But let us attend further to Mr. Paley's argument. "If God," says he, " had wished our misery, he might have made every thing we tasted bitter, every thing we saw loathsome, every thing we touched a sting, every smell a stench, and every sound discord. But if he had wished our happiness, could he not have made every thing we tasted pleasant, every thing we saw beautiful, all our feelings agreeable, every smell a sweet savour, every scund harmonious? In short, could he not have made us perfectly happy?"

This he certainly could have done, if his power is infinite, and if it is not, we have no proof that he could have made us more miserable than we are. " with

"The world abounds," says this author, contrivances, and all the contrivances, which we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil no doubt exists but it is `never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance; perhaps inseparable from it; or even if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but not the object of it. There is no contrivance in nature to produce pain and misery. We never discover a train of contrivances to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomists ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease; or in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, this is to irritate-this is to inflame-this to convey the gravel to the kidneys-this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout :if by chance he comes to a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is, that it is uselessno one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment.

In answer to this I would observe

Firstly, That there is no contrivance, that we can

perceive, to produce death, yet no one will believe that God, who drove us from the garden of Eden, lest we should eat of the fruit of the tree of life, wished us to be immortal.

Secondly, We know nothing of the immediate causes of pain, and of course, if there were any contrivances in the human frame, to produce it, we could not distinguish them. Let an instrument for producing pain, (such as we might suppose would exist in the body,) be placed before us, we could not discover the use for which it was designed. Of course if any such existed in the body, they must be unknown to us.

Thirdly, There are no contrivances which we can perceive, the object of which is to produce pleasure. We have many members and organs which appear to have been contrived for the purpose of prolonging our existence, the right use of these produces pleasure, and their misuse produces pain. Here pain and pleasure appear to be the instruments for preserving the existence of our species, but we find no instruments by which either of these are produced. God too, appears to have been very indifferent in the choice of these means, except where but one was suitable to his purpose. Pain is always chosen when it will answer the end better than pleasure.

Fourthly, There are many contrivances for the preservation and re-production of the human species, without which it could not exist a moment. These prove that God wished the existence of the human race, but not that he wished us any extraordinary longevity or happiness. A full view of man must convince us that God paid more regard to the preservation of his species, than to his happiness or misery. must believe too, (unless we believe God has not made the universe such as he wished it,) that the degree of happiness which we enjoy, is that which is most agreeable to God.

H

We

1 make these remarks for the purpose of showing that we can never have such proof of the existence of this attribute of God, as to infer from it that the evils which exist, whether they arise from nature or from crimes, are violations of his will. I acknowledge that we have good reason to believe that God wishes our happiness, but not that he prefers it to his other purposes, or that it was a principal motive with him for our creation. We may so far trust to God's benevolence, as to believe that he will not afflict us with useless misery, and to hope, where events are wholly unknown, that he will order them in a manner most agreeable to our happiness; but we are not to say when evil has existed, that God has failed in his purposes, of making us happy, nor are we to suppose that this evil will be attended with some secret good.

We may, in fine, lay it down as a rule, to which none can object, and which we should always observe in our speculations, that of two systems, or hypothesises, otherwise equally probable, we should adopt that which is most agreeable to the benevolence of God; but for any thing beyond this, we have not sufficient proof.*

The next attribute of the Deity, which I shall here notice, is his justice. This is said to be perfect. Its existence cannot be proved by arguments drawn from nature. It is not without difficulty that we can conceive what may be intended by it, when applied to the creator of the earth. When applied to men it im

*To conclude from the light of nature, that the happiness of man was an object with God, in the creation of the world, and thence to infer that whatever increases our happiness was agreeable to God, and that whatever diminished it was contrary to his will, would be much the same, as if we should conclude from the examination of a watch, that the motion of the hands was the object of the contrivance, and thence infer, that whatever accelerated this motion was agreeable to the will, & whatever retarded it, injurious to the purposes of the contriver.

plies obedience to some law, but what laws are there which God must obey? Yet it behooves us to find some sense in which this term may be understood. I can conceive nothing in the character of God which may be denoted by it, unless it be an impartiality in the distribution of his favours.

But the noblest and most adorable trait in the character of God, is the fact that he requires no worship. This is the best proved to us of all his attributes, excepting his power and wisdom. Reason must teach us, that a being of such infinite power and glory, cannot highly regard our adoration, and we accordingly find that in the dispensation of his blessings he asks not who hath prayed, nor who hath knelt.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE METHOD OF DISCOVERING THE WILL OF GOD.

"THERE are two methods," says Mr. Paley, "of coming at the will of God, on any point.

First, By his express declarations, when they are to be had, which must be sought for in scripture.

Second, By what we can discover of his designs and disposition, from his works, or, as we call it, the light of nature.

To this I answer

That the positive commands, and express declarations of God cannot be considered, as proofs of his will. If God deliver a positive command to all mankind, and only one tenth part of them obey, the more reasonable supposition is, that he wished the obedience of no others. As God is omnipotent, at least over his own works, if he wished the obedience of all, would he not force us to obey. His wishes so far as they relate to his creatures, must certainly be fulfilled.

Mr. Paley compares our relation to God, to that of an ambassador to his sovereign. A sovereign would give his ambassador such command as he wished should be obeyed, because he would presume that the effect of the commands would be their obedience.

If they