LIMITING POSTWAR CASUALTIES

The first question may be regarded as asking whether the sorts of casualty estimates that are conventionally made the losses from blast, thermal, and radiation effects, and the long run medical consequence of radiation-are really the whole story, or whether they yield a substantial underestimate of the population losses resulting from the war.

Note that I said substantial, and I mean substantial in comparison with the war itself. It is quite possible-in fact I would say it is virtually certain that factors such as disease, starvation, and a lower general standard of life will produce effects on the population that are large by the standards of peacetime.

The question is whether they are large in relation to the direct consequences of the war, since policy choices are unlikely to be much influenced if they are not. Of course, if the difficulties of the recovery problems are to be judged in comparison with the consequences of the war itself, it goes without saying that these consequences must themselves be judged. It is important not to confuse the statement that recovery is feasible with the statement that the consequences of the war are in any sense "acceptable." In logic, though probably not in fact, recovery might be feasible after a war whose consequences were unanimously agreed to be totally unacceptable.

RECOVERY TO PREWAR STANDARDS

The second question goes beyond mere physical survival. It asks whether the society that emerges from the war can recover to the point where, judging by the standards of our present relatively free and comfortable existence, it would be an acceptable place to live. Can democracy survive? Can the moral values of our society survive? Can the economy recover to the point where something approaching our present standards of living are possible? Will the psychological scars produced by a nuclear holocaust make a relatively normal and happy existence impossible?

Many persons who are skeptical about the value of civil defense are troubled by these questions, rather than by any issues relating to the technical performance of shelter systems. Their concern is justified, for, over much of the range of possible wars, the answers to these questions are far from obvious. The issues are too complex to be fully understood, and consequently there is no possibility of providing an swers that are beyond reasonable challenge.

This does not mean that attention to these questions, and research devoted to answering them, is without value. When decisions are made on important issues of national security policy in a world in which nuclear war is an ever-present possibility, some answers to these questions are necessarily implicit in the decisions made.

By giving attention to these problems, we can at least avoid basing our decisions on answers which reflect some gross misconceptions about the workings of our society. But no amount of research is likely to alter the fact that decisions will finally have to be based on a large measure of faith in, or skepticism about, the basic strength and resilience of the people and institutions of our Nation.

RESULTS OF VARYING WAR SITUATIONS

Continuing now with the outline of the problem, let us examine the range of situations covered by the phrase "If the United States is involved in a thermonuclear war."

Mr. Kahn has discussed the point that the range of situations is very wide. We should not think of any single alternative as constituting the only kind of thermonuclear war that can occur.

The range of situations:

Differences in:

A. Military and civil defense postures

B. Circumstances of outbreak of the war

C. Strategies

Produce different levels of:

D. Casualties

E. Destruction of wealth

F. Organizational breakdown

G. Postwar defense burdens

H. Postwar assistance or interference by other nations Depending on military and the civil defense postures on the two sides, the circumstances of the outbreak of the war, and the_strategies employed by the two sides, almost any level of casualties, destruction of wealth, organizational breakdown, postwar defense burdens, and postwar assistance or interference in our recovery effort by other nations could be produced by the war.

Let me indicate briefly the significance of some of these points. Obviously, the military and civil defense postures on the two sides set the whole context in which the war occurs. Depending on the delivery capabilities, stockpiles, and so on, on the one side, as against the civil defense preparedness of the other, very different levels of casualties and physical destruction can result. Since the postures of potential combatant nations can change significantly in rather short periods of time, almost every statement that is made must have the time period of its alleged validity attached before its validity can be judged. But it is much simpler to refer vaguely to what is likely to be true for the next few years.

BACTERIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE EFFECTS UNKNOWN

I should mention that throughout my talk I am neglecting some important possibilities in the range of military postures, particularly the possibility that bacteriological and chemical weapons might play a significant role. The reason is simply stated: ignorance. I believe this ignorance is widely shared, and I doubt that the possible effects of bacteriological and chemical weapons are known with sufficient accuracy to permit an evaluation of how important their effects might be on the recovery problem.

INITIATION OF WAR

Next, there is the important issue of how the war starts-whether, for example, it starts with a surprise attack, or as a result of some crisis leading one or both sides to preempt, as a result of escalation from a limited war, or any of several other ways.

The circumstances of the outbreak of the war have an important implication for the amount of warning the population receives. One can visualize circumstances of the outbreak of the war in which the population would be thoroughly warned. It may be days or weeks in advance.

One can also visualize circumstances where they would be warned hardly at all, and these, obviously, have different implications for the level of casualties. In addition, I should mention that the time of year the war occurs has a great bearing on recovery problems. It affects, for example, the possibilities for evacuation, the fate of homeless refugees, and the level of food stocks.

The enemy's choice of targeting strategy, whether he launches attacks on population, on strategic forces only, or attempts to paralyze our economy temporarily or permanently, will obviously pose quite different problems of recovery. I will provide some indications of just how different the problems can be later in my talk.

I cannot go into further detail on these questions now, but it will suffice to say that given almost any specifications of the consequences of the war, it is possible to construct plausible assumptions about the war itself that will produce those results. At least, this is true if one considers the possible changes in military postures and strategic doctrines that could occur between now and, say, 1970. And this is true even for low levels of casualties and physical destruction.

