chemical, and bacteriological weapons not only against military and strategic targets but also against the main political, administrative, economic, and communication centers of the enemy.

3. Although Khrushchev denies it, the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to strategic attack has increased as a result of the growing urbanization of its population (of the 212 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union, 49 percent or over 103 million live in cities, and 70 percent of the entire population resides west of the Ural Mountains, while half of the urban population is concentrated in 155 major administrative and industrial cities).

4. The Soviet military chiefs have publicly stated that they view civil defense as an integral part of the Soviet defense capability and as directly contributing to Soviet readiness for war.

A current Soviet civil defense handbook states the case for the Soviet need for civil defense quite simply:

The possession of atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons in the hands of the imperialists, and the threat of their use, forces us actively to prepare for civil defense.

MISSION OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

The current Soviet civil defense program is based on a number of requirements.

(1) Civil defense must try, within budgetary and technical limits, to protect the population and the economy against attacks with nuclear as well as chemical and bateriological weapons.

(2) The population must be trained in civil defense so as to reduce casualties and provide the necessary manpower to deal with the effects of an attack.

(3) Civil defense must be so organized as to be able, at least following some types of attacks, to limit the damage and facilitate, where possible, a rapid recuperation of the country from the attack.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Some changes in the Soviet civil defense organization have taken place since the publication of the committee's report. Until 1960 the civil defense organization was headed by an administration and staff within the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

This Ministry was abolished in January 1960 and there is some uncertainty about the present administrative affiliation of the civil defense administration. In all likelihood it has been transferred to the Ministry of Defense in view of the close ties between the civil defense and military organizations. Its former and possibly present head, Lieutenant General of Aviation Oleg V. Tolstikov has been promoted to the rank of colonel general, which may be an indication of the growing importance of civil defense in the Soviet Union. (See fig. G-1, p. 266.)

FIGURE G-1.—ORGANIZATION OF A SOVIET SELF-DEFENSE GROUP

IN ADDITION TO REGULAR MEMBERS, EACH TEAM HAS TWO RESERVE MEMBERS.

IN VETERINARY TEAM:

ONE ADDITIONAL PERSON IS ADDED FOR EACH 50 HEAD OF CATTLE OVER 100

Below the national administration the Soviet civil defense organization remains substantially unchanged, with permanent full time staffs at republic, provincial, county, city and borough levels and part-time but fully trained civil defense services and units at all levels down to individual factories, public buildings, large apartment houses and collective farms.

I think the committee is familiar with the organization charts of the civil defense, for example, of a city and the various services which are performed and which have already been published in it report. (See fig. G-2, p. 267.)

FIGURE G-2.-SOVIET CITY CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

While no official figures have been published on the size of the Soviet civil defense organization, Khrushchev has boasted to some foreign visitors that there were 22 million fully trained persons serving in civil defense and that the organization was being further expanded.

This would represent about 10 percent of the population and would roughly be the number necessary to fulfill the basic Soviet requirement for a ratio of 1 civil defense unit of approximately 48 persons for every 500 inhabitants.

Khrushchev may have exaggerated the actual size of the organization, but since recruiting is carried out on a compulsory basis the Soviet authorities would have no difficulties in achieving such numbers at least on paper, and available sources appear to indicate that most of the required units have been formed.

SOVIETS CIVIL DEFENSE BUDGET

As the committee's report has indicated, the Soviet authorities have published no information on the size of their civil defense budget, many parts of which are actually hidden in the budgets of other agencies and local administrations.

Nevertheless, it has been possible to make some reasonable estimates of the probable range of the Soviet civil defense budget based on a careful assessment of the apparent scope of the Soviet effort.

One such estimate was mentioned by Mr. Ellis, Director of OCDM, when he recently testified before the Subcommittee on Independent Offices of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Mr. Ellis cited what the press reported to be a secret report which, he said, indicated that the Soviet Union was now spending annually not less than $500 million and possibly as much as $1.5 billion on civil defense.

I do not know whether this cost estimate includes the salaries of the full-time civil defense workers, the price of buildings and offices used by them or the cost of various dual purpose constructions and measures (such as the adaptation of subways for shelter purposes, urban and industrial dispersal, warning and communication systems, etc.).

It is also apparent that the Soviet expenditures on civil defense have tended to increase with the progressive expansion of the scope of the program. It is likely therefore that over the past 10 years the Soviet Union has spent at least $3 billion and possibly much more on civil defense.

SOVIET TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Since 1955, the Soviet Union has instituted a series of compulsory training courses for the population including men 16 to 60 years old and women 16 to 55. There are a number of reasons cited by Soviet spokesmen for this training:

(1) A trained population will not suffer the same degree of trauma and panic as an untrained one.

(2) Adequate training will prevent many casualties.

(3) A trained population can practice self-help and can be mobilized to assist the civil defense organization in dealing with the effects of an attack.

(4) For these reasons training serves to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Union.

These views, I may say, have been expressed by all of the leading military leaders of the Soviet Union.

The training program and its implementation is the responsibility of DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy), which is the largest voluntary organization in the Soviet Union.

In addition to the three courses described in the committee's report a fourth, 18-hour course was added in 1960 to be completed in 1962. This will bring the total training time since 1955 to 64 hours, with the last two courses (totaling 32 hours) including extensive practical work and exercises. The latest course is specifically designed to train the population in collective methods for dealing with and limiting the effects of an attack, and consequently stresses first aid, rescue, fire fighting, and decontamination work in the disaster areas.

I would like to show you a 1956 training chart, such as are posted in factories, apartment houses, and so on. (See fig. G-3, p. 269.)

GROUP

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