While the population is being trained in the use of this equipment, radiation meters are to be issued only to civil defense personnel. It is believed that there is no need to provide the general population with such instruments since most people will be in public shelters, under the supervision of civil defense shelter teams and will not be allowed to leave them without permission. Since persons in apartment house basement shelters cannot stay in them for the 2 or more weeks necessary in highly contaminated areas, it is planned to evacuate them through partly decontaminated passages to radiation free areas nearby. The feasibility of the Soviet postattack plans will, of course, largely depend on the scale and character of the attack.

SOVIET PROGRAM PROGRESSING

The available evidence leaves no doubt that the Soviet authorities are serious about civil defense and that they have been trying over a period of years to develop within the limits of available financial, technical, and material resources a significant civil defense capability. It is not a mere paper program. At the same time it appears to be far from complete although it has made considerable progress. One thing, they have no hearings on it.

Its implementation has, of course, been considerably facilitated by the totalitarian character of the Soviet system. Nevertheless, the Soviet civil defense system appears to contain some obsolete or even irrational features and there has been some lag in adapting it to meet new requirements imposed by weapon developments.

Whether these shortcomings are due to budgetary and technical limitations or to bureaucratic inertia is not certain, but constant efforts are being made to improve the effectiveness of the system and its ability to deal with new threats.

LIMITED AND FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES ASSUMED

It is quite evident that the Soviet leaders have been unwilling or unable to invest in a civil defense system which would be effective for the entire range of possible attacks. Instead, the system is designed to provide different degrees of protection for various elements of the population and its effectiveness is largely dependent on the receipt of adequate advanced warning.

This does not mean that the Soviet leaders have not considered other forms of war initiation or attacks (which they have) or that the civil defense program is merely intended to reassure the population (which it does not).

Nor does it necessarily indicate a lack of coordination between the thinking of the civil defense and military authorities. Not only is the program far too complex and costly to serve merely the purpose of boosting popular morale, but there is considerable evidence that the Soviet political as well as military leaders also believe in the possibility of receiving early indications and warning of enemy intentions.

At least they appear to think that the growth of Soviet military and retaliatory power reduces the likelihood that any enemy would choose to launch an unprovoked surprise attack on the Soviet Union.

These expectations appear to justify the investment in a civil defense system which is essentially designed to perform most effectively under a limited and rather favorable range of circumstances. It also provides the leadership with the opportunity to use civil defense readiness in some situations for political and deterrent purposes.

It is difficult to predict the further course of the Soviet civil defense efforts, or of the similar ones in the satellite countries. It is evident and significant, however, that despite the growing destructiveness of weapons and the necessarily limited effectiveness of their civil defense system, the Soviet leaders believe the program to be worth further efforts and continued investments.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Gouré.

Would you give us some idea of the source of your material here to assure us that you have reliable background support for your presentation?

Mr. GOURÉ. Well, sir, my presentation here, is based entirely on Soviet sources and publications, plus traveler reports which are available in unclassified form.

I have, of course, in the course of my work looked at all of the available sources, both classified and unclassified.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mrs. Griffiths, any questions?

SOVIET EMPHASIS ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND CHEMICAL WARFARE

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Why would they spend so much time preparing against nerve gases and bacteriological warfare unless they planned on using it themselves?

Mr. GOURÉ. Well, of course, they always accuse us of planning to initiate it, but they have always thought that chemical and bacteriological weapons are weapons of mass destruction like nuclear weapons, and that all these weapons would be used in case of war, since they are suitable for surprise attacks.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Do you assume that they are prepared to use them? Mr. GOURÉ. I would say that they are seriously considering it, and whether they would or would not, would be a matter of military judgment on the effectiveness of the weapon rather than any other considerations.

They have never explained, I should say, in their literature, why the West would want to use it in preference to nuclear weapons.

They simply say that the West plans to do so. They also say that they would use it if they have to. They also say that the effectiveness of these weapons is constantly increasing.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. But could you make a population unable to protect itself within a matter of minutes by the use of this, or hours? Mr. GOURÉ. Yes, minutes in some cases, yes.

You can, of course, if you-I mean, theoretically, if you have a sheltered population and you want to destroy certain elements of it which are regarded, at least as being sensitive, in the future, and this sheltered population is not protected against chemical and bacteriological warfare, and especially chemical, which is a quick-acting agent, it is easy to knock them out even if they are sheltered, because while they are sheltered against fallout they would not be protected against that unless proper filtration is added to the ventiliation system.

The simple filter for fallout will not remove chemical agents. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. So you take over the productive capacity within their country within a relatively short time?

Mr. GOURÉ. I am not really sure that anybody is quite certain how effective the chemical agents would be when used on a large scale but, in theory, at least, yes.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE INDOCTRINATION

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Why do you think that they do not broadcast their instructions on civil defense?

Do they not have receivers or are they unwilling to tell the rest of the world what they are doing or do they keep down hysteria or do they permit the people to ask questions?

Mr. GOURÉ. No, they never have done that even in the past.

They have had a very protracted—I mean, this is the sixth or seventh civil defense program that they have instituted. I am talking only here about the postwar program.

There is no need for it, really, because it is compulsory. There are special newspapers for it, and the people are instructed, and they simply have to attend the course. Those who have been selected to attend, attend. So there is no use to broadcast it as such, although locally it might be done on occasion or an occasional lecture.

It is simply not necessary, really, in the same sense that you do not have to mobilize the population to take such a course. This is a compulsory mass program, just as many other Soviet programs are training or work compulsory mass programs. The Soviets calls them "voluntary compulsory." You know how the Army works. "I want three volunteers, you and you and you." This is the way they operate, and they simply do not need it.

