He is saying, first of all, that we will have the program in place the day the war occurs.

Now, I read last week's testimony before this committee, and I noticed that several times members of the committee were concerned as to the rate at which the program would be put in. Skepticism was expressed as to whether or not the program will move fast enough.

Such skepticism can be justified by historical examples. By and large, defense programs in this country have lagged, and unless an urgent effort is made they will continue to lag. So one must worry that the program will be in place at the time it is needed.

This worry about phasing also includes worries about possible enemy reactions. One must worry that the enemy does not go faster than we do, so that by the time we have procured programs adequate for 1960, it is 1965 and we are facing a new threat which has obsoleted our 1960-type preparations.

There is one important factor which helps alleviate the problem of obsolescence. There are many different kinds of wars which can occur, and there are many different prewar circumstances which can change the character of the war. I will have a lot to say about this in a few moments. But I would just like to mention that even though the program may be obsolete for some wars and some circumstances, it is likely to retain much value for other wars or circumstances. However, it is difficult for even professional analysts to keep these many cases in mind.

We have again a psychological reaction which is very hard to fight. Most people, including professional analysts, want to worry about the worst case that can happen.

SURPRISE ATTACK-THE WORST CASE

Now, it is literally true, as far as I can see, that if the enemy is determined to kill Americans with a surprise attack out of the blue that is directed against population, then no program that is currently being suggested is going to cut the loss of lives much below half the population.

Therefore, if he is trying to kill Americans with a surprise attack out of the blue, that is a problem which is very difficult, if not impossible, except even here one can argue that he prefers 90 million dead to 180 million dead.

But our weakness in the worst case does not settle the problem. Most wars that are actually likely to occur would have a quite different character and programs which are designed to meet less ferocious wars or less difficult wars can be very valuable.

We do not refuse to go to a doctor when we have pneumonia because he cannot cure cancer. His ability to cure pneumonia is valuable to us precisely because we may catch pneumonia when we do not have cancer.

The same principle is applicable to programs which are designed for special situations, programs which will not work under all situations, but may still be valuable in the special situation. In some ways this is the character of the program we are discussing here today.

Actually you have already had some testimony as to the effects of different kinds of wars, and Norman Hanunian will discuss some effects on casualties in more detail later. I will therefore leave this

question of the different kinds of wars, except for a sort of typology discussion at the end of my testimony.

The next problem is protection against the effects of fallout. This committee has heard much testimony already with regard to this important problem and, in addition, the witness who follows me, Norman Hanunian, will discuss the performance of different degrees of fallout protection. The witness following him, Jerry Strope, will discuss some recent developments in the more adequate forms of fallout protection, so I will not discuss the problem of fallout protection today. In fact, I would like to emphasize that important as fallout protection is, it may have been overemphasized recently to the neglect of other very important aspects of civil defense.

REORGANIZATION AFTER ATTACK

The next problem, the problem of getting things started again, is a very difficult one to analyze. In fact, it is quite clear that nobody can do a study which will prove rigorously that if you give the social organism the kind of shock that a large thermonuclear war would give, that the social organism would not in some sense die. Nobody can demonstrate rigorously how things can be put together after the disorganization of an attack.

This inability to demonstrate viability is not a shocking or a new thing. If you lose a leg, no doctor can demonstrate that if he gets you to the hospital that he can get the blood stopped and that you will survive even with the best medical treatment. He cannot do this rigorously because no one knows enough about the bodily process involved to demonstrate the details of the healing process.

One has to depend on faith and previous experience. Other people have lost a leg and have survived, and, therefore, one believes that you can also under those circumstances.

Even if you only cut your finger, neither I nor anyone else can prove that it will heal, because, again, nobody understands the full details of the mecanism of clotting and healing. But we know you do get healing, and we also know if you put sulfa or iodine on the cut, it increases the probability of healing and decreases the probability of infection.

Civil defense has the same character, except that we lack a relevant experience. In order to argue that the social mechanism will restart, one must have faith in the ability of people to improvise, to meet emergencies reasonably intelligently, and then one can give them facilities and make other preparations to help them meet these emergencies, to improve their capability to improvise and organize.

But even after elaborate preparation, one will still be depending upon the survivors' ability to rise to the occasion. If the survivors were robots, that could only rigidly obey preset instructions, one would indeed have serious doubts about the possibility of restarting things. Insofar as we have historical examples, and some of them are close to thermonuclear wars in intensity, people do seem to rise to the occasion. Faith that they will do so is not an unreasonable or desperate hope. It is the expected thing. It is what a gambler would be willing to bet will happen, even though one cannot prove it will happen. Therefore, while whatever studies that are done will have

an important gap in them, I do not believe that our inability to demonstrate feasibility rigorously is an annihilating weakness. On the other hand, it is clear that much fruitful work can be done in analyzing feasibility and looking for difficulties and ways to circumvent them.

RESTARTING PRODUCTION

The next problem is the maintenance of economic momentum. This is also a tricky problem and one, which Sidney Winter will discuss at some length. The problem of the maintenance of economic momentum at an adequate level reflects the fact that it is not only necessary to be able to recuperate eventually, but one must recuperate before one runs out of supplies to such an extent that major additional hardships are inflicted on the survivors.

To go back to the patient analogy, it may be perfectly correct to estimate that if one gets the patient to the hospital he will recover. but if one fails to get him to the hospital he may still die.

While the patient has an intrinsic capability to recover, he still needs such things as warmth, sustenance, care, food, and medicine while recovering. In our case these things can only be supplied out of stocks on hand, postattack production, and imports from other countries. The sum of these must be at a high enough level to do the job.

