In that regard, can you summarize the impact the MX would have on the mining industry and discuss the apparent conflict between the existing hard rock mining claims and the MX construction?

General BURKE. There is a lot of mining activity in Utah and Nevada. Virtually all of it is in the hills. The valleys are alluvial. There is in that entire region one mine that is located in a valley, a molybdenum mine. All of our activity would be in valleys and none of it in the mountains or hills. We, nonetheless, have done fairly extensive research on the location of known minerals and would obviously avoid locating on top of known or suspected valuable deposits.

In the event that we somehow made a mistake and it turns out that one of our 4,600 shelters is sitting on top of a mother lode in a manner that it couldn't be mined we would be prepared to move it. That wouldn't be very difficult to do. We have talked about this with a lot of miners out there, and, in fact, I met with the Utah Mining Association at their annual convention last year, and, after reviewing the requirement and the specific features of the MX, they unanimously endorsed the MX system, felt that it would be compatible with their activities in that State, and just asked that we work closely together to look after each other's interests, and we will do that.

Mr. DELLUMS. One of the arguments with respect to the system is that it's very difficult to determine the size of the system without knowing the number of warheads the Soviets can theoretically expand. So that the system is only feasible within the context of an arms control environment.

Given that argument, what is the outside limit that you perceive for the size of the system, and if the system is doubled, for example, as a response to Soviet expansion of warheads where else would you build?

General BURKE. All of our weapons planning, everything that we've shown here and everything you'll hear from the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, has to rest on some assumption of what the Russians are going to do because everything we do is in response to what they have done and what we guess that they will do, and we're not always right in those guesses.

But I think it is not correct to believe that the only thing that stops the Soviets from an unbridled arms buildup is the existence of a SALT treaty. I think there are very real and important restraints on what they can do, not the least of which is, I guess, the limited resources available to devote to development of strategic arms. Although they choose to apply a much larger fraction of their resources than we, they don't have unlimited money, and they have a lot of requirements and lots of demands.

So I don't guess that the Soviets are going to build vastly larger numbers of ICBM's than they're already building and are projected to build. They might.

The MX system that we talk about, the notion of having 200 missiles and 4,600 shelters, is designed to buy a substantial level of survivability against the Soviet threat that we believe we are going to see. I personally don't believe that the fact that SALT II is not ratified means that they necessarily are going to do any more than

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that. To date both sides are complying with not only SALT II, but we're still complying with SALT I. However, one has to allow for the possibility that we might all be wrong and they might build

more.

Within the existing area we can expand the MPS system up to on the order of 7,000 shelters without using any additional valleys. We could more than double that within the Nevada/Utah region by adding more valleys. In addition, we could move down into the Texas-New Mexico area and build in even larger numbers.

I would think we would not wish to do that. First, I don't think it will be necessary. I think if the Russians see at the outset that we have not only the capability but the will, indeed, the determination to offset any additional threat they choose to pose they are going to be dissuaded from investing in that area. Our ace in the hole in that regard is that we do have an alternative. We don't have to build additional shelters. We can at some point say "That's as far as I wish to go with that" and build an antiballistic missile system to deal with an increased threat. This can be done at a lower cost than the Soviets would incur to deploy more warheads. If they can see that at the beginning, and if we make it clear that we are determined, I would think they would find that a very unattractive road to embark upon.

Mr. DELLUMS. That means moving away from our ABM treaty though, doesn't it?

General BURKE. Only after they deployed many, many thousands of warheads. The purpose of the ABM treaty was to avoid proliferation of warheads. So if that cat is out of the bag, I don't know who would argue for the ABM treaty. I certainly don't propose we do away with it now. I think we should by all means retain it, but in the event of an expanded Soviet threat, it wouldn't make much difference.

Mr. DELLUMS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bob Daniel.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, we don't seem to be tracking quite along with your costs in the presentation, so I'll ask a question somewhat out of turn related to the one asked by Mr. Emery earlier having to do with the engine model derivative program.

In our fiscal 1981 committee report we stated the following: "Before the Department of Defense makes a final decision to enter full-scale engineering development on a follow-on fighter engine all competitive engine designs must be given full consideration.

"In the fiscal year 1982 budget under F101 engine research and development you requested $35 million, labeled for full scale development of a derivative fighter aircraft engine with higher thrust, gas-burning, turbofan engines."

I would like to ask you to tell us what provisions have been made to comply with our language for competition, in view of the fact that you've make the decision to start full scale development of the F101X fighter engine.

General BURKE. General Marshall, would you speak to that, please?

General MARSHALL. All right, sir.

Of course the emphasis on our F101 derivative engine was, indeed, on durability and not on higher thrust, and that has been the focus of that program. We do have other engine model derivative efforts underway, and I suppose you are specifically leading to the question of more thrust for the F100 engine.

We currently are in discussions with that manufacturer on a proposal that he has for increasing the thrust of that engine. Again, our emphasis has been on durability, and we would not want to increase the thrust of that engine at the expense of durability. Durability is clearly the key issue. So we are entering into those discussions, and it is possible that he may be able to demonstate that he can attain the increased durability we seek and, at the same time, increase the thrust. That may be attractive, but at the present time we have not made a decision on whether that can be done.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. General, irrespective of what might be possible or attractive in the future how can you tell me that you are not in noncompliance with the congressional directive by initiating full-scale development of a higher thrust engine?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, we have not initiated full-scale development.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. You're asking for $35 million to do so. General MARSHALL. No, sir. That is a continuation of the effort that was started several years ago in response to congressional direction regarding an alternative to the F100 engine. You may recall that at that time there were considerable durability problems with the F100 engine. We embarked, with congressional approval, on this road of protecting the option for an alternative engine, and that is all this does. That's what we have been doing. We have tested an alternative to the F101, which is the B-1 engine derivative in the test cell. We've tested it. We have it in test right now in an F-16 airplane. It will be tested later on this year in an F-14 airplane. Those are not developed engines in the sense they were hand-built derivatives of the B-1 engine. So we have not entered into a full-scale development. What full scale development would imply——

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. Isn't that what's requested in this year's request, General?

General BURKE. I'm not familiar with that language you've just read to me, sir. It sounds to me like we might have made a mistake.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. Let's put your language on it. What is the $35 million for in your terms?

General BURKE. The $35 million, the program on which we are continuing, is to complete the durability testing of the F101X engine, with a view toward acquiring sufficient confidence that if needed we would embark on a full-scale engineering development program, which would be a much more expensive program than that one, sir.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. What you're saying, then, is if you do dr on full-scale development you will comply with these mand this committee?

General BURKE. Oh, indeed. That is something that we would not even address until we have assessed the F101 engine. I apologize for that language.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will adjourn until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will be in order.

We will proceed with the briefing we started this morning. General, would you proceed.

General BURKE. Yes, sir, I am happy to.

We had just about completed this chart. I only wanted to mention two items here, the weather satellite, the defense meteorological satellite program, and the space test program, which is a triservice space test program that the Air Force manages.