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In the same manner, if we were told that there existed beings who could contrive without some of the faculties which with us are necessary to contrivance, we should pronounce the evidence, that his mind was produced by design to be greater than that our own was thus produced. This conclusion would be adopted with still greater confidence, if the mind of that being was more perfect, and his contrivances more ingenious, than our own. The more glorious the nature of the being who contrives, the stronger the proof that his mind was the work of a contriver. If we could analyze the minds of the angels, we should undoubtedly discover still stronger marks of design than in our own, and perceive more clearly the glory and wisdom of God.

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power,

Yet I cannot acknowledge that a mind destitute of all! our faculties, could ever be able to contrive, whatever Two kinds of ideas, might be substituted for them. corresponding to sensations and conceptions, associations of some kind, will, and knowledge, (which last might indeed be derived from sources different from ours,) if not all the other faculties and laws which I have mentioned, are absolutely necessary to contrivance. The possession of these, with substitutes for the others, is sufficient to prove a mind the work of a contriver..

Having proved that all beings who contrive, must be the work of an intelligent designing mind, the step is short to the demonstration of the existence of God, Man, we know, from the nature of the mind of man.

is a contriving being, he must therefore have had a cantriver, an intelligent mind, the God whom we adore. This conclusion cannot be denied, unless we deny the principles of belief given in the first chapter of this work..

We might have drawn the same inference, witha

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scarce a greater possibility of error, from a different method of reasoning, without any analysis of our minds. Mr. Paley, in stating his argument, asserts, that if in the watch which he mentions, we had discovered a contrivance for producing a new machine, similar to it, this fact would not weaken our conclusion that it was the contrivance of an intelligent mind. "We are now asking," says he, "for the cause of that subserviency to an use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question, by telling us that the preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without a contriver. Nor is any thing gained by running the difficulty further back, ie. by supposing the watch before us to have been produced by another watch, that by a former, and so on indefinitely. Our going back ever so far brings us no nearer the last degree of satisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is still unaccounted for. We still

want a contriver."

It may be added to this, that if we were told that the marks of design and contrivance diminished as we went further back; that each watch possessed less order and regularity, less harmony in the arrangement of its parts, than that which was produced from it, and that by following the series back, we should finally arrive to a producing machine, which possessed nomarks of design in its construction, we should deem this answer to our enquiries unsatisfactory, and even absurd. But why? How know we that this hypothesis is not possible? Our answer must be that nothing can produce order which has not order in itself, that regularity does not spring from confusion.

This answer would serve against those who should assert that the watch was produced by a machine different from itself. It would prove that that machine, whatever its construction might be, must show marks of

contrivance, properties which would show it to be the product of design.

This answer will also enable us to prove the existence of God, from the existence of the watch itself, without looking for contrivances in the works of nature, which we may compare with it. We ask for the cause of the order and regularity, which we behold in the watch; we are told that it was contrived by man. But we are not yet satisfied. The order and regularity in the watch prove the same in the mind which produced it. We must therefore conclude, that this mind is the work of another intelligence, possessing greater order than itself, and far more glorious in its nature.

This conclusion is not weakened by supposing that mind may possess a necessary existence. We cannot conceive that order and regularity should necessarily exist. Necessary existence is such as arises from the immutable laws of nature, which exist independent of any mind. Can we suppose that these laws should be such from chance alone, as to produce regularity, harmony, and arrangement of the faculties of mind to a purpose. We might as well attribute a necessary existence at once to the watch itself, as to the mind which designed it.

CHAPTRR IV.

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OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

The

THE two attributes of God, which are best proved from nature, are his power and knowledge. slightest view of the universe, must convince that the being who created it possessed an extraordinary degree of power, and when we examine the contrivances which it contains, we must also adore his wisdom.

The power and knowledge of God are both said to be infinite.

By asserting that God's power is infinite, we may mean, either that it is infinite compared with that of man, i. e. that no multiplication of the power of man can be equal to the power of God; or that there can be no possible act, which God has not power to perform. In the former sense the assertion is manifestly true, for since the power of man is dependent on the will of God, it can by no multiplication ever equal the power of that being. A million of men are as much dependent on the will of God as one. If the asser

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tion be taken in the latter sense, we can never prove
(unless it be from revelation) that it is true.
may be acts which surpass the power of God.
may be beings more powerful than the creator of the
earth.

By asserting that the knowledge of God is infinite,
we must mean,
that there is nothing which is unknown

to him.* The truth of this can only be proved from revelation.

The most important attribute of God is benevolence. This attribute authors have attempted to prove from an examination of nature.

"When God created the human species," says the ingenious Mr. Paley, "he either wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both." He then attempts to establish, the first of these suppositions, by showing that the two last are false.

By wishing their happiness, I understand him to mean that the more happiness man enjoyed, the more would God be pleased,

By wishing their misery, that the less happiness man enjoyed, and the more pain he suffered, the will of God would be fulfilled in a greater degree. By being indifferent, that he cared not how much or how little happiness man enjoyed.

If such be their meaning, it may be that neither of his suppositions are true, for there is yet a fourth, more probable than either of these, viz: That God wished us to possess a particular degree of happiness, and misery, and that he had been displeased, and his purposes in some degree frustrated, had we been more or less happy. This degree of happiness as we have great reason to suppose, is that which we actually enjoy. Is not the degree of happiness and misery, which God hath given us, that which he wishes us to possess?

We may however suppose that God has a perfect knowledge concerning his own works, and a perfect power over them. This appears highly probable from the light of nature. We should presume that every being possesses such knowledge concerning, and power over, his works, till the contrary be proved. We are not to suppose God to have failed in his works without the clearest demonstration.

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