Two programs, missile surveillance technology and advanced warning systems, which together are designed to produce the next generation of missle warning and assessment satellite. Some upgrades of our BMEWS sites, the three ballistic missile early warning sites that we have.

In the space surveillance and defense area by far the largest item is our space defense systems. That's our antisatellite, our ASAT system.

Space surveillance technology is for upgrading Spacetrack, the system which keeps track of all of the activities that take place in

space.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command Combat Operations Center is being improved. We are continuing investigating ways to make what we put in space more survivable, and we want that in this program.

Finally, a classified program, with which the 25 Committee is familiar, the defense support program.

General BURKE. The general purpose area, divided into these mission areas as shown: Air-to-surface attack, counterair, defense suppression, reconnaissance, and, finally, mobility.

Air-to-surface: Our most important program is the night attack program element, and that's the Lantirn program, which is intended to allow our F-16's and A-10's to be equipped with modern electronics that would let them go across the battlefield in a single pass, attack and destroy multiple targets with minimum exposure and at night a very exciting and promising program.

The ground-launched cruise missile program: We're still working towards a December 1983 initial operational capability for that deployed in Europe.

Advanced attack weapons, primarily the weapons that are called wide area antiarmor munitions, again seeking multiple-tank kills in a pass.

Medium range air-to-surface missile. Looking at a standoff missile for several purposes, taking advantage of the technology that we've already bought and paid for in the cruise missile program. Upgrading the F-16.

These are those advanced fighter programs of which I spoke earlier. There are two in there, the advanced tactical fighter and the combat aircraft prototype program, together working toward something like a 1992 IOC for the next generation fighter.

Our A-10 squardrons. That's mostly for the two-seat version. GBU-15. The research and development here is for the imaging infrared sensor to go on the GBU-15's and the work on the low level laser guided bomb to allow us to deliver laser weapons with minimum exposure to enemy defenses.

In the Counterair area:

The highest priority and most heavily funded is the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile which we are developing in conjunction with the U.S. Navy and our allies, looking forward to a much more capable, extended range missile to be carried on our F15's, F-16's, and F-14's, and so forth.

The JP-233 is an airfield attack munition that we were codeveloping with the British. This committee supported that program. It was, however, conceled in the 1981 appropriation process. Mr. Weinberger and his team have reviewed that. They and we think, first, that we desperately need a good airfield attack munition, and, second, having entered into an agreement with our allies, the British, that we ought to follow through on our end of the bargain and complete that. So we are, in effect, asking the Congress to reconsider that decision.

Mr. DICKINSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. I don't remember which one this is from the description of it, General. Could you give us a little detail on that? I know there have been several systems advanced. The Germans have a system, the Tornado. We have some proposals for the cruise missile, and so forth. Could you give me some sort of brief description of what this is?

General BURKE. The JP-233 is a direct attack, non-standoff, system. It would be carried primarily on our F-111 aircraft. The British would carry it on their Tornado in a dispenser, and the

aircraft would have to overfly the airfield, which the F-111's, as you know, can do and the Tornados can do reasonably well. Then they dispense their munitions over that airfield. Most of them inpact on the runway. They are of excellent design and sufficient power that they crater the runway and cause it to heave so that it's very hard to repair. Additionally, mixed in with that is a large number of small antipersonnel devices designed to discourage people from working on those runways.

Mr. DICKINSON. Any time I ask you a question if you would rather go into classified, or executive, session don't hesitate to say

SO.

This is one of many solutions that we are looking at, I know, but just speaking for myself personally anything that's going to require overflying airfields in my book is more than suspect because I can't think of a more heavily defended target than an airfield in today's environment. Anything that's going to require a pilot to overfly an airfield without a standoff capability doesn't seem like a very smart thing. I'm a pilot, and I think it's a pretty dumb thing to do. General BURKE. One of the major applications of the Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missile, the MRASM, would be to do that in a standoff role.

Mr. DICKINSON. Exactly. And we're spending a good deal of money to develop the MRASM. How much money are we talking about in this? Is that $60 million?