One thing which makes me optimistic about U.S. recovery is the fact that for the highest priority items, food, shelter, water, and clothing, we need not have any shortages, at least nationally. In other words, all of the attacks we have analyzed, at least for the early 1960's, leave enormous stocks of these items; therefore, one does not have the problem of split-second timing in postattack recuperation. For example, we will not face starvation even if we do not get agriculture going for a year or two.

Of course, preparations must be made for utilizing these resources, particularly food. As I understand, these preparations will be made. There are plans being drawn up to predistribute the food before the attack, so that we will not have to depend on the national transportation system after the attack to distribute it. These preparations are not necessary because studies indicate that the national transportation system would work adequately. Most of us think it will work, but we cannot rely on these studies. We prefer to insure against it not working, against our studies being wrong.

LONG-TERM RECUPERATION

The next problem is the long-term recuperation problem. Recuperation here has many facets: economic, social, political, psychological, and, in a subtle way, moral.

The only one which has been studied with any care is the economic. Here I think we can say with some confidence that if we can handle phases 4 and 5 adequately, the economy will come back with amazing resilience; in other words, countries like the United States are extremely competent, once they get started, at producing capital and consumer goods. Sidney Winter will have more to say about this subject later, but, depending upon the war, one would conjecture that we could rebuild the destroyed wealth in less than a generation, in all

likelihood, in say, 10 years after the kind of war that is usually envisaged.

I am not going to say much at the present time on the social, psychological, political, and moral problems of recuperation. Some discussion may come out of the later testimony and, if there is time, I would like to make some additional comments at the end of the hearings. I cannot speak as an expert in any of these fields, but, if there is time, I would still like to make some additional comments.

But I would like to say now that in terms of studies which have to be done and in terms of the most serious questions which remain unanswered, these social, psychological, political, and moral questions are currently the hard questions. Many feel they are the dominating questions.

However, it is my personal belief, speaking less as an expert than as a man who has read widely, that these problems have been grossly exaggerated.

Most people will not be psychologically deranged. One is not, for example, going to break up family relationships by a war. The family relationship is a very stable one.

One is not even going to obliterate the basic fact that people are Americans. By and large, they will be about as honest, hard-working, reliable, and responsible as they are today. While everybody's lives and thoughts will be affected by the war, the character structure of the survivors is unlikely to be changed in any startling fashion.

The political questions are more difficult. We live today in a very stable country. It is one of the few countries in the world in which the government does not worry about revolution and subversion as major problems, because we do not expect the Government to be subverted or overturned. However, such an event could occur as a result of a war. Even if we won the war, it is conceivable that we might no longer live in a democracy.

However, even though a war is a cataclysmic event, it seems to me a reasonable conjecture, particularly if preparations have been made, that our political democracy could survive most wars. But this statement has more faith in it than analysis. It is not a statement which I would try to maintain before a hostile and skeptical audience. I hope, however, that this and similar statements will soon be subjected to a more careful and deeper examination than I am capable of giving them.

MEDICAL AND GENETIC PROBLEMS

I will not discuss the postwar medical problems and the genetic problems, the next two items on the chart. This committee and the Joint Committee have had more than enough testimony on this subject. It is all in the record. There is no point in bringing it up today except to make the point that in the middle and late fifties there was a widespread belief among scientists, among people who should know, that one could not survive these problems. In other words, the belief in the "end of history" was an expert's belief, rather than a layman's belief.

In fact, if the layman had been told fully and frankly what the experts believed, he would have been horrified. Seemingly reasonable, knowledgeable, and responsible people held the most extreme and

extravagant views. The picture and book, "On the Beach," reflected these views.

I would say that today, by and large, these extreme views are no longer held—at least for the kind of war that seems plausible in the early and mid-sixties. The end of the world, end of history, doomsday, and so on, are not appropriate descriptions.

DOOMSDAY MACHINES

I am not denying, by the way, that it is not technologically possible for us, if we wish, to build doomsday machines. I believe that we have the knowledge today to build such devices. I mention in my book that it might take less than 10 years and less than $10 billion to build devices which could actually destroy all unprotected human life.

All I am saying today is that such devices have not been built, and there are good reasons to believe that they will not be built in the near future.

The fact that they can be built is, correctly, the source of the gravest apprehension. This fact is one of the main things which gives urgency to our attempts to negotiate arms control.

Many people believe, and I am among them, that unless we have adequate arms control such devices will be built, say, before the year 2000, and that is a very serious problem indeed. But I do not expect them to be built within the next 5 or 10 years.

THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL

This summarizes, in rather rough form, the complexity of the notion that a nation can survive a war. I would like to emphasize again this complexity. The man who believes we can survive a war believes we can handle every one of the problems on this chart, each one of which is incredibly complex.

The man who believes he cannot survive a war simply has to believe that we fail on one of these problems.

To use a standard phrase, there are no prizes given for handling seven of these problems. We have to handle all eight.

So, to believe that a nation can survive a war is a complicated belief. To believe that one cannot survive a war is a simple belief. And by and large, it is easier for most people to believe simple things than complicated ones.

I believe that a persuasive case can be made for national survival but it is a difficult one to make in a give-and-take debate.

Let me now return to my first chart. (See fig. K-1.)

FIGURE K-1.-SOME COMMON REACTIONS TO CIVIL DEFENSE

1 Completely ineffective.

2

3

4

Too effective-will touch off a United States-Soviet Union arms race or even a United States or Soviet Union strike.

Both 1 and 2 above.

Neither 1 nor 2 above.

To summarize my reaction to the first point on this chart, the common belief that civil defense is completely ineffective, I would simply state that for a very large range of programs, particularly

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