the recommended radiation decay assumptions for civil defense planning purposes? Major STEBBINS. Well, we attempt to describe in some detail the phenomena that occur when the bomb bursts. Mr. ROBACK. You are giving people many choices, you are telling them all the possibilities. I am asking you whether it makes sense to say from a civil defense planning standpoint that this is what you should be guided by, this is the best one can say as a general proposition. The testimony has been that the t-1.2 rule is still basic for that. Major STEBBINS. That is right. I think that is appropriate to say. As far as the effects of nuclear weapons are concerned, we do not make specific recommendations on it. Mr. ROBACK. That is not your job, that is the policy of the civil defense planners? Major STEBBINS. That is right. Mr. ROBACK. Are you worried about that, Mr. Yarmolinsky? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I want to add, Mr. Roback, that while we use this formula where we need a formula, we also base our planning on the assumption, and indeed on the fact, that there are established large numbers of radiation monitoring stations, and larger numbers are being established. We have asked for funds in our budget to buy an additional 90,000 survey meters in order to provide specific information for planning at the time. Since local conditions vary so much, we are basing our planning on the assumption that the specific information has to be obtained on the spot. BUDGET FOR NEW PROGRAM Mr. ROBACK. Will you submit for the record a breakdown of the new budget request for civil defense into its components? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I will, indeed, sir. Mr. ROBACK. And will you submit to the committee an analysis and costing of the provisioning of shelter? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes. Mr. ROBACK. And also a breakdown analysis of the upgrading costs-improvement costs? Mr. CANNELL. This third aspect won't be available until the survey is completed. That is part of the data we gathered. Mr. ROBACK. Let me ask you this, Mr. Cannell. You probably had something to do with the input on the cost figures, have you not? Mr. CANNELL. Yes. And I am aware of the deficiency in this area of approximating the cost of the improvement phase. Mr. ROBACK. There is a figure in the budget for improvement, isn't there? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. There is a figure, yes, but it is not based- Survey and marking. Shelters in new Federal construction___ (The following information subsequently was received:) Department of Defense budget request for civil defense functions, fiscal year 1962 Item Shelter program: Improvements of existing shelter space Equipment and supplies___ Budget request (millions) $93.0 10.0 7.5 58.8 Insofar as analysis and cost breakdown of the provisions and plans for stocking shelters are concerned, we will not be able to supply information of a more definitive character than that indicated in the budget breakdown, above, until the program is further along and studies have been completed. Likewise, it will not be possible to supply information as to the cost of upgrading existing shelters until a later date since the accumulation of such information is one of the purposes of the planned survey program. RADIATION MONITORING STATIONS Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Are the monitoring stations going to be protected from blast? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I am afraid I just don't know to what extent fallout protection is available for them. I will supply that for the record. (The following information subsequently was received:) FALLOUT PROTECTION OF MONITORING STATIONS The OCDM national plan, appendix I, annex 23, item II, section 2, indicates that radiation measuring devices should be located in areas protected from fallout. Many of the present radiation monitoring stations are located in basements or other areas where danger from fallout is reduced. The protection afforded these stations, however, is the responsibility of the State and local civil defense organizations. We understand that the OCDM has had no plans to improve the fallout protection afforded radiation monitoring stations. We are developing plans to improve the fallout protection of monitoring stations. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Is it the theory of the monitoring station that it will be able to disseminate information as to the radioactivity of the air? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The theory of the monitoring station, as I understand it, is that monitoring stations which are still manned after the attack will be able to disseminate this information to control points, and from there to central headquarters. 73266-61-10 Mrs. GRIFFITHS. And what does it depend upon for such dissemination? Does it depend upon the fact that you will still have intact some type of communications system other than word of mouth? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. It depends on the radio communications backup, largely, on the assumption that most of the landlines will be out. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. So that if an isolated group of people have survived, and they were not in contact with any monitoring station, they could then die because they didn't have the information? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The assumption is that the source of information for isolated groups will not be a hardened communication system, but rather communications from the emergency broadcasting system which is being hardened and which is being picked up on the regular conelrad frequency. Mr. CANNELL. Ånd instruments stored in the shelter. Mrs. GRIFFITHS (presiding). Do you have other questions? STATUS OF BATTLE CREEK OFFICE Mr. ROBACK. Just one more. I have a newspaper reporter in the audience who wants to know about Battle Creek. Can you tell us anything about Battle Creek? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I can tell you only that we visited Battle Creek yesterday, a number of us went out from the Department and met with the people in the installation out there and with a number of the members of the chamber of commerce and others. We went through the facility, met the heads of the various departments, and collected a good deal of information, which we will have to think about now that we are back home. We are certainly not in a position now to reach any decisions about the organization and use of the Battle Creek facility. Mr. ROBACK. As to whether it will be retained or not? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. It is just too soon to say. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Any further questions? Thank you very much for your testimony. I believe that the reporter failed to get the answer to one of the questions I asked you. Will you please supply it for the record? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes. Mr. ROBACK. May I remind you that tomorrow the Atomic Energy Commisison will have representatives here to discuss in rather considerable detail the problems of radiation and effects. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Thank you very much. (Additional information subsequently was requested from the Secretary of Defense by Congressman R. Walter Riehlman. This information appears as Appendix 18, p. 551.) (Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, August 4, 1961.) CIVIL DEFENSE-1961 FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 1961 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 1302, New House Office building, Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommitte) presiding. Present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Douglas Dahlin, staff attorney; Earl Morgan, chief investigator; and Paul Ridgely, investigator. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order. Dr. Dunham, I understand that you have another engagement and would like to testify at this time. Dr. DUNHAM. I can be here all morning, sir. But I would like to get away by 12:30 or 1 o'clock. Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right, Doctor, I will let you put your statement on first. You may proceed. STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES L. DUNHAM, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Dr. DUNHAM. Chairman Holifield, it is always a privilege to appear before this subcommittee. As you know, the Commissioners and the staff of the AEC have testified on a number of occasions before committees of the Congress holding hearings on civil defense. The AEC has supported civil defense and, principally in its role as a supplier of technical information, it has made contributions to civil defense. In cooperation with the Department of Defense, several special reports for civil defense purposes were prepared for distribution by the National Security Resources Board early in 1950 prior to the establishment of the FCDA. Another brief report, "The City of Washington and an Atomic Bomb Attack," was prepared by the staff of the Division of Biology and Medicine and released by AEC in November 1949. So it may be said that we speak from a position of long acquaintance with and a long interest in civil defense. During the nearly 12 years since the release of the 1949 report on "The City of Washington and an Atomic Bomb Attack," the dimensions of the civil defense problem have increased extensively. There are more people to protect now. There are more people in the metropolitan areas. Nuclear weapons in the stockpiles have grown rapidly in numbers and variety. We have witnessed the development of the megaton and multimegaton bombs, and we have been confronted with the problems arising from the large amount of radioactive fission products which may be deposited in the fallout from surface burst nuclear weapons. But the picture is not all black, for the 12 years have also seen many contributions to our understanding of the effects of nuclear explosions; and more is known about what is required to lessen the impact of these effects on man and his property. If as a nation we develop the will to proceed with the application of countermeasures, the path we must follow is well defined. Thus the major problem confronting us as a nation is not so much what can be done but whether and how it will be done. To assume blithely, as many people do, that a nuclear war cannot or will not occur is totally unrealistic. This viewpoint has inherent in it an invitation to disaster no less than the equally prevalent attitude that nothing useful can be done by way of civilian defense measures. The most cursory look at history, at man's propensity for war and at the utter ruthlessness of wars should be sufficient to assure endorsement of a strong civil defense effort as an indispensable part of our total defense effort. It would be a hollow military victory which left the country with no will to bind up its wounds and give meaning and leadership again to civilization. If there is no strong will to survive as a people before a war, there will surely be none after it is over. The mere willingness to spend billions of dollars on military defense in a country as rich as ours is not sufficient evidence of a will to survive as a people. A strong civil defense would be a true symbol of national vigor and one which any would-be aggressor would take full cognizance of. FOREIGN ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE In the past few years I have visited in Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and I have gained the distinct impression that large fractions of their populations are aware of the lessons of history and are doing their best to be prepared for what may come regardless of how much they abhor the thought of war. Few people in this country realize that in World War II 20 to 30 million civilians were killed. For nearly a century we have not suffered heavy losses on our own soil nor have we seen next door the scenes of ruthless invasions. Lacking first hand experience, it is hard for our people, even those who have fought in foreign wars, to realize that it could happen here. WAR WITHOUT CIVIL DEFENSE UNTHINKABLE At the expense of appearing trite, I cannot refrain from restating what you and your committee know full well-a nuclear war in the presence of a strong, well-developed civil defense would be terrible, but a nuclear war in its absence is truly unthinkable. Mr. Corsbie will point out some of the characteristics of the gamut of nuclear weapons and protective measures which can usefully be taken against them-not, to be sure, for 100 percent protection for all the people but measures which would increase the chances for survival of millions of our people. I shall highlight what, in my personal opinion, are the more strictly medical problems likely to be encountered. |