LINE AND STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. MORSE. Do I understand that Mr. Yarmolinsky will have line authority?

Secretary MCNAMARA. He will have line authority over the people transferred to us from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Mr. MORSE. But his relation to you will be as a staff liaison and not as a line subordinate?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, as a line subordinate.

Mr. MORSE. And from what will the authority extend in the Department of Defense beyond the 1,000 people that are coming over from the OCDM?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It extends over to the 1,000 people that come out from OCDM.

Mr. MORSE. Are there any directions that come from the Department of the Army, say, with respect to the exclusion of a civil defense function that will not come from Mr. Yarmolinsky?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They must come from me, that is correct. Mr. MORSE. And it will be on his advice that the

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't wish to draw a distinction between. a staff adviser and a line operator here. For example, a request to a department in the Army for something desired by the Department of the Navy comes to me from the Secretary of the Navy, who is a line officer.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I asked these questions is the fear that I have, and I have just stated it to you that there is a possibility that we are going to again find ourselves where we are going to have several lines of authority drawn, with no one appearing to be responsible for carrying out this program. And this is something, Mr. Chairman, that I hope we will keep a close eye on as far as the committee is concerned, and follow the program as it is being instituted from here on.

Secretary MCNAMARA. So far as the program is assigned to the Department of Defense under section 1 of the Executive order, there is only one person responsible for it, and that is me.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. You are going to be responsible, but, Mr. Secretary, you are delegating a lot of this authority, and there are going to be a lot of people under your assistant, and, of course, you are going to have another department more or less following your activities, too. And somewhere, I am sure we want to be sure that the responsibility is established, and that we are not going to have a lot of duplication in activity and lack of coordination and decision in the manner in which the program is being carried out.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that it is entirely appropriate that your committee should hold me personally responsible for the actions of the Defense Department in civil defense. I propose to assume that responsibility, and to insist that it be carried out properly within the Department.

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FORESEEABLE PROBLEMS OF MARTIAL LAW

Mr. HOLIFIELD. This problem of martial law which was explored somewhat by our member, Mr. Morse, is a very wide field. We have had testimony on this over the years. We had one of the foremost authorities, Dr. Charles Fairman of Harvard, who has written books on this and has studied it very much. The preplanning for the utilization of all civilian organizations in particular lines of expertise, of course, should be done in advance. The lines of authority for the utilization of forest rangers, firemen, policemen, sanitary workers, all of the civilian structure should be planned in advance.

The concept of martial law as we have had it in the past, it seems to me, is not only alarming to a great many people, but I think the effect which has been obtained in the past by summary martial law can be obtained by preplanning of the utilization of civilian organizations under their respective civilian superiors, such as the Governors of the various States.

I would strongly urge, Mr. Secretary, that a very close study be given to this subject. I believe the alarm that is in the minds of a great many people about the transfer of civil defense to the Department of Defense can be allayed if they know in advance the extent of authority which the Defense Department intends to take over in an emergency.

Now, I am not convinced that the shock of a nuclear attack would not bring about martial law. I can conceive of chaos in our cities to the extent where the ordinary guardians of order would be absent.

However, if in advance, emergency planning was made and the necessary laws passed on the State level to place emergency powers in the hands of the Governors or their successors, and if that line of authority extended from the President down through the Governors to these organizations which we have functioning at the present time on all levels in our society, and a preplan made to utilize these organizations, and they would know what they were going to do at the time of an emergency, I think you could allay a great deal of this fear which I think in many instances is unnecessary.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would certainly agree with you.

The necessity for martial law bears an inverse relationship to the amount and effectiveness of preplanning.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is right. We have had the experience in the last war, which may be brought to your attention, in Hawaii, where martial law was established in Hawaii, and it had to be lifted by Federal court action. And in the lifting of that martial law the military people were condemned for maintaining it long after it was necessary.

This is the thing that the American people have an instinctive fear of, that once the military takes over, that they will be from that time on in the hands of a military authority of some kind. I don't think that is very likely. Nevertheless it has happened in many countries of the world. And I think that in a society that is dedicated to the predominance of civilian authority, the necessary preliminary planning can obviate the necessity of the rigid, harsh continuous type of martial law which has obtained in other countries, let's say. With - such assurance the people would cooperate more in local organizations,

knowing full well that their rights would be preserved during an emergency, and such rights as were necessary to take away from them during the emergency would be restored to them after the emergency was over through some planned method of restoration, perhaps by petition of the Governor or his successor that martial law was no longer needed in his area, that the emergency no longer existed.

And I hope that you will assign someone to give deep study to this problem, because I believe it will be important in the psychological acceptance by the people of this Nation of an effective program for civil affairs.

Mr. Roback, our staff director, has some questions, Mr. Secretary.

CURRENT ARMY DOCTRINE ON MARTIAL LAW

Mr. ROBACK. General Lemnitzer, along the lines of the chairman's remarks, prevailing military doctrine specifies that in the event of emergency there will be martial law in the conventional or traditional sense; is that not true?

General LEMNITZER. I did not hear the last part of your question. Mr. ROBACK. Let me restate it.

You are the signatory of an Army regulation dealing with civilian defense which recently was revised. Are you familiar with that regulation?

General LEMNITZER. Yes, I am.

Mr. ROBACK. That regulation states certain policies and procedures and responsibilities. Is it not the case today that if there were an emergency situation, there would be a declaration of martial law for such areas as required it?

