works. It is the spreading of the warning signal from the warning points to the siren points or other notification points throughout the country that requires attention, including improvement in the siren system, which is still necessary to warn people out of doors. ISSUE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL Many people, including previous Defense officials, have been apprehensive about the consequences of bringing civil defense under what has been described as "military control," as well as the dangers of degrading military capabilities. As I indicated earlier in my statement, we propose to organize the civil defense function under civilian control, as a separate unit attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There are a number of ways, however, in which the civil defense organization can take advantage of the competence and capabilities of other units within the Department, without in any way detracting from the Armed Forces primary military obligations. For example, the district offices of the Army Corps of Engineers and of the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks can be called upon to contract with civilian architects and engineers for the proposed shelter survey. The civil defense warning system becomes most effective when it is considered as an extension of the North American Air Defense (NORAD) warning system. FUNCTIONS DELEGATED TO OTHER AGENCIES While responsibility for civil defense is focused in the Department of Defense under the new Executive order, certain specific civil defense functions are delegated to other agencies. Responsibility for maintaining stockpiles of food and medical supplies are specifically excepted from the Executive order, and it is expected that these responsibilities will be delegated respectively to the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Under a series of Emergency Preparedness Orders, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization has delegated a number of specific functions to other Federal agencies. These delegations continue in effect, although they are now subject to coordination by the Department of Defense to the extent that they affect the new civil defense responsibilities of the Department. It may be useful for me to summarize some of these civil defense delegations briefly: The Department of Agriculture, in addition to its expected food stockpiling responsibilities, is responsible for rural fire control and for protection of plants and animals against radiological, chemical, and bacteriological hazards. The Department of Commerce is responsible for developing plans to restore streets and highways, for the emergency use of civil air transport and for the use of shipping in emergency. The Federal Aviation Agency is responsible for emergency plans for civil airports and airways. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in addition to its expected medical stockpile responsibilities, is responsible for planning care of refugees from an attack, including provision of location services. It conducts adult education programs to acquaint the general public with these duties and responsibilities in emergency, and it is responsible for introduction of information on civil defense into school and college curricula. The Department of Interior is responsible for emergency plans for the power and petroleum industries. The Department of Labor is responsible for planning for use of emergency manpower, except medical manpower, in the immediate postattack period. The Post Office Department is responsible for establishing a registration service for individuals and families. The Housing and Home Finance Agency is responsible for developing plans and programs for emergency housing and community services in the postattack period. The Interstate Commerce Commission is responsible for developing plans and programs for use of domestic service transportation in emergency. It is apparent from this exposition that the relations of the Department of Defense with other Federal departments and agencies in administering the civil defense program are quite complex. The transfer of civil defense responsibilities to the Department requires the establishment of new lines of communication, which are going to have to be worked out over the coming weeks and months. RELATIONS WITH STATE AND LOCAL UNITS I am well aware that the Federal responsibilities which I have just described are complementary to the responsibilities of the States as prescribed in the Federal Civil Defense Act. The Department of Defense has for some time been in touch with State and local civil defense organizations through its representatives on the regional civil and defense mobilization boards. As you know, the Department of the Army has designated the principal Defense representatives on each regional board and the Navy and Air Force designate an assistant to the Department of the Army representative. These representatives have participated in all of the deliberations of the regional boards, including the review of the State and local survival plans, and the Department participates in test exercises of the State and local units. I am also aware of the fragmentary nature of most State and local civil defense planning. A few States have made extraordinary efforts. As of June 30 of this year, only 7 States, 9 counties, and 8 cities possessed protected emergency operating centers, and another 7 States, 22 counties, and 12 cities had centers under construction. In more than two-thirds of the States, there is no operating center now available and equipped to function in a civil defense emergency. We have not yet determined what form of regional organization would be most appropriate to carry out our responsibilities to assist State and local governments in planning to protect themselves and to provide emergency survival services. State and local governments have available to them vast resources of trained manpower and equipment in their police and fire departments, civil engineering offices and public utility services. These resources must be organized for emergency operation, however, and plans must be formulated now so that the surviving elements can operate independently and can reestablish communications with other survivors in order to reconstitute an organization after an attack. The Department of Defense has been an active and important participant in existing programs to provide supplies and equipment for civil defense purposes. The total acquisition cost of the equipment made available since this program began in 1956 is estimated at $195 million. The Department will, of course, continue to make this equipment available in addition to assuming responsibility for administration of the program. The last 3 years have seen a substantial acceleration in matching funds contributions to State and local civil defense organizations, from $10 million in 1960 to $22 million, projected for fiscal year 1962. The bulk of the fiscal year 1962 funds, $12 million, will go for salaries of State and local employees. An administrative device to be explored in this connection is the consolidation of county civil defense units in sparsely located regions into multicounty districts to permit more efficient operations. Such an arrangement has already been undertaken in South Dakota, and we plan to explore its applicability in other parts of the country. Five million dollars are planned for contribution to construction of State emergency operation centers-a program that we hope to accelerate. The remaining $5 million covers equipment and supplies for a variety of State and local emergency