to as "Bidoons," which means "those without." Neither the Saudis nor the Kuwaitis accept responsibility for these individuals and they remain in limbo,

and

-Third country national who worked in Kuwait prior to the invasion. The Government of Kuwait continues to deny the right of these individuals to return to Kuwait.

The international community must remain engaged in the plight of these remaining individuals until they are relocated or their status resolved. The Government of Kuwait indicated to the delegation it would permit the refugee camps to remain open until the issue is fully resolved.

The refugee situation in the region is likely to continue until adequate measures are taken to protect the Iraqi population_in southern Iraq. The international community must stay engaged to achieve that goal so that the 25,000 Iraqi refugees now in Saudi Arabia can return home. It must also continue to resolve the cases of those who remain in the refugee camps in the border area.

The U.S. military demonstrated extraordinary skill and flexibility here as well in shifting from a military to a humanitarian mission. Together with international humanitarian organizations, the United States military provided food, shelter and medical care to tens of thousands of refugees fleeing repression by Iraqi forces in southern Iraq.

In addition, the U.S. military organized, on very short notice, an airlift of 1,000 refugees a day from the Safwan Airfield-literally creating a temporary "tent airport" in the desert. The delegation witnessed the departure of these refugees and was impressed by the cleanliness, organization and humane manner in which the departing refugees were treated.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN KUWAIT

Before the war, Kuwait had a population of about 2.1 million people, an estimated 7 percent of whom enjoyed full rights as Kuwaiti citizens. In general only adult males over 21 years of age who

can prove their lineage to a male who arrived in Kuwait prior to 1920 are permitted to vote. The war has changed the political and social environment in Kuwait. Those who stayed behind during the war, primarily the middle class, are demanding a broader role in the affairs of their country. They are pressing primarily for reestablishment of the Parliament and full implementation of the 1962 constitution. Women played an important role in the resistance and are seeking the right to vote and to run for office. "Second category" Kuwaitis-those who are considered citizens but are denied the right to vote-may in a few cases be permitted to obtain citizenship, although it appears the issue will be put off until after Parliamentary elections. There appears to be little serious consideration of extending citizenship to the noncitizens-the third country nationals, the stateless Bidoons and the Palestinians—and these individuals are likely to see little change or expansion of their rights.

An opposition is emerging and is seeking reforms in several

areas:

1. A restoration of the 1962 constitution.-Since Parliament was disbanded in 1986, the government has ruled by decree and can curtail civil and human rights. The opposition wants a restoration of the constitution and the rights guaranteed in the constitution.

2. A date for parliamentary elections.-The Emir has said he will hold elections and has indicated they will be within a year but has failed to set a specific date.

3. Right to vote.-Many opposition members want to extend the right to vote to women and to the second category of Kuwaitis. Some argue for third country nationals to be included.

4. Unity government.-The opposition wants a role in the government prior to the elections, including some cabinet positions, to ensure that the elections occur fairly.

5. Human rights.-Intimidation of suspected collaborators with the Iraqis continues and is largely ignored by the government. Although the Amnesty International report forced the government to condemn the practice and violations have declined, incidents continue, and the government could do more to stop them. Animosity toward Palestinian collaborators with Iraq clouds the government's willingness to intervene on behalf of innocent Palestinians. The international community and the United States should do more to ensure their protection.

6. Press. The government severely curtails the press and prohibits the function of a non-governmental press. It has not licensed opposition papers, prohibited press conferences and continues to censor articles.

7. Political parties.—While political organizations are currently allowed to function, political parties are illegal and face the threat of harassment. The opposition is urging that parties be legalized.

8. Funding. The political opposition needs funding, outside advice and printing presses. While funding is available from the Kuwaiti population, outside support would be an important signal of encouragement for the opposition. The government is

already complaining it will take 7 months to register voters, since all records were destroyed. Outside assistance could expedite the process and make it more credible.

