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read. If then any thing occurs, to divert his attention to other subjects, he immediately turns from his book, his motives for reading being not then present to his mind. These may not be immediately recalled, and when they are, his thoughts may be again diverted in the same manner. This reasoning will serve for all instances wherein attention appears not to be completely controuled by the will.

No being could contrive without attention, for without it the train of our thoughts could not be directed to the object of contrivance. The phenomena of dreaming are accounted for, by supposing attention to be suspended during sleep. If we then possessed not attention, our thoughts when waking would have all the irregularities of a dream. It is true that many improvements in the arts have been suggested to the contrivers by accident, but some attention is necessary from the first thought on the subject to the completion of the contrivance. A previous attention to the same subject, is also manifest, for otherwise it had not been introduced by accidental associations. Harrington derived his notion of the form of a republic, from seeing the contrivance of two girls in dividing their bread; but had he not previously attended to the science of government the same sight had not introduced a thought on that subject..

SEC. III. OF ABSTRACTION.

Abstraction is that faculty of the mind, by which a complex idea is divided into conceptions more simple, than any corresponding sensation.

Abstraction, when it is independent of imagination, is, like attention, governed by the will. It appears to differ from attention chiefly in this, that in attention the whole of an idea is excluded from the mind, which is thereby thrown back, upon the one which preceded

it, whereas in abstraction only a part of the idea is excluded, and the mind dwells upon the remaining part.

It is a law of our minds that whatever may be divided in sensation, may be divided in conception. Thus the idea of a horse, which when a sensation, may be divided into a sensation of each of the legs, the head, and of the body, may, when a conception, be divided in like manner, so that we may form distinct and separate conceptions, of the body and legs. The colour of a surface and the surface itself cannot be separated in sensation, nor are we able to form a conception of a surface, without colour, or of colour, without surface.

Abstraction is necessary to contrivance; for what progress could we make in the arts, if we were obliged to consider objects in the same extent in which they are presented to us by sensation. The whole view before our eyes forms in the mind but one sensation, which without abstraction, could not be divided in conception. Without this faculty, I could form no conception of a tree which I see before me, without joining with it a conception of the landscape and the sky which I behold in the same view. Nothing without it could be conceived, which would not when seen fill the whole angle of vision. But if we could form a conception of no object of less magnitude than this, it is manifest that we could make no progress in contri

vance.

SEC. IV. OF ASSOCIATION.

Association is that principle or disposition of the mind, by which one idea tends to introduce another, and by which our ideas are connected, and their succession regulated, independent of the influence of the will. That such a principle exists, is known to every one who has the slightest acquaintance with the philos

ophy of mind; but philosophers have differed in their opinions, with regard to the primary laws of mind, which constitute that principle. Mr. Hume thinks that the qualities and relations of ideas which produce association are three, viz: Resemblance, Relation of cause and effect, and Contiguity of time and place.-. It has since been shown, (and I am surprised that it should have escaped Mr. Hume,) that the relation of cause and effect may be reduced to contiguity of time and place; since a cause (according to the principles of Mr. Hume himself) is no more than an antecedent, and the effect a consequent, which are always conjoined. It has also been remarked that contrast, as well as many other relations, produces association. In my opinion however (if I may venture one against so many and so great authorities) the relation between ideas, which produce association, may be reduced to contiguity of the time of the existence of those ideas in the mind, or in other words all the phenomena of association may be accounted for by the following laws of the mind.

Every idea which has once existed in the mind, has a tendency, when renewed, to recall either the idea which succeeded it, or that which preceded it, when before in the mind.

This tendency is strengthened by the repeated succession of the same ideas, and by the attention which was paid them..

It will be said that resemblance is well known to produce association, and I shall be asked how I account for this by the law I have mentioned. I answer that there are two kinds of resemblance, the resemblance of the whole, and the resemblance of a part. The ideas excited in the mind by objects possessing the first kind of resemblance, are identical, since the identity of ideas is no more than a resemblance. If I behold. a man perfectly similar in features, form and dress, to

one whom I have before known, the idea in my mind, is the same which I should have possessed, if I had seen the identical person with whom I had been acquainted, and the same ideas would be introduced by association.

The ideas excited by objects which resemble each other only in part, are indeed dissimilar, but when all but the parts which resemble each other, are struck from the mind by abstraction, the remaining ideas are the same. If I behold a man wearing a coat similar to one worn by a man whom I had formerly known, I should strike out of my mind by abstraction (for the mind is continually abstracting and compounding its ideas) all parts of the ideas received, except that of the coat, which would be the same that I should receive from viewing the coat of my friend. With this idea it is manifest, according to the law which I have laid down, that the idea of my friend himself would be associated.

The reader will find no difficulty in reconciling the fact that contiguity of time and place produce association to my principles: but contrast requires some attention before all the objections to this theory can be removed. This relation is not a fertile source of association, and the little effect that it has, arises from the fact that an object and its contrast are often conjoined in reasoning.

The tendency of ideas to introduce others, depends on the state of the mind, in which they exist, but not on that of the external objects, from which they are derived, nor on any qualities in the ideas themselves. It depends, in fact, on the order in which these ideas have before existed in the mind. Hence the operation of reasoning, comparing, &c. strengthen and multiply the sources of association.

But whatever may be the qualities, either in the

ideas themselves, or in the mind in which they exist, or which association depends, it is essential to contrivance, and indeed to nearly all the operations of the mind; for without it no idea could ever be recalled to the mind except by sensation. The law on which (according to the opinion given above) it depends, is well adapted to contrivance, for according to that law, those ideas will be the aptest to be recalled to the mind, which are connected with the object of contrivance.

SEC. V. OF IMAGINATION.

Imagination is that faculty by which the mind compounds its ideas, and forms conceptions of objects which never existed, or never were presented to the senses of the person conceiving them.

Imagination is a complex faculty, implying conception, abstraction, and association, but it is not solely the operation of these principles combined. There must be something which does not necessarily exist with these faculties. A person might possess them all, and yet be unable to combine his ideas, or to form conceptions more complex than his sensations. The operation of these faculties alone could never give us a conception of a horse with the head and arms of a man, with wings, or of one whose colour was green.

It may here be observed, that not only conceptions are compounded by imagination, but parts of conceptions which are inseparable without it. Thus colour may be abstracted from one form, and combined in conception with another, though it can never be made the object of a separate conception.

Imagination is of immense importance in contrivance, of so great indeed, that it is scarcely possible for any being to contrive without it. Who could contrive a watch if they could form no conception of a wheel, dif