aircraft such as the F-4 and the F-111, the need to counter evolving Soviet aircraft capabilities which will probably negate our qualitative advantage, and the need to enhance aircraft survivability in light of the ever growing threat. Because of the long lead times necessary to develop and field new aircraft, we must begin now. Accordingly, we are proposing two programs to respond to this need. First, under the Advanced Tactical Fighter program, we will initiate concept development for our next generation tactical fighter. Maximum industry participation will be encouraged. Secondly, we will initiate the Combat Aircraft Prototype program to mature new technologies that will allow us to introduce advanced concepts in our Advanced Tactical Fighter. Flight test aircraft will be developed to evaluate promising technologies. The program will also reduce the gap between the emergence of new technologies and their operational intro duction. COUNTERAIR Over the last few years the character of Soviet tactical air has changed from primarily a limited range defensive force to a formidable offensive force. They now have the capability to conduct fully supported strikes against targets anywhere in European NATO. The Soviets and Warsaw Pact have several fighter production lines in operation, and with continued high production rates, they are rapidly modernizing and expanding their tactical capabilities. Our fleet of fighters is still the finest in the world, but the Soviets are closing the lead. They are forecast to field an advanced air superiority fighter with radar capabilities similiar to our present generation F-15's and with energy maneuverability characteristics similar to our F-15 and F-16's. We also have superior air-to-air missiles; however, a new missile is expected soon which will give their aircraft an operational look-down, shoot-down capability. Our RDT&E emphasis is on increasing the air-to-air capabilities of our current fighters through the 1980s. Our mid-term efforts center on development of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) which will satisfy the Air Force, Navy, and NATO requirement for a new generation air superiority air-to-air missile with significant improvements in operational utility and combat effectiveness over current systems. In our fighter programs, we will continue to develop better fire control capabilities to improve mission effectiveness. I previously discussed F-16 improvements. We are also supporting radar improvements and AMRAAM integration for the F-15. In addition, we are conducting conformal fuel tank certification on the F-15. The conformal fuel tanks will greatly increase the F-15's responsiveness and flexibility, as well as increase combat mission radii by 30-70 percent. We are also stressing the development and integration of our beyond-visual-range identification technology into aircraft systems, since such a capability is essential to full exploitation of AMRAAM capabilities. Our identification developments are accomplished in the Air-to-Air Identification and Aircraft Identification programs. In the Counterair mission area, we consider more than just destruction of enemy aircraft in one-to-one aerial combat. In addition, we are exploring concepts to attack and deny the enemy's use of airfields and to destroy his aircraft on the ground. One example mentioned earlier is the development of MRASM, a cruise missile suitable for airfield attack. We are also proposing to continue the Low Altitude Airfield Attack System, a joint U.S./ United Kingdom development for runway destruction and denial. DEFENSE SUPPRESSION Soviet air defense systems continue to grow in density, quantity, and complexity as the Soviets develop and deploy new tactical and strategic air defense systems. These new systems emphasize mobility and the use of both radar and electro-optical means for target acquisition and tracking. Growth in their air defense capability has also been marked by increased reliance on command, control, and communications (C3) as they strive to maintain a highly reliable, efficient, and integrated system. Because of this growing threat, we have and will continue to place considerable emphasis on defense suppression. Our objective is to achieve an effective mix of systems which degrade, deceive, or destroy the enemy's air defense network in order to ensure the survivability of our aircraft and aircrews in the modern combat environment. To accomplish this, we have programmed updates for our operational defense suppression systems as well as stressed the development of several new systems to handle the highly sophisticated Soviet threat. We Today, our primary system for destruction of tactical emitter systems such as air defense radars is the F-4G Wild Weasel. have programmed funds to develop an update to this system to keep pace with the evolving threat. We are also continuing with the Navy in the joint development of the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, which will greatly improve the lethality of the F-4G. In addition, under our Expendable Drones program, we plan to expand our kill capability through the use of relatively low cost expendable drones (Locust) being developed jointly with the Federal Republic of Germany. The primary program for improving our long term strike capability is the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS). PLSS will offer us the unique capability to precisely locate and strike time-sensitive threats and key command and control elements. Its purpose is to allow our forces to operate more effectively and to reduce attrition to acceptable levels, especially in the critical first few days of conflict. 80-743 0-81-26 On the electronic warfare side, we are emphasizing both support and self-protection electronic countermeasures (ECM). Since the Soviets are relying more on the C3 networks for effective battlefield management, we are placing heavy emphasis on tactical c3 countermeasures to counter their networks. Specifically, as part of our Tactical c3 Countermeasures program, we are developing a new jammer for the EC-130H Compass Call aircraft which will provide us with a standoff C3 jamming capability. RECONNAISSANCE Reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide decision makers at all levels with the tactical information and intelligence required to minimize the likelihood of surprise and to plan, move, and counter enemy initiatives. These same assets assist in interdiction by locating key targets on the battlefield. Therefore, the development and deployment of these systems is critical to the credibility of NATO defense of Europe and to general U.S. combat capability wherever and whenever it might be employed. Without reconnaissance, even our best weapon systems are ineffective if employed at the wrong place and time. Our reconnaissance RDT&E efforts focus on increasing the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence information required by battlefield commanders to offset the superior numbers of opposing forces and weapons. To meet current needs in timeliness and accuracy, our planned program includes the continued development of improved sensor and ground processing capabilities. To satisfy our needs for detailed accuracy under all-weather conditions, we are continuing the Side Looking Airborne Radar program to develop the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) for the U-2R and TR-1 aircraft. To make maximum úse of ASARS, we are also developing the exploitation system and the ground equipment that will receive the data-linked imagery. In fiscal year 1982, we will initiate the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System program, a development effort to define a survivable, day/night, all-weather penetrating reconnaissance capability. This program, coupled with sensor developments in our Reconnaissance Equipment program, will provide the tactical reconnaissance capabilities needed to meet the threat anticipated for the future. MOBILITY To protect our global interests, the United States chooses to deploy some forces forward, to preposition limited amounts of material, and to maintain the majority of our forces and supplies at home. These home based forces, supported by mobility resources, serve as a centrally located strategic reserve which can be projected anywhere in the world to deter or resist aggression. Airlift is the most visible, responsive, and flexible element of our mobility resources. Its primary role is to project and sustain combat forces until other means of transportation can deliver the required follow-on support. In many situations, airlift is the only means of responding rapidly, because of either the geographic location or the speed with which the threat develops. For years we have known that our airlift assets were inadequate to fully meet the requirements of both general conflicts and regional contingencies. Our most pronounced shortfall lies in our capability to airlift outsize equipment such as mechanized artillery pieces, infantry fighting vehicles, and tanks. This shortfall becomes more critical as warning times grow shorter and Army combat equipment becomes larger and heavier. |