stances we are living in and the possible hazards, and the possible benefits, that we get out of it, that this expenditure would be justified? Mr. KAHN. I think it is one of the most justified expenditures I have ever heard of. It should have been done in the mid-1950's.

The only objection one can have for this expenditure is that it will be used as a substitute for other things.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Used as what?

Mr. KAHN. A substitute for other things. In other words, this is a thing which is very much worth doing.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes.

Mr. ROBACK. But it is not the only thing worth doing.

Mr. KAHN. That is right, not the only thing worth doing. There is always a tendency to do things sequentially, and that should be resisted. I am myself not in favor of extremely large and by large I mean over $5 billion a year

CIVIL DEFENSE COSTS AND THE ARMS RACE

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me understand you-you talk fast, and I have a little bit of difficulty because of the acoustics here.

You say you would not advocate a system that would be at a cost of over $5 billion a year?

Mr. KAHN. That is right.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Let me put it the other way: "Would you advocate a system that would cost $5 billion a year for a period of say, 4 or 5 years?

Mr. KAHN. I would recommend something between $1 to $5 billion a year, depending on the international situation, and I probably prefer something closer to $1 than to $5 billion. The reason for this is not because I could not justify more than $5 billion a year; as a military analyst, I think I could.

However, I take the arms race arguments very seriously. I think if we went into a big program we would find Soviet reactions which we would be sorry to have touched off.

In this sense I agree with the people who worry about civil defense accelerating the arms race. I just draw the line at a different place. Programs of $1, $2, or $3 billion a year, I would suggest, are not so startlingly different from what we have done in the past, and are not so scary that they would really accelerate the arms race unduly, while their effectiveness is really quite large. This is the kind of thing I would be in favor of.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Would you believe that, let us call it for want of something else, a 4- or 5-year plan should be given to the American people in order that they would know that a modest step at this time was the first of a series of steps, or do you think that this program should be presented on a very modest scale this year, and then another one the second year, and another one the third, and so forth?

Mr. KAHN. I think if you make the decision to go ahead with this 5-year program you should go ahead now, but I think the position of the administration, and I say this as an outsider, is that they have not made the decision.

They literally do not know today, if this $200 million program for fiscal 1962 is adopted, whether it will peter out into a $100 million a

year program or go to many billions a year. This uncertainty will continue until they have made their decisions.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. What type of studies do you feel the administration can make which will be of benefit?

Mr. KAHN. Basically they have to make up their own minds on how they wish to trade between deterrence of the normal sort, and the extent they wish to be able to alleviate the consequences if a war occurs. These are different things, and to some extent, but not completely, the money is competitive. In addition, many of the administration advisers are deeply concerned about the arms race.

By and large, the arms race issues are more important to these advisers than the money question. Some of these advisers, to put it mildly, are very dubious about doing anything which would tend to accelerate the arms race.

On the other hand, they have a responsibility for protecting the people of the United States if a war occurs.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Notwithstanding your feelings about extending the arms race, they have now been provided with $3.5 billion more which is an acceleration of roughly 7 percent.

Mr. KAHN. Yes. This is what I mean by the international situation. If the Berlin situation deteriorates into violence or a more extreme animosity than we have today, I would assume the administration would go ahead with an adequate civil defense program.

If the Berlin crisis were settled peacefully I would suggest there would be a good chance they would not. I think it would depend on this kind of thing.

RESPONSE TO CRISES

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Do you think we should look at these matters on the basis of periodic crises which are always in the hands of the other side? They can make one-Quemoy and Matsu at one time, and then make another one in Laos, make another one at Berlin, and make another one in South America next year—in other words, these periodic crises are in the hands of our opponents and shall we respond with a well-thought-out, long-range plan to strengthen our Nation, to put us in a position where we not only can take care of the Berlin crisis but we can take care of future hot spots which may be developed by our opponents?

Mr. KAHN. I think I would answer that yes and no; that is, to the extent that we get into modest programs, and I would call $1 or $2 billion a year modest, that should be independent of crises. Programs of this size are simply being competent about your military prepara

tions.

To the extent that we go into larger programs, for example, at RAND we looked at program where we spent $50 billion in 1 year, well this is done only in reaction to a crisis. Let me remind the Chair about the Korean situation.

In June 1950 there was a great debate in the United States as to whether the budget should be $14 billion, $15 billion or $16 billion.

In that same month, the North Koreans marched into South Korea, and Congress authorized $60 billion. That authorization represented an enormous military defeat to the Communist bloc because even if they won in Korea the military balance had shifted against them. In addition, they were forced to increase their own budgets in response.

In that sense, Korea cost the Communists tens of billions of dollars. They probably learned a lesson. I hope that if the United States is ever humiliated, that even if we do not resist by going to all-out war, that we will, at least, mobilize, and that will be bad for them.

To that extent I think we should be willing to let our program react to their moves.

But I would like to repeat, when it gets down to a modest program, modest in the context of an overall $45 billion budget, for example, $1 or $2 billion a year for civil defense, this seems to me such an urgent need that it should be carried through irrespective of the international situation, arms control, friendliness or enmity. This is simply being competent about our military preparations. But this is a question of size.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It is also a question of setting up a well-defined plan and a goal for accomplishment.

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And taking orderly steps toward that goal. Mr. KAHN. Absolutely.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Rather than to respond in emotional ways to a crisis created by the other man at his will.

Mr. KAHN. I think that is right. We do not have to have an epidemic before we pay attention to our sewers. We do it as a public health measure. We also try to prevent epidemics. To a great extent our miltiary programs should be of that sort.