General LEMNITZER. Well, that would depend entirely upon the ability of other branches of the Government to function. It is generally regarded that the need for martial law arises only when all civil authority has ceased to function and there is no other means of exercising control.

Mr. ROBACK. And there is nothing new about that, that is an accepted idea, and that is embodied in the prevailing doctrine as of now, is that not the case?

General LEMNITZER. I am not clear as to the point you are trying to make.

Mr. ROBACK. The chairman has asked you to consider, and has asked the Secretary to consider, some type of arrangement which would eliminate the necessity for martial law. But as the doctrine now stands in written regulations of the Department of Defense, there is no new policy in that field?

General LEMNITZER. None that I know of. But I heartily agree with the statements that have been made here to the effect that much can be accomplished by detailed preplanning.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I want to make the record clear that the chairman did not advocate abolishment of martial law. I recognize that there will be martial law almost inevitably. The thing that I am recommending is preplanning to soften the effect of martial law insofar as it is possible through the Governors and other State officials which ordinarily would perform the function instead of having men with bayonets come in to do the job of policing and fire protection and sanitation, and that sort of thing, where it is possible to utilize the civilians

as we utilized them in those cities that we took over and in which we established military government in the devastated areas, as we conquered the enemy territory.

I am thinking something along that line, and hoping that a real new study and a new concept will be given, so that when martial law is declared in those areas where it is necessary to declare it, that it will be declared in such a way that its implementation will take full advantage of all of our civilian resources and maintain to that extent possible our civilian organizations and our civilian lines of authority and functions, meanwhile recognizing that they must report possibly to a military command.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure the record will be clear on the policy of the Department of Defense today. There is, so far as I know, no doctrine and no policy that indicates that martial law will be declared following such an attack.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I understand that. But I am thinking about the effects of a nuclear attack, which I think will be so catastrophic that within 24 hours you would have it whether you are thinking about it

now or not.

And I want you to start thinking about it and preparing for what I think is inevitable, and preparing for it in such a way that it will be as little shock as possible to our civilian institutions.

EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY AUTHORITY

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Secretary, under the Executive order which assigned civil defense functions to your Department, the emergency functions are specifically excepted; is that not true?

Secretary MCNAMARA. When you say "emergency functions" you are speaking

Mr. ROBACK. I am referring to the emergency authority under title III, I believe, of the Civil Defense Act.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. ROBACK. So that the President conceives that he, himself, or whomever he designates, would be the director of civilian defense operations in an emergency situation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. ROBACK. That is, you do not have, as of now, authority put upon you to direct civilian defense operations in an emergency? Secretary MCNAMARA. No, I don't have put upon me the authority to direct the functions which would be much broader than civil defense in the situation you outline.

Mr. ROBACK. Then is it your responsibility or the President's responsibility in respect to this issue to determine how authority will be exercised in an emergency?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I didn't understand the question. The acoustics are so bad I couldn't understand your question.

Mr. ROBACK. Since the President is reserving the emergency authority for himself, or for whomever he designates, and you have not been designated to exercise such authority, is it your responsibility or the President's responsibility to determine what kinds of authority will be exercised along the line of the chairman's inquiry?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, I have the duty of planning for the circumstance, anticipating the contingencies that we may face, developing alternatives for continuing operations under those contin

gencies.

But I have no authority to place those plans into effect; only the President has that authority.

Mr. ROBACK. General Lemnitzer, I referred a moment ago to the Army regulation on civil defense. That was revised, I believe, in September 1960. And you as Chief of Staff of the Army signed that regulation.

Now, will that regulation be revised further in the light of the Executive order?

General LEMNITZER. I am sure it will be reviewed in the light of the changes. Offhand, I do not know of any major changes that would be required. I have not been the Chief of Staff of the Army for some time, and the question you raise is an internal matter within the purview of the Army.

Mr. ROBACK. Somewhere in the boundaries of that regulation I believe it says that the Army considers that civil defense is second only to the combat mission of the Army.

Do you recall some such statement?

General LEMNITZER. I do recall it, and I agree with the statement. Mr. ROBACK. And is that statement now a Defense statement, or is that still an Army statement?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is still primarily an Army statement. Mr. ROBACK. So that the question of the priority of civil defense in the Military Establishment has not at this stage of the game been determined or identified?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Will you repeat the question?

Mr. ROBACK. Let me put the question in the context of your testimony that your new civil defense functions will not interfere with the essential military responsibilities.

Now, this, as it stands, can mean any number of things. It may mean, for example, that you downgrade civil defense, and lose it in the Military Establishment. It may mean, on the other hand, that you may have to budget large amounts for it and build it up.

Now, what does it mean?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It means exactly what it says; that the civil defense function will not degrade the military function. I see no way in which it could be interpreted as meaning that we will downgrade civil defense. Civil defense has been disassociated from military functions to date. To continue to insure that the military functions of the military departments take priority should not in any way dilute the effectiveness of the civil defense function or responsibilities assigned to the Department.

Mr. ROBACK. Well, the Army regulation which I just mentioned in a sense spells out a defense policy, because the Army is the assigned civil defense agency to date of the Department of Defense. Secretary MCNAMARA. No, I beg your pardon; that is not correct. Mr. ROBACK. It was until the Executive order, certainly.