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Findings

I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. KURDISH REFUGEES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

1. Saving lives.—The international community, led by the United States and its alliance partners, has succeeded in saving more than 20,000 lives of Kurdish children, women and men under extremely difficult conditions in the largest and most impressive relief effort in modern history. In a matter of days, following the allied intervention into northern Iraq on April 16, the death rate along the Turkish/Iraq border fell from 500 to 1,000 a day to less than 50, and now is less than 5 to 10 per day, although serious health problems persist.

2. Coming health crisis.—Water sources supporting the remaining refugees in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraqi border will dry up within 3 weeks, by mid-June, at which point conditions will deteriorate rapidly. Unless the refugees come down from the mountains before then, an even more extraordinary relief effort may be necessary. Otherwise, large numbers may be doomed to the same fate they escaped just 1 month ago.

3. Expansion of U.N. security zone.-The danger of the coming health crisis for the remaining refugees in the mountains centers over the difficulty of securing the city of Dahuk. The remaining refugees are unlikely to return home until Dahuk is free of Iraqi soldiers. Efforts by U.N. officials to negotiate the departure of these forces are proceeding on an urgent basis as this report is written, and must be strongly supported by the United States. Once Dahuk is secure, an estimated 90 percent of the refugees along the Iraqi-Turkish border, and many along the Iraqi/Iran border, will return home.

4. Secret police.-Although the presence of Iraqi military forces has been virtually eliminated in northern Iraq, Iraqi secret police continue to operate in the area, including coalition-controlled areas. Reports indicate that intimidation by secret police continues even in the city of Zakho, liberated weeks ago. An estimated one hundred secret police enter Zakho each day to take names, gather information and otherwise harass the Kurdish population. The Kurds identify these agents and the allied forces were expelling as many as six a day. The presence of these agents obviously poses a serious threat to returning refugees.

Uniformed Iraqi police and army units are expected to return once coalition forces withdraw and there will be the inevitable fears they will renew their campaign of terror against Kurdish civilians, unless ongoing protective arrangements under international auspices can be achieved for northern Iraq.

5. Security in northern Iraq.-Iraqi forces and secret police in northern Iraq outside of the allied controlled zones continue to

threaten returning refugees and other civilian populations. The continuing negotiations between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi Government are addressing this issue but it is not yet clear that adequate measures can be agreed upon to ensure the safety of the local population.

6. Turkey.-The arrival of an estimated 800,000 Kurdish refugees on its border presented an overwhelming burden on the Turkish Government's resources. The Turkish Government is to be commended for its own efforts on behalf of the refugees as well as its willingness to allow international relief agencies and coalition forces the use of its territory and resources to assist the Kurdish refugees.

The delegation was deeply troubled, however, by several actions by the Turkish Government during the crisis. There were reports of brutality by Turkish border guards and recent actions by local Turkish border and custom authorities have impeded the delivery of humanitarian relief to the refugees in northern Iraq.

7. Broad humanitarian mandate.-The international community has been granted a far-reaching mandate for humanitarian efforts under United Nations resolutions and the "Memorandum of Understanding" signed with Iraq on April 18. Fully implemented, these instruments will facilitate relief and ongoing protection for returning Kurds after coalition forces begin their eventual withdrawal. 1

Recommendations

1. Short-term protection for returning Kurdish refugees.-Coalition forces must continue to support United Nations security arrangements now underway for Dahuk, thus enabling most of the Kurdish refugees along the Turkish border to return to their homes. Coalition forces should also continue their efforts to rid areas under coalition control of Saddam Hussein's secret police. This effort may need to continue for several weeks or even months. 2. Long-term protection-U.S.-coalition forces must remain in the region until adequate measures are in place-Coalition forces should be replaced gradually with U.N. officials empowered to address any continuing human rights or security problems. Such officials must be afforded full freedom of movement in northern Iraq, just as the Iraqi Government agreed to permit United Nations relief officials under the terms of the United Nations, Memorandum of Understanding with Baghdad.

The international community should provide its full support to the negotiations between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi Government to establish security and freedom for the Kurdish populations in northern Iraq. Adequate security measures must be established beyond the zone currently controlled by allied forces.

Any negative reports from U.N. officials should be grounds for the continuation or immediate reimposition of strict economic sanctions against Iraq under the terms of Security Council Resolution 687, April 3, which requires the Security Council to review the

1 See the appendix for the text of these documents.

sanctions every 60 days "in light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq." (Article 21).

3. Turkish actions.-Turkey should make every possible effort to bring about an immediate end to the instances of unnecessary bureaucratic delays at its borders in the delivery of relief supplies.

