as long as the members are cooperative I don't think we need to have a timer, if somebody is interested in a subject and is developing a point that they will be allowed to proceed. Mr. Chairman, I know we have discussed it, I would hope that we will attempt to deal in that way with some flexibility and latitude. If it doesn't work and if there are any complaints from the members, then we'll just decide whether or not to go to the inflexible 5-minute rule. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else have any ideas on the subject? [No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. If the staff will then proceed.

BRIEFING BY ANTHONY R. BATTISTA AND DR. THOMAS E. COOPER, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. BATTISTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you stated, the R. & D. program is rather complicated insofar as there are slightly under 3,200 projects and it covers everything from computer sciences to antisubmarine warfare to space research, including high-energy lasers, directed energy weapons, and when you begin review of this budget you will find that there probably are 10 times the numbers of terms, phrases, acronyms, and special brands of Pentagonese jargon that's associated with these projects and programs. After a while, for the benefit of the new members, it becomes rather clear as to what we are talking about. For example, you're going to hear about DSARC and mission element need statements, MENS statements, and, for example, you might have a defense witness telling you that the MENS was approved; the program is now in advanced development, or AD, and the DSARC is going to meet, and they will decide whether or not they're going to FSED, and that's rather confusing at first. But all that means is we have a requirement for a new weapon systems. We built an experimental model, and now the board of directors, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, is going to meet to decide whether or not the program should continue into engineering development, that is, to convert the experimental model to the actual piece of hardware that's going to be in the aircraft, or the ship, or whatever.

You will hear terms like EMP, electromagnetic pulse, and that's rather confusing at first. But basically all that means is you've shot a heavy dosage of voltage at an aircraft or a system and it didn't die; it lived.

So after a while I think you kind of get a feel for the terms and the jargon that's used.

I'll start by saying that in 1977, when Mr. Ichord took the R. & D. subcommittee and Mr. Price had gone over to the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee, he asked that the staff get together and give the subcommittee our assessment of where we stood vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in terms of our defense capability, and he said, "I want a no holds barred presentation. Tell it the way you see it," and getting that license, we gave a presentation, which some of you may recall, that in effect said at the rate we are going the Soviets will achieve total military dominance over the United States by about the mid-1980's.

If you use a bad news-good news kind of approach, that was the bad news, and the continued bad news is that they are probably 4 years closer to that objective today, one of the reasons being the massive Soviet defense program that they have embarked upon, with no letup in sight.

Mr. DICKINSON. To interrupt, Tony, there is no classification on this. Is that right?

Mr. BATTISTA. At this point there is no classification.

Mr. DICKINSON. I wanted the members to know whether they can quote this, whether this is in the public domain or is not.

Mr. BATTISTA. This is very much unclassified, Mr. Dickinson. Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. McDonald.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Battista, the Delta segment of 323 which the Soviets outspent the United States seems to me gets constantly bigger. I can remember not too long ago when we were looking at $104 billion plus $40 billion, and I know that was from 1968 to 1978. But when we were looking at the decade of the seventies there was $240 billion, and now we've gone up almost another $100 billion.

Mr. BATTISTA. You're right. It depends on what you include in the category. I'll address your $104 billion.

The $323 billion Delta refers to military expenditures, including research, development, test and evaluation. It includes equipment, procurement and personnel. The $104 billion you're talking about related to just R.D.T. & E., procurement and military construction, as I understand it. Is that right, Tom?

Dr. COOPER. That's right. But the $240 billion is in fiscal year 1981 dollars, and we are talking about that in fiscal year 1979 dollars. This is all-inclusive. If you escalated that to fiscal year 1981 dollars you would probably have to add 20 percent to those numbers, or so. But this is all-inclusive, whereas the $240 billion that you alluded to includes only R.D.T. & E., facilities and procurement.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you.

Mr. BATTISTA. This slide will show you the percentage changes in terms of expenditures.

Mr. BATTISTA. This is the R.D.T. & E. program here, and you will notice that in that period there was about a $40 billion Delta between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. program over that period of time.

Now, if you throw in the procurement and R.D.T. & E. expenditures you see on the next viewgraph――

Mr. McDONALD. Tony, before you leave that, could you leave that just a minute?

Mr. BATTISTA. Mr. McDonald, to bring this up-to-date, though, to relate that to the $240 billion that you mentioned, if you add fiscal years 1979 and 1980 to bring it up through the decade, that $40 billion becomes $70 billion, and that is a number you're familiar with.

Mr. DICKINSON. Tell him where the figures come from too, please. Mr. BATTISTA. OK. The figures for the Soviet Union are the best intelligence estimates we have.

Now, if you want my personal judgment on this, I think the situation is far more catastrophic than just the numbers indicate. These are the conservative estimates. When you consider, Mr. Dickinson, that the Soviets don't have to go through all the procurement widgets that we do and I can prove this to you later on by examining what comes out of their pipeline-I think the situation is a lot worse.

For example, consider the M-1 tank and the way we're procuring it. The fact that we're not buying it at the minimum economic rate, means it is costing us $2.5 million a copy. I think the Soviets, in contrast, do produce at effective economic rates, and consequently they pay significantly less for their T-72 than we're paying for our

For example, during the period 1971-75 the annual Soviet tank production at their three plants was 3,030 tanks per year, and we have means of ascertaining those numbers. Ours was 413.

Just to give you a feel for the problem I'll pass this photo up to you. This is one of their three tank plants at Nizhniy Tagil in the Soviet Union. You will see I have outlined the area of that plant superimposed over a map of the District, and it goes from, one border to the other and covers everything from the Lincoln Memorial to Union Station. I'll pass this up to you. This is an example. This is only one of their three tank plants.

Dr. COOPER. While you're doing that, Tony, I might also mention that 2 years ago this information was classified. General Stafford, the former astronaut, presented it to the subcommittee and Mr. Dickinson asked if he could do what he could to get it declassified, which he did, and several of the members have been using this type of data. If anybody would like to, we can get graphs of this for you.

Mr. BATTISTA. The following viewgraph shows if the $104 billion was available to the United States, that is just the difference between what they spent and what we spent in 1978 dollars, that is what we could have funded here in the United States.

It would have paid for the entire fleet of 244 B-1 bombers, the entire MX program, all of the subs, and you can read the rest. But basically the message is if we just had the difference between what the Soviets spent and what we spent we could have modernized all of our strategic forces and most of our ground forces, and greatly enhanced our tactical air forces. That's just with the difference. Now, that's only part of the story. The rest of the story amounts to what the Soviets are accomplishing at their universities, in filling their pipelines, and this is a chart that I used in the 1977 presentation to the subcommittee.