services. USE OF MILITARY RESERVES FOR CIVIL DEFENSE What happens after a thermonuclear attack depends almost entirely on the kind of planning that has preceded the attack. But any plan must allow for a wide range of contingencies. One of these contingent matters is the availability of military personnel to assist in providing emergency survival services. The primary mission of all military personnel, whether active or reserve, is necessarily military operations. But a current Department of Defense directive provides that "Military support to civil authorities in civil defense operations is an emergency task within the mission of all Federal active duty and reserve units of the military services." It further provides that: "The military departments shall be prepared to furnish assistance to civil authorities for a limited period in domestic emergencies, utilizing resources not required in the execution of their essential military missions." Present plans do not contemplate an immediate mobilization of standby reserve forces. A major portion of the standby reserves might be available for civil defense assignment. Such utilization of standby reserves is one of the possibilities that we expect to explore. Since any thermonuclear attack will undoubtedly find a large portion of our Military Establishment located in the continental United States, a civil defense emergency is a common concern for military and civilians alike. Placing of civil defense responsibility under the Department of Defense should facilitate a common effort to plan for, and, if necessary, to conduct emergency operations. SIZE OF THE PROGRAM The changes introduced in the defense program by the President have all been in the direction of increased flexibility in order to deal with a wider range of defense problems. As the size and range of strategic weapons are multiplied, civil defense becomes an essential element to round out our overall defense capabilities. The proper balance between active and passive defense is always open for discussion. By any standard, however, the present level of civil defense spending is not only inadequate but I believe extremely wasteful. It buys an organization, but it does not buy a program. The program proposed by the President will not satisfy everyone. It is not large enough to guarantee survival for all our citizens in a large-scale nuclear attack. No program that is financially feasible can do so. What it does is to offer the greatest amount of protection against nuclear attack that can be made available to our civilian population in the near future, while actively exploring possibilities for practical achievement of great shelter capacity in the future. FUTURE COMMITMENTS The proposed program involves no future commitments, other than a commitment to stock the remaining 20 million shelter spaces expected to be identified and stocked in fiscal year 1963. The approximate cost of the additional stockage is $2 per space, or $40 million. Depending on the results of the pilot modification program and of the construction program for shelters in Federal buildings, decisions can be made and proposals advanced about the future shelter program. The present warning and communications systems will require continuing support at their present level. If the NEAR system is to be installed on a national basis, it will require an additional investment over a 3- or 4-year period of some $50 to $60 million. On the other hand, by integrating the civil defense national warning and emergency communication systems with military systems, it may be possible to effect substantial economies while at the same time providing increased efficiency. The future of matching funds programs for State and local activities is difficult to predict. If the overall civil defense effort is to be effective, State and local participation must increase substantially, but this increase may be offset by State and local governments assuming a larger share of the costs. As you pointed out to me, Mr. Chairman, in your invitation, "The President's decision to revitalize this long-neglected program" makes these hearings particularly timely. Your subcommittee is now in a position to provide a valuable forum to interpret the new program to the Congress and the people of the United States. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and to enlist your support. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. We are honored this morning by having also before you Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And he also has a statement which I notice is quite short. And with the forbearance of the committee, we will extend to you at this time an invitation to present your statement, and then the questioning can be conducted both of you and the Secretary. STATEMENT OF GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, U.S. ARMY, General LEMNITZER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I have long been an advocate of a more viable national civil defense program. Therefore, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak in support of the program Secretary McNamara has outlined for you. In my statement, I shall address three aspects of the civil defense problem: First, the interrelationship between civil defense and military strength; Second, the contribution of civil defense to deterrence; and measures. RELATIONSHIP OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND MILITARY STRENGTH In regard to the interrelationship between civil defense and military strength it is important to remember that the basic objective of any nation's security policy is to protect its people. Throughout history, nations have relied upon armed might as a primary means to attain such an objective. In warfare, nations almost invariably sought destruction of enemy armed forces for the purpose of forcing enemy capitulation. To facilitate defeat of enemy forces, those parts of an enemy's economy which provided the tools of war were also attacked. It was during World War II, for the first time, that populations, as an essential aspect of a nation's economy, were taken under attack. Today, with both range and destructiveness of weapons vastly increased, a deliberate attack on populations—or the threat of such an attack might well become the primary means selected by an aggressor to force surrender of his victim. Even if civilian populations were not primary targets, the inadvertent or incidental loss of life. among noncombatants in a general war as the result of fallout could achieve unprecedented proportions. Thus, today, all who are charged with national security responsibilities, must give close attention to one of the most elemental of our security objectives preserving the lives of our people. There is a very important way in which an effective civil defense program would support our military capabilities. Ultimate victory or defeat in general war would depend upon our ability to recover from the effect of nuclear attack and to conduct such operations as may be necessary to lead to a successful termination of hostilities. CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO DETERRENCE As regards the contribution of civil defense to deterrence: The extent to which we have the ability to defend against an attack, particularly the initial attack, or to minimize the effects of an attack, is an essential element of our overall deterrent. Any doubt in the mind of a potential enemy with respect to his capability to deal us at decisive blow makes less likely the possibility that he will initiate a nuclear attack against us. This, then, is the important way in which |