4. New international humanitarian mandate.-The broad humanitarian mandate granted to the United Nations in Iraq-a mandate which permits U.N. humanitarian assistance even without Iraqi Government cooperation—should not only be vigorously applied in Iraq, but also should now be asserted in other situations as an accepted principle of international humanitarian law.

The talent which the U.S. military has demonstrated in responding to this humanitarian emergency should also be formalized for use in select future disasters. While in the past, the intervention of U.S. forces in any capacity raised cold war fears, this is no longer the case. The U.S. military should now be used to respond to specified international humanitarian emergencies, and regular planning and training should be made part of the military's overall policies. In the long term, the administration should explore the possibility of developing an international team for disaster relief at the United Nations, an "international guard," much like our national guard.

5. Extending U.S. military personnel benefits.-The men and women of the United States Armed Forces who are now serving in "Operation: Provide Comfort" in northern Iraq and Turkey, are performing an extraordinary service under difficult and often dangerous conditions. In recognition of the sacrifices made by our military personnel in Operation Desert Storm, Congress enacted a package of additional benefits for those troops and their families. The administration should ensure that these benefits continue for the duration of "Operation: Provide Comfort."

6. Clarifying U.S. trade sanctions relative to voluntary agencies.In order to facilitate the humanitarian relief work of United States voluntary agencies in Iraq, humanitarian exceptions to the sweeping economic sanctions against Iraq should be extended to include not only relief goods but also to the stationing and support of American private relief workers in Iraq. Under current interpretations of the regulations, these voluntary agency activities are prohibited.

B. REFUGEES IN IRAN

Findings

1. Conditions in Iran.-Since little is known about the conditions of refugees in Iran, and the Iranian Government is impeding access by United States and other personnel, every effort must be made by the United States to support those who are able to work in Iran-especially U.N. agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Iranian Government denied visas for the subcommittee's delegation to visit refugee camps along the border. The delegation is concerned about the lack of information on the condition of refugees in Iran, which number three times those on the Turkish border.

Both the United States and the Iranian Governments have allowed politics to stand in the way of providing the massive relief needed over the past weeks to help the Kurds in Iran. The U.S. Government should have offered direct assistance, and much sooner. If the Iranians refused, we should have channeled a much larger amount of assistance and funding through international agencies on European governments assisting Iran. The policy of leaving the Iranian half of the crisis to the Europeans alone was not a sufficient response to an overwhelming need.

2. Obstacles created by Iran.-Despite its pleas for international assistance, the Iranian Government has blocked humanitarian organizations from access to the camps, slowed assistance by insisting on lengthy bureaucratic processes, intimidated relief workers, and politicized the shipment of United States blankets and other goods. 3. Imminent health crisis.-While the delegation was refused entry to Iran, health experts who recently visited refugee camps there report that by early June, large numbers of refugees are likely to contract life-threatening diarrheal diseases. Diarrheal diseases normally infect western Iran at this time of year due to declining water sources and extreme heat. The refugees, already weakened by their ordeal, will be particularly vulnerable to this annual cycle of disease.

4. Shiite refugees.-There is reason to be deeply concerned about the safety of the estimated 100,000 Shiites now in Iran if they return to Iraq. Many Shiites are from southern Iraq. Many Shiites are from where there is no United States or United Nations presence, except for a 6-mile demilitarized zone on the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Shiites who rose up against Saddam Hussein face the same threat of repression by Iraqi forces and secret police if they return as do the Kurds. The Shiites are also unlikely to return without adequate security assurances.

5. Kurdish refugees.-While some of the Kurdish refugees in Iran are from the Iraqi towns of Zakho, Al Amadiyah and Dahuktowns that have or will have international protection at least in the short run-many are also from Kirkuk and other cities south of the international protective zone. Those returning refugees are severely at risk if they return and are unlikely to do so without adequate security arrangements.

Recommendations

1. U.S. assistance.-The United States should provide a higher level of indirect assistance to the international agencies and government currently aiding the refugees in Iran. We should continue to offer direct assistance publicly and on a large scale, particularly in light of warning from health experts regarding the anticipated onset of life-threatening diseases within 2 weeks.

2. Long-term security.-The refugee crisis in Iran is likely to continue unless adequate protection is provided to those who return to areas in southern Iraq and along the Iran-Iraq border. Allied forces and the international community should consider ways to enhance the security of the refugees from Iran who wish to return to areas outside the allied security zone.

3. Iranian policy toward the refugees.-The Iranian Government should permit relief efforts for the refugees to proceed unimpeded.

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