PALESTINIANS

Intimidation of Palestinians since Kuwait's liberation has declined since Amnesty International published its most recent report. But the delegation heard reports that human rights violations had been carried out by persons connected to the royal family, as well as members of the state security, military intelligence, and private militia. Some 600 Palestinians are in jail for collaboration. Some of the charges against them carry the death penalty although Kuwait does not have a history of executions.

ISRAELI BOYCOTT

The United States has long been concerned with the Arab boycott of Israel. Eighty-two Senators wrote to the Government of Kuwait urging it to end its role in the boycott. The government has indicated it will no longer enforce the boycott of companies that do business with Israel or require a certificate of origin. However, the delegation was disappointed with the government's less than forceful commitment to end the practice.

The delegation also objected to the stamp put in its passports beside the Kuwaiti visa, which reads "This visa is considered void if bearer obtained an Israeli visa thereafter." The delegation was told by government officials that this practice was no longer official policy, but it should be terminated forthwith.

VI. CONDITIONS IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED IRAQ

While the delegation did not visit areas of Iraq under Baghdad's control, there was considerable concern throughout the region regarding the plight of civilians in that country. Not only were security-related issues raised, especially regarding the feared secret police, but also the fact that large segments of the population are suffering from disease and malnutrition.

If these issues are not addressed, Iraqi civilians are expected to migrate to United Nations and coalition assisted areas in search of help and protection.

On April 15, in a hearing before the subcommittee, an official from the International Committee of the Red Cross underscored this possibility. Dr. Peter Fuchs, head of ICRC's Gulf Task Force, described not only the acute humanitarian needs among Iraqi civilians, but also noted that refugees who have fled Iraq are not likely to return to their homes until adequate assistance is available in their home areas. Dr. Fuchs stated:

Having been present in Iraq before, during and after the war, the ICRC alerted the international community as early as the 17th of February, and then again on the 19th of March, on the disastrous situation [in Iraq] in terms of water supply and lack of basic food and, by the way, other potential causes of displacement of civilians. Lack of food

and water is not necessarily a pull factor to make refugees
come back.

These findings presented to the subcommittee were confirmed by a Harvard University study team of public health experts. The Harvard team visited the major urban areas of Iraq from April 28 to May 6 and found the whole of Iraq to be "a public health catastrophe." The team found widespread and severe malnutrition; cholera, typhoid, and gastroenteritis epidemic throughout Iraq; a breakdown of the country's health care system, and the incapacitation of water purification and sewage disposal systems.

As a result, the Harvard team projected that, if the international community does not respond, at least 170,000 Iraqi children are likely to die over the next year.

Both the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross have issued appeals for funds to respond to these and other needs within the region. So far, the United States has focused its energies on the Kurdish refugee relief through the U.S. military in northern and southern Iraq and has not contributed significant funds to these international appeals. While the President's policy continues to be that Saddam Hussein's government, and not the United States, should redevelop Iraq, this should not preclude appropriate donations by the United States to international organizations to address emergency humanitarian needs for civilians throughout the country.

Hopefully, with the passage of a supplemental appropriation for Kurdish refugee relief, which replenishes many of the accounts which had been depleated in recent weeks, the administration will have in hand the funds needed to respond more adequately to the pending international appeals. The government in Baghdad has amply demonstrated its disregard for many of these needs. A failure by the international community to respond to them will lead to increased migration and loss of innocent lives.

In addition, the United States should facilitate the work of private voluntary agencies in responding to relief needs in Iraq. Not only are voluntary agencies essential to continuing efforts with the Kurds in northern Iraq, but they can play a vital, lifesaving role with civilians in other parts of the country.

One way in which the administration could support voluntary agency efforts would be to exercise its authority under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 to exempt humanitarian assistance from the embargo and to authorize private voluntary agencies to work in Iraq to provide such assistance. Some voluntary agency officials have expressed concern that, even for their work with refugees in coalition-controlled areas, they are theoretically subject to penalties under the Sanctions Act. This fear of legal sanctions under the act is magnified for those agencies wishing to work in areas of the country which are not under coalition control. The administration should move to ease these fears by clarifying that it will waive the provisions of the Sanctions Act for bona fide humanitarian activities by voluntary agencies.