I also believe that we should be prepared to go into an accelerated mobilization if the Soviets ever do anything that makes that desirable. In other words, we should have two complementary military programs, a basis for mobilization and a normal competent, everyday establishment which is necessary for the security of the country, but is not so excessive as to put undue pressure on the Soviets. You want to put some pressure on them. They are not being very friendly to you, you have to retaliate.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Do you know of any studies contemplated by the administration at this time which seek to set up this type of thinking? Mr. KAHN. I have a little problem. As a member of the Hudson Institute I am trying to persuade the administration to give me a contract to do that study.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We will withdraw the question.
Mrs. Griffiths, do you have any questions?

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING

[Laughter.]

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Chairman, the only thing that has ever-not the only thing, but the thing that bothers me most completely about this whole program is that if an attack ever occurs, in my opinion, there will be millions survive who will die shortly thereafter because there has been no information given on how to survive, and some of those people could have survived on their own if they had just been told what to do.

Mr. KAHN. I think this is right, and I think this will be corrected though as soon as they go into a program.

It is difficult to educate people to take civil defense seriously if the Government itself does not take it seriously. The most urgent thing the Government can do in the educational area is to do something in

the noneducational area. Then the people will educate themselves if, in addition, the Government makes the information available.

While we do not believe in elaborate training of the mass of the population, we do believe that there should be a cadre of something between 50,000 and 100,000 trained civil defense people. We have not done enough work to pin the figure down any closer. This trained cadre of civil defense people might be volunteers and be treated much like reservists. For example, they might take a 2-week course. If this is done then every community will have trained and maybe uniformed people available, in addition to the full-time people. In addition, we might have 5 to 10 times as many people signed up as a volunteer unorganized reserve. These last would not take the formal 2-week course, but they would be assigned to tasks and responsibilities and in addition, presumably, have read the manuals.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. The greatest problem of the civil defense people is that they themselves do not have the information. They do not exactly understand what they are protecting against.

Mr. KAHN. They cannot have all the information. If you were to ask me do I understand all of these problems, I would say "No," and I work on them very hard. But I would say the civil defense people have more information than they are usually given credit for.

It is like anything else. Whenever you see the weaknesses you notice it very sharply. You do not notice the strength. It is harder to notice. But I agree with you there are serious weaknesses which must be corrected, and will be if the Government goes ahead.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think most of the professional civil defense people have had access to the voluminous hearings and reports of this committee.

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And I think, without any undue immodesty we can say that in those hearings and in those reports there is a compilation of information for them to use if they want to use it, and if they want to study the problems, because we spent a great many hundred hours trying to bring reputable witnesses before us and their testimonies are all contained in these hearings and reports.

CIVIL DEFENSE STUDIES

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kahn made a comment in his book about these hearings. The gist of it was that while the committee had developed information about immediate survival needs, with which they seemed to be concerned, they did not give sufficient attention to the long-range problems. Of course, there was not much of that type of information available, but I wonder if Mr. Kahn would comment about how he characterized our efforts.

Mr. KAHN. Let me answer that frankly.

Mr. ROBACK. Of course.

Mr. KAHN. I think that this committee has really done a very impressive job in civil defense, not only for the laymen but for the experts. You have gathered together the information and stimulated the production of new information.

However, one simply cannot do an overall study through a committee hearing. There is a role for organizations like the RAND Corp.

Mr. ROBACK. You recognize, Mr. Kahn, when a committee gets interested, frequently the agencies or others get interested-even the RAND Corp.

Mr. KAHN. I not only recognize it, I respond. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROBACK. You also recognize that it would have been a kind of mistake to emphasize long-range recovery problems rather than the immediate survival problem as the first basis of study.

Mr. KAHN. I want to apologize. I do not believe, if I remember the testimony, that you missed the long-range problems. I think this was often mentioned in your hearings. The problem was that in spite of your urging, the interest was not stimulated.

I notice Sidney Winter just came in. He has been looking over the RAND Civil Defense Study. He recently gave a critique in which he said, “That was fine for 1957, but what have you done in the last 4 years?"

He is right, we did not push it as hard as we should have.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think this committee realized that the problems of postwar rehabilitation and recuperation were a tremendous field itself, and had to be looked at; but we put first things first. We did try to do as good a job as we could do with our limited facilities, our appropriations and the numbers we had on the staff, doing what we thought had to be done first, which really was to bring attention to this subject and get recognition at the top level that there was such a thing as a new type of hazard and a new type of war that could occur.

I notice in your comments and in your book you did say that we did an impressive technical job of gathering together much valuable information, and that you did state we were preoccupied with the shortterm survival problem. I think this is true. I think we, of necessity, had to take the initial problem of immediate survival in case of attack first, and we did spend a great deal of time on that in order to get the first step, you might say, accepted at top level.

Now, after some 5 or 6 years, that recognition has been given at the top level of our Government.

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Once those facts we were anxious to have accepted, have been accepted, it now becomes, I would think a responsibility of the Federal Government to direct enough research and study to all of the facets of survival in the case of nuclear war. This committee from time to time possibly can help the developing of some of the additional steps.

But, first, we are still very much concerned with being sure that we are embarking upon a solid program under that new recognition that we have, and that it is an adequate program under the circumstances, and in the priority position in which it happens to be, along with the other needs for national defense and survival.

Mr. KAHN. Well, I would like, in fact, to repeat what you have just said. Anybody who works in this field cannot ignore or underestimate the contribution that this committee made. These hearings are the bibles. When you want information you open up your committee hearings. I think we have ordered dozens of copies which we have given to our people, and they use it every day.

However, it is the responsibility of the Federal Government, not this committee to initiate programs for civil defense. When they