Mr. RIEHLMAN. Of course, if we were going to evacuate into a rural area with the fallout situation such as it might be, we would not be escaping anything; they would be moving into an area which would be contaminated by the fallout.

Secretary MCNAMARA. You are quite correct.

Evacuation in itself, except under the most unusual circumstances, will not protect against fallout, and must be accompanied by a fallout program.

CONSIDERATION OF HOME AND PRIVATE SHELTERS

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I think one of the most important things that we should take under consideration is a program which would interest individuals in providing in their homes for some fallout protection, because an article just recently written, some time in June, in the Washington Star indicated that there were only about 1,500 homes in the United States of America that had made any provision for any protection for their families.

What is your attitude, Mr. Secretary, toward promulgating such a program? Do you have any idea as to how the cost could be borne, whether the Government would share some portion of it?

May I just say this to you, too? Maybe I am making this a pretty lengthy question, but some time in the past I introduced legislation to encourage people to build shelters in their homes and give them some tax relief; that is, over a period of years-let's take an illustration of $600 or $750, or $500 for building a shelter-that over a period of 4 or 5 years they could write this expense off through such an income tax program.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I understand a similar bill is presently before the Congress. I think it is quite clear that the program of shelter that we are outlining and requesting funds for the support of, important as it is, is not by itself, à solution to the Nation's fallout shelter problem. Additional action will be required both to provide additional public shelters, and, I am confident, eventually to provide private shelters.

Exactly what form these private shelters should take and how they should be financed, I am not prepared to say.

We are, in the very short time that is open to us during the remaining part of this congressional session, devoting our energies to developing the program that will protect the maximum number of people. And it is for that reason we have concentrated on this identification marking and stocking program that, as I say, will apply to about 25 percent of the population, and we hope would permit the saving of 10 to 15 million lives.

It is only because of lack of time that we have not discussed with you today our views on private shelters, their form, their cost, and the manner in which they might be financed.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I would expect, Mr. Chairman, that we will have future hearings on this matter after the Secretary and those in charge of this program have had a chance to study it and can give us a more complete story on their interests and what they propose to do in that respect.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We shall be prepared to do so, sir.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. That is all.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Morse?

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join with my colleagues, Mr. Secretary, in congratu lating you for your statement and welcoming you here and expressing my personal gratitude for the vigor with which you have approached this.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you.

Mr. MORSE. I have a number of questions I would like to ask.

JUSTIFICATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE

The first relates to a statement which President Kennedy made in his talk to the Nation on May 25, in which he said-I will read from this statement:

This administration has been looking very hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply, it cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guarantee against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.

We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.

And then the important paragraph:

But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. The nature of modern warfare heightens these possibilities. It is on this basis that civil defense can readily be justified—as insurance for the civilian population in the event of such miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed-but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

In General Lemnitzer's statement, I detected that the general identifies civil defense as an essential part of our deterrent force, since according to his statement, the extent to which we have the ability to defend ourselves against attack, particularly the initial attack, is an essential element of our overall deterrent.

I see some inconsistency between the President's statement, General Lemnitzer, and your statement.

General LEMNITZER. My statement was not intended to imply that civil defense by itself is going to deter a nuclear attack.

But a nation that is completely open to an attack, and does not have adequate means of protecting its citizens whatsoever is, in my opinion, inviting an attack. That is one of the factors an enemy would consider in calculating the effect of an attack. I regard civil defense as a part of our total deterrent, the major part of which is made up of our offensive strategic retaliatory forces, and consisting also of our active defense forces, as well as our passive defense forces. They are all elements of the overall deterrent.

Mr. MORSE. It seems to me from reading the President's statement that he does not consider it seems to me that since he considers that civil defense is valuable only in the case of miscalculation, that that rules out the definition that you have advanced.

General LEMNITZER. No; I do not think there is any inconsistency. I believe that the ability to defend one's population is a part of the overall deterrent, but not the major part.

Mr. MORSE. I realize that you didn't, sir, but it seems to me that the President has said that civil defense will not comprise any portion of the deterrent.

His statement is simply "It is on this basis"-that is, the danger of miscalculation-"that civil defense can be justified."

And civil defense cannot be considered as a deterrent against miscalculation.

General LEMNITZER. It is a matter of emphasis and not a difference in views. I believe that civil defense is a part of our overall deterrent, although a very small part compared with the importance of our strategic retaliatory power and our active defensive capabilities. Mr. MORSE. Thank you, General.

DELEGATIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

There have been by each of the proponents of the President's Executive order statements as to the essentiality of keeping this under military control. The Secretary is granted authority by the Executive order to delegate his functions, and it is in section 6 of the Executive order that you are authorized to redelegate a limited part. To whom will these redelegations be made?

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I suggest, I understand you to mean that the proponents of the legislation have emphasized the need for maintaining civilian control over the operation.

Mr. MORSE. Yes, sir.

Secretary MCNAMARA. And in accordance with that basic philosophy, I propose to delegate the authority granted to me to a civilian. At the moment I have delegated them to Mr. Yarmolinsky, sitting on my left. I should have introduced to the committee earlier the two gentlemen sitting at the table, Mr. Vance, the General Counsel of the Department, and Mr. Yarmolinsky, my personal assistant, who is at present in direct charge of the civil defense of the Department.

