The results of the burn were that, although high temperatures and high concentrations of carbon-monoxide were observed outside the shelter, negligible changes in environment occurred within the shelter. The data suggest that whereas fire hazards would be very severe for shelters within combustible buildings, the separations anticipated for the USNRDL experimental shelter would make closure unnecessary.

RADIATION SHIELDING EXPERIMENT

In September 1960, a radiation-source experiment was conducted by staff members of USNRDL at the experimental shelter for the purpose of prooftesting the adequacy of the shelter entrance and exhaust ventilator in shielding the interior of the shelter from radiation from fallout on the ground outside. A hose-source device developed by Technical Operations, Inc., and mentioned in previous testimony by Mr. Corsbie, was used, in which a radiation source was pumped through a long hose layed in a pattern over the shelter to simulate the fallout radiation field. The experiment showed that the reduction factor at the interior shelter door was about 10,000. The data are being analyzed further by Technical Operations, Inc., under contract to USNRDL.

TESTS ON NEED FOR AIR FILTERS

Another uncertainty in the protective aspects of the shelter has to do with the question of whether it is necessary to filter the ventilation air to prevent fallout particles from entering the shelter. All weapons test data, including that obtained in a similar shelter at Operation Plumbbob, suggest that filtration is not necessary, but the conditions of test were not completely realistic. To get further information, the existence of a large-scale fallout-simulant production facility at Camp Parks is being exploited. This facility, developed by USNRDL for decontamination studies, produces large amounts of material incorporating a radioactive tracer and possessing all of the physical characteristics of fallout from large-yield weapons. An enclosing tower has been constructed over the shelter entrance, from the top of which simulated fallout will be dropped so as to arrive at the intake ventilators in a realistic way. The degree to which the fallout particles penetrate the ventilation system and arrive in the living area will be determined. This experiment is ongoing at the present time.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK

I would like to summarize our situation as follows: The costs of the USNRDL shelter research program, including the construction of the prototype shelter, have been about $150,000 over the past 212 years. The work has produced a fund of valuable information on shelter design and outfitting that is directly applicable not only to the construction of group shelters of the type considered but also to the stocking of protected spaces in existing buildings. The program has developed the only confirmed cost data available, to our knowledge, on group shelters in the United States today. These data have shown that single-purpose fallout shelters can be constructed for less than $100 per person sheltered. Human occupancy experiments in the shelter have established the management experience

necessary to develop shelter organization and training programs. Much of the data collected to date is still to be analyzed, evaluated, and applied to further improvements or cost reduction. At this point it is well to recognize that savings of a dollar per person sheltered would be multiplied by the total population sheltered in a national program. A number of areas where work is still to be done have been mentioned in previous sections. In addition, more work is needed in the application of alternative materials in construction of the shelter and its equipment, in the design of larger complexes of shelters and in the production engineering of many of the shelter components. Experience to date suggests that if a vigorous research and development effort were initiated, a standardized fallout shelter could be mass produced, completely stocked and outfitted, at a cost approaching $50 per person sheltered. The costs would, of course, depend on the protective and operational features incorporated.

That concludes my prepared testimony.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS (presiding). Thank you very much.

Would you like to ask some questions first, Mr. Riehlman, or would you, Mr. Roback?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Roback.

NATIONAL PROGRAM COST BASED ON NRDL SHELTER

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Strope, will you translate those figures into a national estimate, that is, some concept of what a total cost of the program would be?

Mr. STROPE. If we can reach $50 a person sheltered, which I regard as a reasonable objective of a research and development program in this area, and multiply this by 200 million shelter places-this assumes everybody gets this sort of shelter-the cost then is $10 billion.

But I recall to you that these costs are the base costs on which the costs of administration and profit and so forth must be placed so, perhaps, one might estimate $12 billion as something that is reasonable to expect.

To the extent that shelter in existing structure can contribute by cutting down the number of these shelters that would have to be built, the cost could be less.

COMMENT ON CURRENT PROGRAM

Mr. ROBACK. May we ask what your understanding is of the role of group shelters in the program announced by the administration and, secondly, your evaluation of that program generally?

Mr. STROPE. As I understand the program, I consider it quite reasonable. It is, I think, to be regarded as a first step and not as a single program for all time.

If I may recall my testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which held hearings on the 22d to 26th of June 1959, on page 695 of the record of those hearings you will find the following paragraph which I stated at that time:

Another course of action that has considerable merit would be to exploit only the best protected areas of existing structure, that is, better than a factor of a hundred, supplementing these with the necessary new construction to house the

total population. The cost of such action would lie between $5 and $20 billion depending upon the portion of the population that could be sheltered in existing structures.

Since that statement, having conducted enough research in the experimental shelter, I now believe that the costs that I stated at that time could be materially reduced.

I will now say that $12 billion may very well do it, particularly if a sensible research and development program accompanies this effort. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. But it is for $12 billion, which is about 25 percent of this year's defense budget, and you would buy a defense that positively worked as opposed to the defense that most probably will fail. Mr. STROPE. That is a broad statement. There are other programs that should be considered.

This program that we are talking about would protect against fallout. Well, it would also protect against 10-pounds-per-square-inch blast, but you may want to consider others, additionally.

But in the spirit of the way you said it, I agree.

Mr. ROBACK. Your discussion about blast value presupposes underground shelters in all cases.

Mr. STROPE. I consider that I am competent to discuss only the type of shelter I have been working with. That is the only one I have had time to consider seriously. I understand it well, and I do not feel that I understand the other possibilities well.

RESERVING EXPOSURE FOR POSTSHELTER PHASE

Mr. ROBACK. In your presentation you have emphasized that getting protection of people is only one phase, and not the end of an important job of recovery operations and survival.