Therefore, even in the past programs, it was very rare when the major newspapers, for example, would publish articles on civil defense, even during World War II or before. It was simply not neces

sary.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Of course, I would think it would be cheaper to tell them all at once.

Mr. GOURÉ. Oh, they insist that the people learn it systematically; that they find out and that they go through the course.

It is not just a question of lecture, because they have to learn the practical aspects of it, too. So the broadcasts are not good enough. Mrs. GRIFFITHS. They actually go through the exercise?

Mr. GOURÉ. The first two courses, the first 32 hours, which were largely lecture courses, included at least training of how to wear gas masks, and protective clothing and so on.

The last ones are actually carried out on training sites, not so much in the rooms, themselves, but especially in what they call training cities, which are, really, simply some areas reserved for this purpose where they can rescue people from a second story of a building and lower them down by ropes and fight fires and dig people out, and this sort of thing.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. I see. Thank you.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Morse.

CIVIL DEFENSE AS PART OF DETERRENCE

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In a recent speech, Mr. Gouré, the President of the United States pointed out that insofar as American planning is concerned, that civil defense was not useful as a deterrent against planned attack, but useful against miscalculation, to protect the populattion against miscalculation.

I would infer, and I would like your substantiation or contradiction, that the Soviet Union civil defense effort is part of their deter

rent.

Mr. GOURÉ. It is part of their deterrent and part of their readiness for war, both. They have always taken war or the possibility of war seriously, since the inception of the Soviet system.

Consequently, they always were hoping or doing their best to survive. So this is one requirement which always existed.

The other one, of course, is that since it contributes to the overall Soviet defense capability, as they have stated, and the overall Soviet defense capability is one of the political instruments in the conflict with the West, over its entire range, so it serves to build up their strength, let's say, for blackmail purposes. It contributes to their deterrent posture and not only to a deterrent but also to their general military capability.

It contributes to their freedom to exercise various pressures on the West for political purposes.

Of course, I should say that it has never been used that way explicitly. Khrushchev has never mentioned it as such. The only thing he has mentioned as part of a deterrent has been the statement that Russian territory is very vast and that the Russian population and industries are more dispersed than Western industry, and, therefore, would suffer less in an attack.

This has been repeated several times as a part of a deterrent picture by them, but this does not preclude them from using their civil defense quite specifically for this purpose.

ATTITUDE TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE IN U.S.S.R.

Mr. MORSE. Recognizing, of course, the totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union, is there any voluntary disposition on the part of the masses in the Soviet Union in favor of the civil defense inspired by the experiences of World War II?

Mr. GOURÉ. Well, like all people, they are divided. They have the activists, who are pushing for it, and then they have the other kind.

I would say the Soviet press complains about the defeatists, the people who say, "What is the use," or the people who come to the meetings with a bored expressed or fall asleep or even the ones who just come to register their presence and walk out again. This is all, of course, highly condemned, but is is mentioned in the Soviet press. I would say on the whole that the public is neither reassured, nor impressed, nor very interested. The general hope is that they just want to avoid war-period. And the existence of shelters does not make them feel any happier. It is just part of life in Russia.

They always had shelters. For every adult Soviet citizen there was always a civil defense program. And there was always somebody trying to organize a civil defense team in the apartment house or at work. On the other hand, the Soviets have never connected it to a crisis situation. The civil defense training and the preparations, at least since World War II, have never been tied to any specific crisis. So it has never raised or lowered, I should say, the level of apprehension, particularly about war or about a crisis. It is just simply that it always goes on in the background.

Mr. MORSE. What motivational efforts does the government of the Soviet Union make to create a disposition or to sustain the disposition among the Soviet people apart from the authoritative force that the structure provides?

Mr. GOURÉ. Well, it simply tells them that you must learn it because of the war which is always potentially plotted by the capitalists. If such a war were to occur-of course, this is part of the propaganda, that the West always thinks about it but is possibly afraid to do it, but if not the West then the Pentagon-in that case the argument is that this is for your protection. That if you really learn the facts about the weapons and how to protect yourself your chances for survival are very good. But there is no other particular inducement in that sense, no.

Mr. MORSE. Did I understand you to say that it is compulsoryMr. GOURÉ. It is compulsory.

Mr. MORSE. That the mass of the population be exposed to it? Mr. GOURÉ. Absolutely. It is compulsory that they take the course. It is compulsory that they become members of the civil defense. Mr. MORSE. Is there any civil defense provided in the Soviet schools?

Mr. GOURÉ. Yes, for children 12 to 16, as part of the standard lecture courses.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Riehlman?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. No questions.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Gouré, will you give the committee some biographical data, your professional qualifications, and your background of experience?

Mr. GOURÉ. I am Russian-born, left Russia in 1923, resided in Germany until 1933, and France until 1940, and came to this country at the end of December 1940; served in the Army as a special agent, Counterintelligence Corps, from 1943 to 1946.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In the U.S. Army?

Mr. GOURÉ. Yes, sir, and became a naturalized citizen in 1943.

I am a graduate, B.A., of New York University. I did my graduate work at Columbia, Russian Institute, and the School of International Affairs, and I have a degree from both.

I have a Ph. D. from Georgetown University in political science. I have been professionally working in this or, at least, in the Russian field, since 1949, and I have been with the RAND Corp. since 1951. I am also the author of two studies on Soviet wartime disaster, that is, urban disaster, and studies on the behavior of Soviets under disaster conditions.