It should cease blocking international relief shipments, streamline bureaucratic controls and prohibit intimidations of relief workers. The delegation would welcome a reconsideration of its request for visas to visit the refugee camps in Iran. Findings C. KUWAIT 1. Relocation of refugees.—Allied troops performed an outstanding job of relocating over 25,000 refugees to Iran and Saudi Arabia from along the Kuwait-Iraq border. The Saudi Government is to be commended for its willingness to accept these refugees. However, their long-term status remains in doubt. 2. Security. There is fear among many of the remaining border refugee population over possible repression and intimidation by Iraqi forces, not only in Iraq, but also in the demilitarized zone along the Iraqi-Kuwati border. Inside the DMZ, many fear the secret police will infiltrate the camps and towns and intimidate, harass or kill suspected Saddam opponents. 3. Remaining refugees.-Although the vast majority of the refugees have been relocated, an estimated 2,000 remain. These can be broken down into three categories: (a) Iraqis A small number of Iraqis declined relocation to Iran or Saudi Arabia. One family told the delegation they feared mistreatment in Saudi Arabia, although the delegation does not believe such fear is widespread. Some Iraqis were forced to stay because they lacked proper documentation. All refuse to return to Iraq for fear of repression. (b) "Bidoons" Those in the region who have no formal citizenship of any country in the region are referred to as stateless individuals, or "Bidoons", which literally means "those without." Neither the Saudis nor the Kuwaitis recognize any responsibility for these individuals, and they remain in stateless and unprotected limbo. (c) Third country nationals The Government of Kuwait accepts no responsibility for the Palestinians, and individuals from Arab, African, and Asian nations who worked in Kuwait prior to the invasion, many for decades. The government of Kuwait continues to deny the right of these individuals to return to Kuwait. 4. Prisoners of war still held by Iraq.-According to Kuwaiti officials, as of early May, the Iraqi Government was holding nearly 4,000 individuals from Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry put the figure at 2,082 Kuwaitis and 1,892 "stateless people." Recommendations 1. Security.-In the Kuwait Demilitarized Zone, Iraqi secret police must depart and a highly visible international presence must be maintained. A permanent international presence in the camps must remain so long as the camps exist. The international community must continue to press for adequate security measures in southern Iraq in order to provide for the return of the 25,000 Iraqi refugees in Saudi Arabia. 2. Unify command structure of camps.-In future situations, one of the relief organizations should be selected as lead or a group of decisionmaking individuals should be selected to bring greater coordination to the relief 3. Identification of the remaining refugees.—Identify clearly who the remaining refugees are along the Kuwaiti border. This should be done by independent organizations, such as the ICRC or UNHCR. 4. Keep camps open.-The refugee camps along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border must remain open until the issue of the thousands of remaining individuals is fully resolved. The delegation welcomes the commitment of the Kuwait Foreign Ministry that the camps will remain open as long as necessary. 5. Accepting refugees.-Both Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf States should be urged to take Persian Gulf refugees on a permanent basis. 6. Long-term need.-The refugee situation in southern Iraq is likely to continue until political stability and democracy comes to Iraq. A sporadic stream of refugees is likely to continue as threats of Iraqi intimidation in southern Iraq persist. The United States and the international community must be prepared to stay engaged in relief and relocation efforts. 7. Democracy.-The United States should do more to encourage human rights and democracy in Kuwait. We should call at the highest levels for a date certain for parliamentary elections, an end to martial law, and an expansion of the right to vote and opportunities for women to hold office. The United States should also do more to protest abuses of Palestinians and persuade the Government of Kuwait to guarantee human rights and a fair trial of those currently held on charges of collaboration with Iraq. 8. Press. Freedom of the press should be guaranteed and the delegation urges the administration to make this goal a priority in U.S. policy. Assistance to the nongovernment press should be provided and the practice of repressing press critical of the government should be ended. 9. Assistance.-The United States should provide assistance_to the opposition, perhaps through the National Endowment for Democracy. Grants to opposition groups and the use of advisory teams to help organize for the elections would be important signs of support. 