TABLE 1.-Numbers of missiles required for 95-percent knockout of 100-p.s.i. targets 0.5... 1.0.. 2.0.. 5.0.. 2. 5. TABLE 2.-The stray-missile problem [Table entries show fraction of a salvo having more than the specified radial error] APPENDIX 14-STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTORS We are deeply appreciative of this opportunity to present the views of this association on matters pertinent to the purpose and interest of the committee's current series of hearings. The composition, functions, and interests of our association are of record with this and other congressional committees and therefore need not be repeated. Our interest at this time is primarily concerning the effect of any reorganization or reconstitution of civil defense and defense mobilization at the Federal level upon the administration and development of civil defense in accordance with our responsibilities to our respective Governors and legislative bodies. While we do not presume to speak directly for the local authorities, we can state that in performing our responsibility of coordination of the plans of the political subdivisions we find that our views are basically in accord with local authorities, particularly on the problem discussed in this paper. Now that executive decision has been made concerning the broad outline of assignments to Department of Defense, Office of Emergency Planning, and other Federal agencies, we do not believe that it is our responsibility to express opinion on various alternatives that might have been considered. However, there is one point in the future development of the interest of the reorganization that directly and seriously affects us. That is, the question of the Federal executive agency to be responsible for direct contact with the State governments on the total national defense program-its basic concepts, policies, plans, directives, and the authoritative decisions on administrative, procedural, and operational matters. It should be remembered that the concept of a joint responsibility between the three levels of Government for a function that is basically "the common defense against all enemies" is new in our country and therefore requires clear and unequivocable advice and guidance from the Federal Government. The State governments have since 1950 recognized and accepted this new responsibility in all of its implications, arising from the facts of warfare in the world of today. However, the structure and capabilities of State governments cannot be as readily adapted to this function as can the Federal Government which has been charged with all of the problems of "common defense" since the adoption of our Constitution. The ultimate and actual effectiveness of civil defense depends upon the gradual development of the capabilities of State (and local) governments to operate in an emergency of the magnitude envisaged in a modern war. This development cannot be accomplished if unreasonable and unessential burdens and responsibilities are placed upon the State authorities, even if those burdens are only the result of administrative and organizational flaws in the Federal governmental structure. The flaw that we detect in the "plans" as currently outlined (as noted also by the chairman of this committee during the hearing on August 2) is the lack of clear designation of ultimate authority, short of the President himself. We understand that civil defense, particularly its operational aspects, rests with the Secretary of Defense. We also understand that the defense mobilization functions and some overall coordinating planning authority remains in the Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Planning. Both Department of Defense and Office of Emergency Planning will "delegate and assign" to some 15 or more other Federal departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions certain functions and responsibilities directly and indirectly affecting civil defense at the State and local governmental levels and also affecting the public to whom all elements of government should be speaking in clear, informed terms. The sum total of these programs come down from the President to Governor via channels that center in the State government in a "single agency" responsible to the Governor for all civil defense matters. Certainly the State civil defense agencies have been able to elicit and develop with wonderful cooperation the capabilities of other State agencies to begin to adapt their peacetime function to their war-caused-emergency responsibilities. In fact, the record will substantiate that the relative capabilities of those units are much more nearly "ready" at the State and local levels than at the Federal. Nevertheless, we are not yet in position to accept and effectively coordinate programs, projects, and plans stemming from a dual or possible multiheaded authority within the Federal Government without substantial staff work through the civil defense agencies. Civil defense has grievously suffered in the past from unclearly divided responsibilities. The "new program" will likewise remain on paper in the hands of "officials" if we do not resolve this problem before "implementation" starts. Under the present setup the plans, policies, directives, and guidance material that reach us are inevitably in confusing terms, if not directly conflicting in concept. The requests for clarification or explanation results in endless correspondence and coordinating conferences that end up telling each State or local authority to make its own decision or to decide his own interpretation of the Federal material "in light of the local situation." Obviously, this results in a lack of national uniformity. The State authorities cannot be expected to assimilate plans from one source and operational directives from another or to seek Federal financial contribution and equipment through one agency to be used in carrying out projects and programs designed by other Federal agencies. When the Federal agencies need authoritative information concerning, civil defense within a State there is by Federal policy, State law, and executive direction, one source to which they can turn. It is difficult for us to understand why we cannot have the same service from the Federal Government. We do not conceive that this would result in a larger Federal bureaucracy nor otherwise increase the cost of the Federal program. In fact, the total nationwide program could be achieved at less total overhead by developing true strength at the State and local levels and not burdening them with responsibilities that rightfully belong to the Federal Government. If we did not have to spend so much time trying to coordinate confusing directives from several Federal agencies we could more adequately develop and coordinate the programs at our level of government. Our request for this single voice is not to be considered as critical in any way of Executive Order 10952 nor of the plans announced to date of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization concerning their ideas for carrying out the order, as we believe the problem we have raised can be met administratively through the cooperative efforts of all concerned. We simply wish to bring the problem to the attention of the committee so that it can be emphasized to the Federal administrative agencies; we do not believe they have fully understood the problem in the past so that now would seem to be a good point of beginning for a new approach to the difficult problems of intergovernmental relations that are involved. The members of this association look forward to a fully effective national nonmilitary defense plan, to complement our military defense, as directed by the President. We firmly believe that with his leadership and the cooperation of the Congress, the State and local authorities can contribute materially to the attainment of all basic objectives. The officers, committees, and individual members of this association stand ready to assist the committee and its staff in establishing the facts and requirements. We are most appreciative of all that the committee has done in furtherance of a sound national program for nonmilitary defense. Respectfully submitted. AUGUST 7, 1961. HUBERT A. SCHON, President. APPENDIX 15.-STATEMENT OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SANE NUCLEAR POLICY As an organization dedicated to the achievement of comprehensive, inspected disarmament, a strengthened United Nations, and world economic development, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy submits the following statement to contribute to the important discussion of the implications of civil defense planning. Regretfully, we feel obligated to oppose any stepped-up civil defense program— regretfully because one cannot lightly oppose a program which offers possible protection to some of our fellow citizens. We do so after careful deliberation. We do not take a position on which agency should administer the program. Our position is based on the following considerations: 1. The administration's requested new measures are clearly tied to the Berlin crisis, yet even if the funds are voted the projected program would do little except to create false hopes of protection. 2. Civil defense in general is a basically unrealistic concept in the thermonuclear age, if our standard is the preservation of our society and most of our people. |