To expand our capability to carry outsize cargo over long

ranges, we are continuing development of the C-X. It will be a wide bodied cargo aircraft capable of operating over intercontinental ranges into small, austere airfields worldwide and capable of airlifting all the essential firepower and support equipment of U.S. forces. The C-X, combined with the other programmed airlift and mobility efforts, will provide the flexibility and capability needed to implement our military strategy.

To extend the service life of the free world's only aircraft presently capable of transporting outsize cargo, we are also strengthening the C-5A wing. The wing modification of this essential aircraft will ensure the continued availability of the C-5 force by providing a 30,000 hour wing service life compatible with the service life for the remainder of the aircraft structure.

Although not directly related to airlift, we include the combat rescue force in the Mobility mission area.

Modernization

of the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service and the Special Operations Force must begin at once to cope with increasing threats and to overcome problems resulting from obsolescent equipment. Therefore, in our Combat Helicopter Modernization program, we are proposing to develop a derivative of the Army UH-60 Black Hawk--a helicopter of proven reliability, maintainability, and survivability.

Using the basic H-60, we

will integrate equipment and improved avionics required for

Air Force missions.

IV. SPACE

Our military forces have become heavily dependent on the information derived from space systems. Effective operations on the modern battlefield are increasingly a function of surveillance, warning, communications, meteorological, and navigation support obtained from satellites. The programs in the Space mission area provide the launch and orbital support for these

vital space systems and include space programs not allocated to other mission areas. A complete list of our programs is included in Table IV at the end of this statement.

The Soviets are well aware of the military utility of operating in space and have committed significant resources toward a sizable space presence. Over the last decade, Soviet space launches have exceeded those of the U.S. by a factor of three and one-half to one. The majority of these launches have been for military purposes. Some of this difference is due to Soviet satellite design--Soviet satellites are generally less reliable than ours and, hence, are shorter lived. The Soviets are also supporting an active man-in-space program, and they have deployed and continue to test an operational antisatellite

capability.

On the other hand, we are concentrating our efforts on doing more with each launch. We are supporting the development of a new space launch capability; we are improving our space operations capabilities, and we are providing an advanced technology base for future space system opportunities.

Our future space launch capability, the manned, reusable Space Shuttle, is being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration.

The Shuttle will provide major new capabilities which will make our operations in space more effective, and we are taking the necessary actions to transition our spacecraft to Shuttle launch. By the mid-1980s, we will be nearly totally dependent on the Shuttle for supporting our national security space missions.

The Air Force has two major efforts underway that are crucial to the Shuttle program. We are developing the Inertial Upper Stage to deliver spacecraft from the Shuttle to high altitude orbits. Also, we are constructing the Shuttle launch and landing facilities at Vandenberg AFB, California, so that polar and near polar launches can be conducted in support of all Shuttle users-civil as well as military.

The importance of our payloads to national security makes it essential that we maintain our current space booster capability during the period when we plan to transition our spacecraft to Shuttle launch and to provide a back-up capability in the event of delays or any unanticipated problems in Shuttle availability.

These capabilities are being supported by our Space Boosters program.

We are also developing improvements to our space operations capabilities. A severe limitation for our current space operations is the antiquated computer system used by the Satellite Control The SCF Data Facility (SCF) to support on-orbit satellites.

System Modernization program is a major effort to correct this problem and will give us the ability to support more sophisticated satellites. In addition, we are continuing work on a new Consolidated Space Operations Center. This facility will provide the required support for satellite control functions in conjunction with the Satellite Test Center. It will also provide Space Shuttle operations planning and control capabilities for DOD Space Shuttle missions, as well as provide a back-up capability to the NASA control facility at the Johnson Space Center.

The Air Force is committed to maintaining the technical superiority of our space systems through continual testing of new concepts and by investigating the effects of the space environment on our systems. The tri-service Space Test Program (STP) supports this effort by providing the spaceflights for DOD experimental payloads. STP simplifies the experimenter's job by centralizing management for the many tasks that are required to launch a payload. Furthermore, STP has been designated by DOD to lead in developing an important facet of the Space Shuttle--its use as a manned space laboratory. By taking full advantage of man on the spot, we should be able to accelerate the rate at which we can incorporate new technology into our space systems and make significant strides toward effective manned control of our space systems from space and on-orbit repair of space systems.

V. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

Command, control, and communications (C3) systems are essential

to the implementation of strategy, control of forces, and employment of weapons in modern warfare. These systems support day-to-day operations, rapid assessment of indications and warning information for decision makers in periods of tension and impending conflict, accurate situation monitoring and allocation of resources in crisis situations, and the conduct of military operations in wartime. In response to our dependence on c3, the Soviets place heavy emphasis in their doctrine on the disruption of our C3 links. The threat includes physical, electronic, and electromagnetic attack to achieve this disruption.

Our C3 development efforts have three principal objectives. Our primary objective is to counter the growing threat with increased survivability, security, and jam-resistance of our c3

links.

Achievement of this goal will require more complex systems. A second fundamental aim of our RDT&E efforts is to improve both the reliability of our systems and their capability to interoperate with each other. Our final thrust in C3 is to exploit new technological concepts such as space-based laser communications which could prove feasible and cost-effective in meeting future threats and requirements.

c3 programs cover a broad range of strategic, tactical, and general purpose systems. The most important of these are highlighted in the following paragraphs. A complete listing of programs is shown in Table V at the end of this statement.

C3

A primary program for command and control of the Single Integrated Operational Plan forces and other nuclear capable forces is the Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) System. The AFSATCOM system consists primarily of communications packages, called transponders, that share the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) System and the Satellite Data System spacecraft with other missions and terminals located on the

ground and in aircraft. Our AFSATCOM efforts are focused on the development of AFSATCOM terminal equipment, operational tools for managing the AFSATCOM network, and the super high frequency (SHF) communications equipments that will be carried on the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III spacecraft and installed in the missile launch control facilities. These SHF equipments will provide a communications link that is more resistant to both jamming and to nuclear weapon effects. In addition, we are developing improvements to the capability of the command post aircraft to communicate with nuclear weapon storage sites in Europe.

The Satellite Data System (SDS) is a major part of the AFSATCOM system. SDS satellites, using AFSATCOM transponders, provide critical two-way transpolar command and control communications for our nuclear capable forces. In the future, the Satellite Data System will become the backbone of the AFSATCOM system as the Navy's FLTSATCOM satellites begin to reach the end of their useful lives. Our RDT&E program is designed to sustain the operational utility of the Satellite Data System. It consists of transitioning the SDS to the Space Shuttle and improving the jam-resistance of the AFSATCOM payload.

Our existing tactical communications systems have a number of critical deficiencies. Chief among these is their susceptibility to enemy jamming. Accordingly, we are taking action to add jam-resistance to our tactical voice communications network. We are now deploying the HAVE QUICK system to provide a near term jam-resistant voice capability. At the same time under our Advanced Communications Systems program, we are using more advanced technology to develop a system which will be less sensitive to evolving jamming technology. This system, SEEK TALK, will be produced and deployed as HAVE QUICK becomes vulnerable to new jamming techniques.