NEW CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICE

Mr. MORSE. And to whom will Mr. Yarmolinsky delegate the authority? And what will be the operating forces under Mr. Yarmolinsky?

Secretary MCNAMARA. There will be a substantial number of men transferred to the Department of Defense, effective today, from the Office of Civil Defense, and I believe that that total will approximate 1,000. It will be those personnel of OCDM who will be carrying out the functions transferred to him, and those will be under the direction of Mr. Yarmolinsky.

Mr. MORSE. Will there be participation in the execution of the program by the Armed Forces?

Secretary MCNAMARA. To some degree, and as agents of the Office of Civil Defense. I have mentioned in my statement one way in which we plan to utilize these services, the Corps of Engineers and Navy's Office of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, in connection with the contracting for the engineering and architectural services which we must procure, to carry out the inspection and marking program that we plan to undertake.

DILUTION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

Mr. MORSE. It is my recollection that the concept of controllership, established by the 1947 amendment and the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, was also designed to be civilian, and I rather expected that in the 10 or more years that have since transpired, the civilian control has been diluted.

Do you contemplate any such similar dilution of authority?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No; because it was my recollection that the controllership function when it was initially established was not thought of as a civilian function. I was one of the originators of the function in 1945. It started in the Air Force. The first man who was recommended for the position was a general in the Air Force, a man presently executive vice president of General Mills, but a career military officer, and it was our concept, those of us who were reserve officers at the time and who were about to leave the service, that the function should be an integral part of the military operation, and in large part should be carried on by military officers.

But that really doesn't specifically answer the question of, will the civil defense function, which we believe and state should be under civilian control, be diluted by being associated with the Defense Department and eventually ending up under military control. I do not believe it will.

OCDM-DOD RELATIONSHIPS

Mr. MORSE. In the original Executive order of July 20, the Department of Defense is given authority-and I read from section 1— which shall include but not be limited to the development and execution ofa list of eight or nine specific responsibilities. Section 2 imposes upon the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization authority to advise and assist the President in determining policy, planning, directing, and coordinating. It seems to me that this is going to create a difficult situation which perhaps may be analogous to the situation of the single chief of staff concept, with the general staff making plans which other forces will have to execute.

Do you understand that the OCDM is going to function, if you will, as a general staff to develop policy, to develop with the Department of Defense being the operational arm?

Secretary MCNAMARA. In connection with the activities specifically outlined under section 1 and assigned to the Department of Defense, the first of which is the fallout shelter program, I understand that we are to be fully responsible for conceiving of, initiating, and recommending to the President the specific actions necessary for the Federal Government to undertake. And I would say that my understanding applies to each of the other items in similar fashion. "I think that the concept of the Office of Emergency Planning is that it is one of the staff agencies which will act to advise and counsel the President, as do many other staff agencies.

Mr. MORSE. Without operational authority?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Without operational authority.

Mr. MORSE. With authority to advise the President in policy planning directly in coordinating the total civil defense program?

Secretary MONAMARA. Yes. The total program is broader than the functions assigned to the Department of Defense.

Mr. MORSE. And it includes those functions?

Secretary MONAMARA. Yes; it includes them in the sense that they must be properly integrated into the total program. The total program includes such planning as the planning for postattack utilization of the Nation's resources and rehabilitation.

This lies outside of our area of responsibility.

Our actions and plans must be coordinated with those of the other departments of Government and other staffs that are responsible for these other functions. It is a responsibility of the Office of Emergency Planning to carry out that coordination.

USE OF MILITARY RESERVES IN CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. MORSE. The Secretary mentioned at page 17 of his statement that a major portion of the Standby Reserves might be available for civil defense assignment. What sort of responsibility would you contemplate assigning to the Standby Reserves in civil defense?

Secretary MCNAMARA. These could be available for use at the discretion of local authorities for whatever purposes the local authorities wish to use them in a postattack period-maintenance of order, fire protection, debris removal, the whole host of activities that must be undertaken to rebuild the life of the city following the attack. Mr. MORSE. Is it possible that they could be used for police protection?

Secretary MCNAMARA. If the local authorities chose to use them for that purpose, I think that is possible.

Mr. MORSE. What assurance do we have that the control of these Reserve forces would be under the local authority rather than under the structure of the Department of Defense?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Because we have no authority to utilize them for local purposes.

Mr. MORSE. But you do have authority to use them by virtue of this Executive order for civil defense purposes?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Not within the sphere of the local govern

ment.

We have no authority under this order or any other order that I know of to utilize any personnel in the sphere of activity of local government, which certainly includes the police function.

Mr. MORSE. I agree with that. But isn't it possible that you do have authority to use the Standby Reserves in execution of our civil defense responsibilties?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Not under existing legislation.

Mr. MORSE. I am speaking of the Executive order.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Not under existing legislation, to the best of my knowledge.

We can organize these and train them and lay out plans by which they could be made available to and of use to local governments in the postattack period, but we have no authority to direct their use now or then on functions that lie within the sphere of responsibility of the local governments.