Leadtimes of construction led, in many cases, to the necessity to utilize not only existing support bases, but also suitable existing access roads. Basically, support bases were selected in the western portion of the United States to avoid heavily populated and industrialized eastern areas. Selecting existing bases not only saved urgently needed time, but provided continued utilization of the heavy dollar investments therein. Certain northern tier bases were selected on the basis of design maximum range and payload with respect to deeper enemy target coverage required. Certain Air Force bases, for example, provided deep target coverage of a previously uncovered set of targets requiring heavy payload. Having selected the desired area and the support base therein, geology be came an important factor. Areas with favorable geological shock attenuation characteristics were selected to permit hardening and thus provide for force survival. Geological formations requiring heavy and difficult construction with associated cost runups and extensive leadtimes were rejected. Water table requirements were applied so that areas favorable to construction, maintenance, and onsite water requirements were selected. Geological fault areas were rejected. Areas best suited for relatively cheap access were selected. In this process, access roads became important. Site preparation distances between the support base and the individual launch emplacements, one to the other, were necessary for survivability. In order to save needed time and provide the most direct and immediate access to the missile sites for logistical support reasons, it became necessary in most instances to utilize exiting road networks. Logistical consideration resulted in Atlas and Titan site locations not exceeding 60 road miles from the support base, and Minuteman sites not more than 120 road miles from the support base. With logistical support costs increasing sharply, in direct proportion with the distance of a missile site from the support base, stringing missile sites in one direction along existing roads became economically undesirable. With respect to the fallout criteria, the westerly siting of the ICBM bases generally avoided the heavily populated eastern portion of the country. In most cases, ICBM sites were located at least 18 nautical miles from communities of 25,000 population or more. Whenever practicable, in consideration of other important criteria, individual launchers were located downwind of communities. However, in certain instances, other factors mentioned required upwind sitings. Dr. McDonald's paper has been reviewed from a technical viewpoint within the scope of his study. There are no important technical errors with respect to his presentation. The basic oversight of this paper is that it ignores the overall military problems and factors of national importance, which dictate the requirement for an ICBM force in this country. To take one possible enemy target out of this context ignores the larger and more important problem. ADEQUACY OF CIVIL DEFENSE LEGISLATION Mr. ROBACK. We reviewed with the legal counsel for OCDM yesterday the legislative situation with regard to the President's civil defense program. Has the Department of Defense studied the legislative background of the civil defense program? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. If I may, Mr. Roback, I would like to refer that question to Mr. Vance, the General Counsel of the Department, who is sitting at my right. Mr. VANCE. I am sorry, Mr. Roback, I couldn't hear your question. Has the Department of Defense done what? Mr. ROBACK. Has the Department of Defense studied the legislative requirements and relationships of existing legislation? Mr. VANCE. We have made a very brief review in the limited time available to us. Mr. ROBACK. And what conclusion, if any, have you come to? Mr. VANCE. Our principal conclusion is that it requires further study on our part before we could come up with any recommenda Mr. ROBACK. You have no recommendations as to whether the legislation is adequate or inadequate or needs to be recommended in any respect? Mr. VANCE. No; I do not. Mr. ROBACK. Does this brief review evoke any possibilities? Did you notice anything that might pose a problem or interfere with any program that you propose to put forth? Mr. VANCE. I noted one thing, that the emergency powers under title III expire, I believe, in June of 1962. So that some action would have to be taken in the next session of Congress with respect to that. Mr. ROBACK. So that one of the real responsibilities of the Department of Defense would be to put to the President the problem of extending the emergency authority and possibly revising it if it were thought necessary? Mr. VANCE. The President reserved the emergency powers to himself, as you know, Mr. Roback. Certainly, I think urgent consideration should be given to extending those powers. BASIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHELTER PROGRAM Mr. ROBACK. Now, we will discuss for a few moments the shelter responsibilities of the Department of Defense. What is the basis for this program? Was this an independent study of the Department or is this a derived study from the OCDM? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The program that we offer to the Congress was based on a number of studies running back, some of them a number of years, including studies conducted by OCDM, a number of pilot or sample surveys which have been made, and a larger number which are currently underway, and also studies that have been conducted within the National Security Council and other studies prepared for the President. The work that we examined by other agencies was supplemented by work done by a task force established in the Department of Defense which drew on elements of the Department, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and outside consultants from Stanford Research Institute, the Operations Research Office, and other consultant organizations, and also, of course, extensively, with the help and cooperation of Mr. Ellis from OCDM itself. COST OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHELTER IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM Mr. ROBACK. There was some testimony yesterday which suggested that the cost of marking, of identification and marking shelters, as put forth by the OCDM, was $50 million; and as put forth by the Department of Defense was twice that amount. The question then came up, or the explanation was offered by Mr. Devaney of OCDM, that the Department of Defense was interested in a more refined technical inquiry, so that it could set itself the needed task of upgrading. Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I believe Mr. Devaney's answer was quite correct, Mr. Roback. The $50 million figure which we examined in the course of our task force study covered a survey which would be adequate for the purposes of identifying these shelter spaces but which wouldn't provide the necessary facts to determine what kind of modification program should be undertaken. In fact, I believe the study which contained the $50 million figure had an additional figure, the amount which I do not recall, which covered a partial resurvey to obtain this additional information. Mr. ROBACK. In making these estimates Mr. YARMOLINSKY. May I add just one point here? In the interests of economy we considered the possibility of an immediate identification survey and a later modification survey. And we found that the total cost of the combined survey was substantially less than the cost of the two separate surveys, and therefore we proposed the combined survey. Mr. ROBACK. By "combined" do you also contemplate that as you identify you will improve shelters? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. No; we do not, because we believe that it is necessary to obtain a good deal of the information out of the survey before decisions are made on modification. It is for that reason that we included only a pilot program of modification in this year's program. BEGINNING OF SHELTER MODIFICATIONS PROGRAM Mr. ROBACK. The figures given in the testimony were that December 1962 would see the end of the identification program, and improvement, if any, would follow after that time. Is that right? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Not precisely. I think, in addition to the $10 million pilot program of modification which could begin, I suppose, in January or February of 1962, depending on the results of the survey, to the extent they were available at the time of the formulation of the fiscal year 1963 budget, we might propose additional funds for additional modification to begin in July of 1962, before the survey and the identification process was completed. Our notion here was to achieve as much concurrency as is consistent with reasonable longrange planning and reasonable economy. Mr. ROBACK. If that is the case, why don't you select the most promising spaces first and then improve those? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The most promising spaces? Mr. ROBACK. Spaces, that is, occupancy potential. You have a program, as I understand it, to conduct a technical census of all the shelters, all the buildings, all the structures in the United States. Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes, sir. Mr. ROBACK. Now, it is obvious that if you wait until you count every nose, so to speak, that takes a long time Mr. YARMOLINSKY. We are not proposing, as I tried to indicate, we are not proposing to wait until we have counted every nose or even a majority of the noses, we are proposing to go ahead with a pilot program of modification very shortly after the survey has begun and then, depending on the results of the first part of the survey we will be able to decide whether or not to request additional funds perhaps more substantial for modification beginning, say, in June of 1962. NEED FOR STARTING WITH SURVEY AND MARKING Mr. ROBACK. So that the committee can understand the rationale of this program, just let me ask you simply, why is the survey and marking of existing structures the most important way of achieving Mr. YARMOLINSKY. For three reasons, Mr. Roback. In the first place, we are convinced that this is the fastest way to get the greatest number of bases for immediate protection for perhaps 40 or 50 or 60 million people, using a very considerable range of estimates, giving these people a reasonable degree of protection against fallout. Our second reason is that our best estimates indicate that the shelter which would be provided would be very substantially lower in unit cost than any other kind of shelter that we know of or have been able to find out about. And the third reason is that it seems to us, as the Secretary said in his testimony the day before yesterday, that you have got to find out what you have before you decide what you need. And we feel that we don't know what we have, that one cannot extrapolate sufficiently on the basis of the very limited sample surveys that had been conducted by OCDM in the past-not that we are critical of these surveys, but the coverage is just insufficient. We don't propose to complete the survey before we make decisions on the subsequent program to be proposed to the Congress. COMPETITIVE COST OF BLAST SHELTERS Mr. ROBACK. Suppose that you find out what you have, and you find out it isn't very good, and you then have to set for yourself the policy, of, let us say, constructing blast shelters in certain areas, according to the findings and priorities that targeting and population and industrial concentrations suggest. Now, suppose you come to such a conclusion as that. Do you think it is even possible or plausible that you might come to such a conclusion? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I think the conclusion that a substantial blast shelter program is needed, is, from what I have been able to learn in the very brief time that I have been involved in this subject, highly unlikely. Mr. ROBACK. Highly unlikely from what standpoint, technical or cost? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I assume that a degree of blast protection is technically achievable. But the relationship of cost to protection is so high that it seems to me we need to know more than we know now, just for example, about the relationship between the cost of active defense and the cost of passive blast defense. In this connection, I might Mr. HOLIFIELD. How are you using the words "blast defense"? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I am using the words "blast defense" only when we are talking about protection against the direct effects of blasts. I am well aware of the point you made the day before yesterday that fallout shelters of any kind at all afford not insubstantial protection against missiles, projectiles, pushed out by the blasts, and against secondary effects. I am thinking of the primary blast effects, sir. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let's use those words "primary blast," because we can get fouled up on the use of the word "blast" without modification. Any kind of shelter provides some kind of blast protection, along with the radioactive protection. And the degree of that blast protection, of course, is determined by the size of the blast and by the type of protection, the type of underground protection. So let's not divide blast and radiation protection into two completely separated compartments, because they are mingled. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Chairman? Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mrs. Griffiths. STANDARD SHIELDING FACTOR FOR SHELTERS Mrs. GRIFFITHS. What is the standard, or what are the specifications that you will accept now for a shelter? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. În terms of shielding? Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Yes. Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Well, I should say first that we have not determined specifically numerical specifications for the survey. The first part of the job that has got to be done and which we are just beginning, is to make the specifications on which the survey will be conducted. I would suppose that a factor of 50 to 150 would be the factor that we would be looking for in the shelter survey. Now, I would suppose that we would find a good deal of space that had, let's say, protection factors between 10 and 50 which would be valuable in large areas well away from the ground zero, the source of the fallout. And the decision as to what number, what percentage of those areas, to mark is one that we haven't made yet. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Will the standard vary from city to city? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I would suppose that the standard might vary from area to area, depending on what our predictions are as to the range of likelihood of fallout intensity, given a reasonable or probable range of target patterns. But, again, this is a matter that we don't have any answers on yet. We will have them in a few weeks. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. It will not bear, though, on the consideration of what is available? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. In consideration of what is available? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I hadn't thought of it as bearing on that basis, because if a shelter space is not going to offer an attenuation factor high enough to save the lives of people who are exposed to whatever the expected dose, based on the attack, might be, there is no point in marking and stocking the shelter. We don't want to have a program that looks good when you walk around before the attack but afterward all you find are the victims of radiation. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Thank you. OCDM STUDIES OF NEED FOR BLAST SHELTERS Mr. ROBACK. IS Mr. Devaney in the room? Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Devaney, will you come up? You are Director of Systems Analyses, whatever it is called, in the OCDM? Mr. DEVANEY. Yes, sir. Mr. ROBACK. From a systems study or operations analysis standpoint, does it make sense to consider the possibility of a blast pro |