10. Israeli boycott.-The United States should insist that Kuwait end its participation in the Arab boycott of Israel. Findings D. CONTINUING ISSUES IN IRAQ 1. Security beyond the allied zone.-The allied efforts to secure an international security force in northern Iraq, if successful, will provide adequate assurances to enable the refugees to return to the area of allied control. The delegation is concerned that the area under consideration for such a security arrangement is only a small fraction of Iraqi territory and that serious security problems will continue throughout the rest of Iraq. 2. Negotiations.-The current negotiations between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi Government represent the best hope for long term security in northern and eastern Iraq. Until the negotiations are successful, many of the estimated 1.3 million Kurds in Iran will not return home and the crisis in that region will contin ue. 3. Southern Iraq.-The residents of southern Iraq continue to face the threat of reprisals from Iraqi forces now that the allied forces have withdrawn from the region. The Shiite population in the region rose up against Saddam Hussein following his military defeat and they remain at risk. The estimated 100,000 Iraqi Shiite refugees in Iran and the 25,000 in Saudi Arabia are unlikely to return without adequate security measures in southern Iraq to permit the return of these refugees. 4. United States policy toward Iraq.-United States Government policy toward democracy in Iraq remains unclear. Administration policy continues to advocate an overthrow of Saddam Hussein by his own Ba'ath Party officials, not democratic elections to permit the people of Iraq to chose their own leaders. The Ba'ath make up only 20 percent of Iraqi population and thus 80 percent of the Iraqi people would continue to be denied a choice in their leadership. 5. Continuing refugee problem due to insecurity, disease and malnutrition. Until adequate security measures are provided throughout Iraq, the refugee situation is likely to continue, albeit to a lesser magnitude and urgency. But large numbers of Iraqi civilians may flee toward United Nations and coalition assisted areas in search of food and other emergency assistance, unless more is done by the international community to meet their needs. A Howard study team of public health experts, confirming testimony offered to the subcommittee by the International Committee of the Red Cross in April, projects that at least 170,000 children will die of malnutrition and disease in Iraq unless international emergency aid is provided right away. Recommendations 1. Security outside allied zone.-While it is unrealistic to extend the allied zone beyond Dahuk, the international community must be mindful of the continuing security threats beyond the zone. Stability in Iraq will not be possible until security is established throughout the country. The administration should lend its full weight to the ongoing negotiations between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi Government until a satisfactory agreement is in place. It must also press the Iraqi Government to provide adequate protection to populations outside the zone of current negotiation in order to permit the return of the Shiite population from Iran and Saudi Arabia and ensure long-term stability in Iraq. 2. Human rights monitoring.-The international community should pay close attention to any reports of repression by the United Nations officials being stationed throughout Iraq. Any findings of those officials of human rights violations by Iraqi officials should trigger a review of and possible strengthening of the sanctions against Iraq under the authority established under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, article 21 that calls for a review of the sanctions every 60 days "in light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq. The United States must lend its full support to United Nations officials being stationed in Iraq. The United Nations should move swiftly to station officials throughout the country to call attention to, and perhaps deter, any repressive actions by the Iraqi Government, military or secret police. Such a "tripwire" system would reassure the returning refugees and the Iraqi people that the international community intends to stay engaged in the struggle for human rights and democracy. 3. Emergency humanitarian help for Iraqi civilians.