Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

Per cent

100

FIGURE W-3.-CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES-POPULATION AND RECOVERY AND MILITARY SUPPORT INDUSTRY

[blocks in formation]

100

FIGURE W-4.-CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES-RECOVERY AND MILITARY SUPPORT INDUSTRY AND POPULATION

[blocks in formation]

The group contains mainly heavy industry-the primary metals, machinery, industrial chemicals, aircraft, and so on. We find that this group is more concentrated than survival industry. In particular, when target areas are ranked according to the amount of recovery and military support industry they contain, it turns out that something like two-thirds of the total is in the first hundred areas. Support of military forces would be very difficult relative to the problems of survival, let alone in absolute terms. Also, this result indicates that recovery might get off to a slow start as a result of relatively heavier destruction in the industries required for the production of new capacity. This is in line with the conclusions of earlier studies.

As a last comment on the concentration of resources, I want to mention the fact that severe bottlenecks can easily be produced in certain industries if the enemy chooses to attempt this. A good illustration is petroleum refining. (See fig. W-5 on opposite page.) Figure W-5 shows that concentration of capacity in this industry is about the same as the concentration of population, when the areas are ranked by population. A dramatic change occurs when petroleum refining is singled out. (See fig. W-6, p. 323.)

Over 90 percent of the industry is in about 100 areas, and 1211⁄2 percent of the population. Given the extent of our dependence on petroleum for tractor fuel and transportation, this is disturbing. However, the significance of this sort of result can be exaggerated. A heavy attack on a specific, concentrated target system will generally result in significantly less total destruction than one aimed at the population or the economy in general. If imports are possible, the recovery problem may not be as serious as in the more general attack. Also, the apparent importance of these severe bottlenecks tends to diminish when they are examined closely, and the possibility that they can be avoided by modest preparations often seems more likely. Both of these statements apply in the case of petroleum. It should also be noted that, in order to destroy a very large proportion of our petroleum refining capacity with high confidence, the enemy would certainly have to assign more than one weapon per target area.

RESTORATION OF PREWAR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

I now want to examine, very briefly, the question of how long it might take to restore gross national product to its prewar level after a thermonuclear war, assuming now that the reorganization problem can be solved-that is, that the economy can be restored at least to the point where it is viable. (Needless to say, the question of the rate of recuperation is not reached unless there is reason to think that a cumulative decline can be avoided.) I also assume low levels of Government expenditure. Rather than making specific assumptions on damage levels, I consider a situation where the full population survives and half the economy's capacity is destroyed. This is clearly unrealistic, but the relative balance between surviving industry and population is on the pessimistic side here, and the results of the following calculations in per capita terms depend only on the relative balance. This emphasis on the relative balance can be quite misleading when destruction levels are high, but not nearly so misleading in

[blocks in formation]

FIGURE W-5.-CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES-POPULATION AND PETROLEUM REFINING

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

FIGURE W-6.-CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES-PETROLEUM REFINING AND POPULATION

[blocks in formation]
« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »