shelter relative to people, because to the extent that the shelter and the people are not located together, the program we propose does not work.

Now, the preliminary estimates we have made from the surveys that have been made indicate that the problem you were concerned about is not quite as serious as it should seem on the surface. We think that shelter in existing buildings will be in proportion to the distribution of people much closer than it appears at first sight. I would like to explain why.

If we used a city that would be similar to Detroit or Indianapolis, there would be somewhere around 15 or 20 cities in the Nation in that general geographic area or size. If we were to use that as an example, the central city, roughly a mile in diameter, has about 5 to 10 percent of the population in it. And you are right that the people in that area may not be the highest element of society, and at night you are saving out of proportion people in that central core and there is too much shelter there compared to the number of people. So the point you make is true.

But I would say just as an aside that I understand that these central core people are very good voters, they sometimes vote more than once. But aside from that, I would say that in the central core-it is not a very large area-this proportion of shelter is far higher than the proportion of people that are there in the off hours. But in the next concentric ring around it, if you went another mile out and included a 3-mile circle, in that ring is the apartment house area in cities of that category, and somewhere around 20 to 25 percent of the people live in that area.

Now, the preliminary review of the statistics that we have from sample surveys indicates that there is a fair balance of people to shelter in that ring.

The next ring out, which carries you to about 5 miles, is in about that same proportion. Thus there is a tendency for the density to be high toward the center of the city.

Now, if you go out to a 10-mile ring and Indianapolis city limits approximate that very closely-that includes about 85 percent of the population. It is in that area as you go from somewhere around from the 5- to the 10-mile limit that we begin to run out of shelter.

It is not that we want to visualize, as it almost came out in the testimony, the people in the periphery moving from the outskirts of town and evacuating toward the center, because that is the wrong visualization of the problem. There isn't enough shelter in the central city to take account of that mass movement.

ASSIGNING PEOPLE TO SHELTER A FEW BLOCKS TOWARD THE CENTER

There is, however, a tendency for the shelter to be concentrated somewhat more toward the center of the city than the people, which means that in an operational sense when people are assigned the shelter they should move to, it is possible for everyone to move a few blocks at the minimum, say, or the maximum, say, of a mile or so in the general direction of the center, so that in anyone's individual mind

he is not moving from the outskirts to the center, rather he is moving a very slight distance toward the center.

It is almost like a train with a lot of cars and the locomotive moved toward the center of the city and the caboose in to the next closer ring. The idea was to maximize the use of the shelter, but the ones on the outskirts didn't move downtown, they moved very little inward. It is not a mass movement of people all rushing toward the center of the town, it is a very slight movement for any one individual.

The problem we are trying to solve in surveying and marking is, where does the shelter run out relative to the people who need this shelter space, so that we can build or provide by some other means the shelter in the periphery area.

Now, I don't know whether this tends to answer some of the questions. But I think that there was one more aspect of the problem that didn't come across clearly to me in the testimony that I could elaborate on very slightly.

AIMING ERRORS WILL SAVE PARTS OF CITIES

We tend, each of us, when we think of the attack to visualize the bomb aimed directly at us and ourselves in the fireball.

Now, if we were to think of these two sheets of paper as representing one of these cities, if it were Detroit, it would be a little bit elongated, if it were Indianapolis it would be almost round, and if an enemy were targeting such a city, he would tend to pick the geographic center for his designated ground zero, and he would allow the aiming error to distribute the weapon. A five megaton weapon in that area happens to coincide, in its blast destruction with a city about the size of Indianapolis. To illustrate, if the weapon landed on the designated ground zero when the weapon misses we save people on some side of the city. Because of aiming error, the area of blast and fire and primary effects, leaves uncovered a number of people who can be saved by fallout shelters. And so our program is effective. We are not saying we saved those that are under the blast, we are saving those that were not under the blast, because the enemy cannot put the weapon down on designated ground zero.

Mr. HOLLIFIELD. And this very point, that we cannot predetermine where ground zero will be, suggests we must prepare a system of shelters on the premise that the majority of the people will not be in a ground zero locality, and, therefore, they will get the benefits of even a modest type of shelter.

COMPETITION FOR FUNDS

Mr. CANNELL. I concur with you completely, I am only saying that we are faced always with the problem of maximizing the effectiveness of our dollars and cents. And it happens that the first money spent can buy more lives this first year by using structures that are already available.

It is not that we are trying to say that we won't do these other things, but we don't want to have Von Braun beat us to the moon, we want you to give us the money so we can do it and not give it all to him; you have to give us a fair racing chance in this.

And our fair racing chance comes in being funded along with him. If you do fund it, we will sequence this program in such a manner as to buy the most lives with each incremental expenditure of money. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. I will agree with you; I think it is remarkable that we are putting $40 billion on the theory of Von Braun reaching the moon while the Secretary of Defense has already stated that $10 billion for shelter is not a proper amount, is ridiculous.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is absurd.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Let me point out to you that the Secretary of Defense, handling this program surrounded by admirals and generals who are devoting their time and attention to thinking of a weapon that will knock down the enemy's weapons, is in direct opposition to an enemy that is thinking of a weapon that will overcome any defense that they can make.

Therefore, it is in my opinion absurd to spend the kind of money that we are spending on defense that will ultimately fail and refuse to spend any money or even set up any plans for creating a civil defense that would ultimately succeed for some people.

PROBLEMS OF SUBURBS AND RURAL AREAS

Now, you have spent a lot of time telling me about what would happen in Detroit, with which I agree, with this exception.

My district begins 8 miles from the downtown. It extends for some 15 or 20 miles from the downtown area. It is the second highest owner-occupied district in the United States, which means that they are all individual dwellings, 86.8 percent live in the individual dwellings. There are few buildings in the entire area that are as much as two stories. I think even some of the main new high schools do not have basements.

So that any kind of shelter program that you are going to decide upon must, in my opinion, consider this type of an area. And I am sure it is not the only such area in the United States.

Mr. CANNELL. I was trying to explain that it is quite a common problem. We have to designate and find all these areas so that the program can be planned on a very logical overall basis.

We can't at random pick these areas without accidentally skipping some. So the survey has to be in a very systematic manner to each time find where is our best option for saving lives with the next increment of money.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. I would like to ask you a question on this.

I asked the Secretary the other day, and he said that he did not believe that people in rural areas had any greater chance of avoiding destruction than people in city areas.

Is this true, or is it not? I asked him if the people in rural areas wouldn't have a better chance of evading destruction than people in urban areas. And he just said no.

Mr. CANNELL. Of course, it depends entirely on how it is targeted. But from a fallout standpoint, it is not a great deal different to provide the shielding one place than another.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. From a blast, then.

Mr. CANNELL. You can't target rural areas with a blast.

TARGET AREAS

Mrs. GRIFFTHS. And, as a matter of fact, the shelter program that you have explained to us considers hit cities abandoned after the blast. Mr. CANNELL. No, it doesn't, because, as I explained, there are a number of strategic situations where cities aren't the targets.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. That is true. But a city that is hit would certainly be abandoned under this shelter program. I mean, there would be little chance that anybody would survive.

Mr. CANNELL. This is not a total program; it is the first year of a program.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. But under the present circumstances you are going to abandon the cities that get hit, right?

Mr. CANNELL. I think that is the wrong way to phrase the question. Even in those cities that are targets, as I tried to explain, aiming error means that you will buy some lives in those cities by the mere fact of identifying and marking shelters. It is not an abandonment. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. If it is a shelter that will protect.

I have already explained to you that in my district you are not going to have any shelters.

Mr. CANNELL. Your people are not without recourse, however. There are a number of expedient things that people can do in the time between a detonation and the fallout coming back down to earth. And in this interim period I see no other recourse than for them to do things for themselves.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Let me point out to you that they are not going to be able to do anything for themselves unless this program has a tremendous educational impact, unless you educate them practically one by one.

Mr. CANNELL. It is envisioned in our program.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Unless you do that, it won't happen.

I have already heard from one of the civil defense administrators of a neighboring State who pointed out in regard to the question I asked the Secretary on the educational program that they had never been told in that State what they were supposed to do.

TWO BOMBS ON A CITY

Mr. RIEHLMAN. What is going to happen if you have a second bomb dropped right on that same target area?

Mr. CANNELL. I oversimplified the problem by explaining it in the relation to one bomb per city, which isn't necessarily the way one targets. Usually you have to assign more than one weapon to some of the larger cities, which means the smaller ones don't get any. And some of the smaller cities are in need of fallout shelter which would be very effective in those areas. There are all of these optional ways to assign the weapons, but on a national estimate, you still had only so many weapons to assign. If you don't save people one place, then you save them in another.

Mr. ROBACK. You are saying, Mr. Cannell, that the enemy has got so many weapons in a given stockpile or targeting program, and if he has to put more on one city, some other city doesn't get it?

Mr. CANNELL. There is a range of ways to distribute them, and we considered this when we said how many lives we would save. We have tried many ways of allocating them and it is just that different people are saved.

NEED FOR CONTINUING SHELTER PROGRAM

Mr. ROBACK. In relation to Mrs. Griffiths' question about the hazard, as far as the Department of Defense is concerned, this is a 1- or 2year program for fallout shelter protection which does not preclude any further programs?

Mr. CANNELL. I think perhaps we have put undue emphasis on the point of the people whose lives we save with the first-year program. Another equally important aspect is to have the planning base for determining the extent and nature of a continuing program.

Mr. ROBACK. For determining the optimum program?
Mr. CANNELL. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. There is nothing in the testimony, outside of this little excursion that we had this morning into the Secretary's testimony before another committee, there is nothing in any concept that you have in the Department of Defense that precludes planning for and ultimately achieving an optimum shelter organization? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I think I should speak to that.

And the answer is, certainly not. The program that we have presented to the Congress is a program intended primarily to save, we hope, 10, 15, 20 million lives, and secondarily, to develop the next facts so that we could present a further program to the Congress in the following year.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. As the head of the program, are you going to depend on Nike-Zeus or shelters?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. No, Mrs. Griffiths. The question as to whether we should undertake a large-scale primary blast shelter program, is one that seems to me can't be answered until we know a good deal of the results of this survey, and more than we know now about the effectiveness of Nike-Zeus. I am not saying that this is a question that we have to wait to settle for 1 or 2 or 5 years. I would hope that by fiscal year 1963 budget time we would have some kind of answer to bring before the Congress, and a program to propose.

But we don't know enough now to answer that question.

We do know enough to know, and I can assert it here, that we cannot rely on any kind of active defense system to protect this country against fallout. Therefore, our primary problem is the problem of fallout protection.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. If it would take ten years to protect by Nike-Zeus, and in the meantime you would know exactly what additionally the Russians would have, and the bomb would drop in 5 years, I presume you would be for a shelter program now.

REVISED EDITION OF "EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Yarmolinsky, you have with you some representatives of the Atomic Support Agency.

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The Defense Atomic Support Agency, we do.