-The United States should facilitate and finance efforts by the United Nations, the International Committee for the Red Cross and private voluntary agencies to provide emergency assistance to vulnerable civilian populations in Iraq. In addition, where there are competent American voluntary agencies prepared to provide such assistance, the administration should exercise its authorities under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 to exempt humanitarian assistance-as well as the personnel needed to provide such assistance-from the embargo. REPORT AFTERMATH OF WAR: THE PERSIAN GULF REFUGEE CRISIS II. RELIEF FOR KURDISH REFUGEES IN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRAQ BACKGROUND When Iraqi troops overpowered Kurdish "Peshmerga" rebels during the Kurdish rebellion of late March, and proceeded to pummel Kurdish civilian populations, they set in motion one of the most tragic refugee exoduses in modern history. As the first Kurdish refugees began to cross international borders on March 28, 1991, seeking haven in the wintry cold of the inhospitable mountains of Turkey and Iran, they brought with them tales of unimaginable horror and panic. Virtually no family escaped unscathed. All tell of family members, mostly children and the elderly, who did not survive the rugged, 1- to 2-week trip through the snow and winter rains into the barren mountains. And many also report the loss of family members due to the concentrated attacks by Iraqi helicopter gunships, tanks, and artillery on major Kurdish towns. For days, hundreds of thousands of refugees huddled on some of the most remote terrain on earth, surviving only with what they brought with them and with the aid of local Kurdish villagers in Turkey and Iran. All the while, the refugees wondered if the world heard their cries for help, as around them their fellow Kurds died by the hundreds each day from exhaustion, exposure, and illness. Finally, on April 5, after prodding from French President François Mitterrand and British Prime Minister John Major, President Bush announced that the United States would join in international efforts to airdrop relief supplies to remote refugee camps along the Iraqi-Turkish border. And on April 7—a week after the first refugees arrived-United States and French troops began the first airdrops into refugee areas. It quickly became evident that the rugged mountain terrain precluded the mobilization of long-term relief efforts required to sustain the huge refugee population over time. The airdrops saved lives, but clearly were only a bandaid solution as refugees continued to die in chaotic camps along the Turkish border at a rate of 500 to 1,000 a day. It soon became clear that a massive commitment by the United States and coalition partners was necessary in order to secure areas in Iraq to enable refugees to receive adequate international assistance and protection. And only if the refugees could return to the more hospitable terrain of the plains of northern Iraq could a large-scale, viable relief operation be sustained. On April 16, President Bush made that commitment, announcing that the United States, in conjunction with Great Britain and France, would secure a portion of northern Iraq to which refugees could return. This announcement paved the way for the largest international relief operation since World War II. An armada of troops, supplies, aircraft, and vehicles was dispatched to save the refugees. The current effort along the Turkish border and in northern Iraq-coupled with the smaller, but no less important operation in Kuwait and southern Iraq-resembled a military campaign rather than a traditional relief operation. The command and control structure, including a dozen full-star generals from several nations, along with the logistics, supplies, and militarily precise objectives, were all the hallmarks of a military operation. Not surprisingly, many engaged in the relief effort had just completed an engagement on the battlefield-because "Operation Desert Comfort" came in the wake of an "Operation Desert Storm.' As a result, the ratio of international relief personnel helping Kurdish refugees along the Turkish border is not unlike what the ratio is between the number of military personnel needed to support frontline soldiers during battle-for every soldier on the front, seven or more are needed in the rear. Along the Turkish border today there is one international relief person-not including security forces-for every 100 Kurdish refugees-1 to 100-an astonishing ratio when compared with any other recent international relief operation. The approximate ratio, for example, during the Ethiopia refugee crisis of 1984-85, where some 7 million famine victims were “at risk”, was less than one international relief worker for every 10,000 refugees, a ratio of 1 to 10,000. This extraordinary response to the plight of the Kurds is not to imply criticism, but rather praise-for it saved the lives of thousands in a matter of days, when no other recourse was available. Until then, an estimated 500 to 1,000 Kurds were dying each day in the camps along the Turkish border-and an unknown number along the Iran border. Approximately 20,000 Kurdish lives were saved-mostly children and the elderly-in just 3 weeks. The intervention and transport provided by the U.S. and coalition forces remains a critical life saving effort. Today, the mortality rate in the Turkish border region is less than 10 per day. Although some new and continuing public health |