CIVIL DEFENSE AS INSURANCE

The important conclusion to be drawn is that it is almost meaningless to ask whether given civil defense preparations "will work" or whether recovery "is possible." It is clear that within the next decade or two, wars could occur where any particular type or degree of preparation might be (1) not needed; (2) helpful but not essential; (3) essential for the avoidance of substantial additional population losses and for social recovery; (4) worthless, because hopelessly insufficient.

In deciding whether any given measure of preparation should be undertaken, we have to ask whether making the preparations will affect the probability that they will be needed. Depending on the measure and the way it is carried out, I believe that this effect can go either direction.

If it is a substantial magnitude, this consideration will probably dominate. Otherwise, we must ask whether the measure is a good buy considered as insurance. This means asking whether the range of situations for which the measure would be helpful or essential is sufficiently broad to justify the expenditure. It does not mean asking whether the measure will be valuable in every conceivable war that could occur, or whether a war in which the measure would be valuable is certain to occur; no insurance policy pretends to cover every contingency.

RECOVERY REQUIRES BOTH PEOPLE AND RESOURCES

Let me now relate the consequences of the war to the problems of recovery.

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It is clear, that the relative balance between surviving population and surviving productive capacity has a very important bearing on the problem of economic recuperation. If, for example, the enemy concentrates his fire primarily on military targets and we have neglected to provide fallout protection for our citizens, a situation could easily arise where the surviving wealth per capita was greater than it is now, although there would remain, of course, the problem of organizing the surviving wealth and human resources into a viable economy. If, on the other hand, we have an extensive system of blast and fallout shelters, and the enemy attacks our cities, much of our population may survive the immediate effects of the war, but the destruction of productive capacity may make it difficult to support the survivors in the long run. Thus the relative importance of the problems of recovery may be inversely related to the level of direct population casualties in the war.

EXTENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN

The great and possibly overriding importance of point F-organizational breakdown-is, I believe, increasingly recognized by almost everyone who has looked into the economic aspects of the recovery problem in any detail. Many of the important unsettled questions relate not to the physical and technological feasibility of taking constructive actions which will lead to full recovery, but whether there is sufficient reason to believe that capabilities will exist for recognizing the possibilities and taking the actions.

If one speculates on how a complete failure in the recovery effort might occur, the picture one develops is of a situation where the effectiveness of the Federal Government and many State governments is greatly diminished, the banking system disrupted, most surviving firms are bankrupt, electric power and water supply systems are severely damaged, and the transportation network broken in many places, and where few survivors have the responsibility, authority and plans to do anything about it.

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Such a situation could arise even if the physical feasibility of recovery were beyond question. The efforts that are being made to assure continuity of Government and of management of firms, to serve the banking system, to assure solvency, and so on, are clearly a very important part of our preparations. I should mention that Secretary Dillon has recently urged steps to assure the continued functioning of the banking system after an attack.

POSTWAR DEFENSE BURDENS

The expected character of the international enrivonment after the war is also extremely important and constitutes a major source of uncertainty in evaluations of the recovery problem. Most such evaluations, including my own, assume that attempts to support military forces will not be pushed to the point where serious obstacles are placed in the way of reorganization and reasonably rapid recuperation.

It is reasonably clear that the forces do not have to be very large, by present standards, before their support becomes a serious obstacle to recovery. Thus the assumption that the Nation will recover rather than rearm appears to involve a more fundamental assumption that

for one reason or another, a war would produce a substantial and fairly permanent reduction in the external threat. I do not find this assumption implausible, but its existence should be noted. Some form of international control of strategic weapons would be one mechanism by which this might occur.

POSTWAR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The question of our economic relations with other nations after the war will also be important. If, for one reason or another, nations untouched by the war are unwilling or unable to trade with us, very heavy damage to particular industries may make rapid recovery impossible even if many other industries go relatively untouched.

But if we can trade with nations that escape involvement in the war, the problem of imbalance, that is, of "bottlenecks," in our surviving economy will be greatly alleviated. Very severe damage to any particular industry will then be of relatively little significance as compared with the total level of destruction of our economic resources. The prospects for recovery would be further improved if, in addition to trading goods of which we have a relative surplus for those that are scarce, we could finance additional imports by drawing on our gold stock and liquidating our investments abroad. We might have up to about $25 billion to draw on from those two sources, although the feasibility of actually making use of a large fraction of that amount is questionable. It is conceivable that we might obtain assistance from other nations in our reconstruction effort.

But the availability and significance of help from all these sources are obviously dependent, first, on the pattern and level of destruction in the rest of the world, and, secondly, on the postwar international political situation.

The latter presumably depends to a considerable degree on our success in limiting damage to the United States, and securing a relatively favorable military outcome is likely to be conducive to success in the recovery effort.

THE RECOVERY PROBLEM

With the questions that need to be answered and the wide range of possible situations in mind, let us now turn to the problem of recovery itself. It is quite useful to divide the recovery period into three time phases, each of which has its distinctive problems:

A. Survival-Minimize population losses.

B. Reorganization-Achieve economic viability.

C. Recuperation-Restore economy and basic institutions.

SURVIVAL PHASE

I have indicated for each time phase the principal domestic probiem facing the Nation. In the survival period. which begins with the first attack and extends to a few months after the end of the war, the principal problem is that of minimizing the short-run population losses imposed by the war and the resulting destruction and disorganization.

Not only are there likely to be millions of nonfatal casualties from the blast, thermal and radiation effects of nuclear weapons who will