General BURKE. There is $60 million in the 1982 budget, there is $66 million in the Reagan 1981 supplemental, and there is on the order of $40 million in the 1983 budget to complete that project. Mr. DICKINSON. The staff tells me we're talking about a total of almost $300 million as the U.S. portion of the joint endeavor. Would that be about right? $289 million?

General BURKE. The remaining work is on the order of $160 million for the U.S. research and development share.

Mr. DICKINSON. Are we going into this 50-50 with the British? So they would be spending the same amount of money presumably. General BURKE. Yes.

Mr. DICKINSON. What are you going to have that will be better than MRASM when you finish?

General BURKE. It will not necessarily be better than MRASM. Mr. DICKINSON. But if it saves a pilot I think it's better. If it will crater a runway without exposing an F-111, say, to antiaircraft fire, it's better. If we're going to send pilots and crews over there, I just don't know why we would want to spend $300 million to develop this when we're going forward with other systems that would do it as well, or better.

General BURKE. The MRASM is a vehicle.

Mr. DICKINSON. Yes; I know what it is.

General BURKE. This is a munition. One of the things that could be imagined is you could put――

Mr. DICKINSON. This is just the munition?

General BURKE. This is the munition, yes sir, and its dispenser, but it is not a vehicle.

Mr. DICKINSON. I see.

General BURKE. On the other hand, the MRASM you have to find some munition to go in it, and one of the things we would certainly look at is JP-233.

Mr. DICKINSON. And that hasn't been perfected yet, the doublecharge munition that would crater a runway? We don't have that yet?

General BURKE. No, sir. It's in development, and there have been successful development tests, but it's certainly not available.

Mr. DICKINSON. All right. I would like some additional information later. I don't want to hold up the committee.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mollohan.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. General, I don't want to hold up the committee either, but I need a bit more information about this myself. [The following information was received for the record:]

MRASM AND SUBMUNITIONS

MRASM is a lower cost conventional variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile intended to satisfy Air Force standoff missile requirements. The main USAF mission for MRASM is airfield attack. MRASM employs a modular runway cratering munitions dispenser which was successfully demonstrated during a Tomahawk flight test in 1978 using dummy submunitions. An issue that is key to the entire MRASM effort is the successful development of small, yet effective, cratering submunitions that can be efficiently packaged in the limited volume available in a cruise missile. The Lawrence Livermore Laboratories cratering submunition was specifically designed to fit into the MRASM modular dispenser. This submunition is still in the early stages of development testing at Lawrence Livermore Laboratories with results showing promise. The Air Force plans to begin testing of this submunition at Eglin Air Force Base in June 1981. Assuming that these tests are successful, initial flight tests of the Livermore submunition will be conducted by the end of this year. Other cratering submunitions, such as scaled down versions of JP-233 or the German STABO, are also potential alternatives. However, the use of either of these submunitions in MRASM will require major redesign of the warhead/dispenser section of the missile.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. It seems to me that this is a fantastic amount of money to be putting into a program of this sort, which is, in large part, a duplication of a capability we already have.

What is your own personal judgment about going forward with a program such as this when we have such great need in other areas that have apparently a higher degree of immediacy than this does? General BURKE. We really don't have this capability now, sir. If we went to war in Europe tomorrow those fighter pilots would be asked to attack those airfields. It would be an inevitable part of the air battle that would take place. They are going to fly those F-111's in there, and when they get there they're going to drop MK-82 bombs of 1941 vintage.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Considering all the other programs, the shortage of moneys, and the moneys that have been assigned to you, would you go forward with this program as it's being outlined, or would you be diverting those funds to some other purpose?

General BURKE. The airfield attack is among the very highest priorities of the Tactical Air Force commanders. Our commander in Europe, our commander at Langley, and our commander in the Pacific all view that as enormously important to close airfields, and there is a very high payoff if you can do that and do it successfully. So the priority they have assigned it is sufficient in my mind that we ought to try to fund it.