Mr. STROPE. That is right. I have not covered recovery operations. I believe that a subsequent witness will talk about this.

The only place I considered the recovery problem was where I pointed out that I prefer to reserve any significant exposure of the people to radiation until after they come out of shelters because I regard that period as the critical phase in getting started.

I would not like to have them absorb considerable amounts of radiation while in the shelter.

Mr. ROBACK. In other words, if you stint on the protective phase, shelter-protective phase, you do not have any leverage for recovery operations.

Mr. STROPE. Well, obviously you cannot rob Peter to pay Paul continuously.

Mr. ROBACK. Now, Madam Chairman, in connection with Mr. Strope's testimony, which was given as an expert on his own rather than as an official of the Navy, it is a fact that his commanding officer is here, and Mr. Holifield wanted to say a few words and ask one or two questions of Capt. Eli B. Roth.

May I read this brief statement in Mr. Holifield's absence?
Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Yes, indeed.

Mr. ROBACK. Will you come forward, Captain Roth.

I am now speaking the chairman's words:

Captain Roth, we are happy to welcome you here today. I would like to say at this time that the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, of which you are presently the commanding officer, has rendered great service to this country in

the field of radiological studies for countermeasure and basic civil defense concepts. We have called upon the laboratory from time to time for technical advice and consultation. Its staff has always been helpful and cooperative. We believe that this Laboratory, which is an important Navy installation, but is more than merely a military service laboratory, deserves full support and ample funds to continue its work. Certainly I believe very strongly that its studies and experiments in shelter design and operatons should go forward. Captain Roth, will you tell us briefly about your staffing, funding, and present operations.

STATEMENT OF CAPT. ELI B. ROTH, COMMANDING OFFICER,

NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY

Captain ROTH. Well, thank you for the kind words, sir. Actually the shelter work is less than 2 percent of what we have done in the business of learning to live with the atom.

The Laboratory is a basic, rather than an engineering laboratory, where chemical, physical and biological aspects of radiation and radiation effects are studied. All aspects of the Laboratory actually contributed to this shelter by being available and giving a backup of some 13 years of experience for this design.

We are not constructors. We are not in the engineering business as far as the building or construction business is concerned. That is another part of the Navy and part of the Army.

BACKGROUND OF NRDL EXPERIENCE

Mr. ROBACK. When Mr. Strope mentioned a $150,000 investment in the shelter research phase, he did not state explicitly, but you are now stating, that contributing to the high value in results of a modest investment were these long years of experience and experimentation in the Laboratory.

Captain ROTH. Well, yes; we must admit this. In other words, the money that OCDM assigned to this project, which paid specific people for doing the work they did on the shelter, had the backup and support of all of the technology of the whole Laboratory, which goes right across the board.

Essentially, if you want to cut it thin enough, there are some 60 different scientific disciplines involved in contributing, to making this a technologically correct thing.

Mr. ROBACK. What is the problem? Now we have $12 or $13 million requested for research in shelter work in the Department of Defense budget.

Can you give us any observation about the use of such moneys for hiring firms who, say, do not have such a background of experience or who must learn at public expense? I mean, what conclusions can we draw, if any?

Captain ROTH. Well, of course, as you well know, all of our reports, every one on the shelter, certainly, is available to all activities that have to work in the business.

Some of the improvements that might be needed for a big shelter program we think we would be best able to help with but it is a small amount compared to that $13 million that was mentioned.

The kind of work we would do would come in the tens of thousands and maybe up to $100,000. That is about all we would expect to be working on in this specific field on such a program.

Mr. ROBACK. With the new dispensation for civil defense, do you assume that since you are already in the Department of Defense, your work will be drawn upon and that you will get further assignments?

Captain ROTH. We were not involved in the budget preparation for this so I cannot really answer that candidly. I do not know.

CURRENT PROGRAM A FIRST STEP

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. I would like to ask Mr. Strope, not on this point, is the present shelter suggestion an effective shelter program if the bombs drop far enough away? Is it built really on that premise? Is it an effective shelter if the bomb hits far enough away?

Mr. STROPE. You mean this first proposal?

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. This first step; yes.

Mr. STROPE. If you offered me the $170 million they have programed and asked me to save as many people as possible, I am afraid I would do it exactly the way they are doing it.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Well, I agree.

Mr. STROPE. But I regard this as a first step only in what I think is a reasonable civil defense program.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. But it is only effective, is it not, if the bombs are landing, for instance, in the next town.

Mr. STROPE. This is true.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. And military bases are hit in place of cities.

FILM ON MIXED POPULATION SHELTER TEST

Mr. STROPE. Would you care to see this film?

Mr. ROBACK. During the course of the film, Mr. Strope will be a commentator.

Mr. STROPE. I think the committee, if you would move over to this side, you will see the screen which is located in the best possible position.

(Showing of film.)

Mr. STROPE. Madam Chairman, this film is a work print, it is not edited, it is simply a sequence of scenes taken during the most recent experiment.

I think that the main purpose of showing it is that a picture is worth a thousand words in allowing people to understand what we really mean by life in a shelter. Most people have feelings about this, but I have found that their concepts are usually quite erroneous.

There is no sound here, and what I will do is comment to show you what is happening as we go through this film.

These are some of the people, volunteers from the laboratory, getting on a bus to go to the shelter. None of these people had ever seen this shelter before. It is all very new and different to them.

You will notice we are having them sit down in two rows back to back in the center of the shelter. The reason for this is that this is a blast shelter and, as I mentioned in the testimony, it has a flexible arch structure. It deforms to resist blast. If you were leaning against it at the time you would be injured, so we keep the people away from the shelter walls during the red alert.

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