Mr. KILGORE. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mrs. Griffiths?

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. No; except that I am particularly happy to welcome the Secretary this morning. I am sure all of the Nation is proud of him.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Morse?

Mr. MORSE. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. We welcome you here. And I understand you have a prepared statement. You may proceed with it.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It seems particularly appropriate and fitting that I should appear before this committee on August 1, the day that I assumed new responsibility for an accelerated program in the field of civil defense under the President's Executive order. I know that the pioneer efforts of your chairman and indeed of your entire subcommittee have played an important role in the development of an awareness in the executive branch that civil defense is an essential element in our total national defense program. As the President said last week:

To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should go if bombs begin to fall would be a failure of responsibility.

You must be gratified to feel that your efforts are beginning to bear fruit.

FOUR PRINCIPLES STATED BY SECRETARY M'NAMARA

When Executive Order 10952 announced less than 2 weeks ago the responsibilities to be transferred to me, I stated that we would be guided by four principles in administering the program within the Department of Defense.

(1) The civil defense effort must remain under civilian direction and control, involving, as it does, the survival of every citizen. It requires the closest and most sympathetic cooperation between the Federal civilian authorities and State and local governments.

(2) In the age of thermonuclear war, civil defense must be integrated with all aspects of military defense against thermonuclear attack.

(3) The civil defense functions of the Department must not be permitted to downgrade the military capabilities of our Armed Forces.

(4) Whatever expenditures are undertaken for civil defense projects must be directed toward obtaining maximum protection for lowest possible cost.

Defending the civilian population of the United States against the dangers of a thermonuclear attack is not in itself a new responsibility for the Department. Our primary reliance is on U.S. military forces as a deterrent against attack. But if miscalculations, irrationality, or accident produces an attack against the continental United States, our defensive forces are prepared to meet and engage the attacker. Despite the damage that these forces might inflict on enemy aircraft, some of these aircraft would probably penetrate our defenses far enough to release their weapons. Further, we do not yet have any effective operative defense against ballistic missiles, and some of those

missiles would undoubtedly reach targets in the continental United States. Therefore, in a nuclear attack, several million Americansperhaps several tens of millions-might be killed.

PROGRAM TO GIVE FALLOUT PROTECTION

In the hypothetical attack which was examined in the "1959 Hearings of the Special Committee on Radiation," of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, under the chairmanship of Mr. Holifield, it was estimated that approximately 50 million Americans would have been killed and some 20 million others would have sustained serious injury. No program of civil defense could save all of these people, at least no program that is financially practicable. But a comparatively modest civil defense program can provide a great deal of protection for people who are not close to points of detonation.

The augmented civil defense program proposed by the President is designed to protect the American people primarily against the dangers from fallout. I need not detail this committee with any explanation of the nature of the fallout problem or the reasons why a fallout shelter program is at the core of any effective civil defense program, which are well known to the committee. I do want to point out.for the record, however, that protection against fallout is much less expensive than protection against blast and can be highly effective. A megaton yield weapon can destroy the heart of a city. But a near-miss, upwind, could also wipe out the city's population, unless the citizens know how to take advantage of the time following warning or the burst of a nuclear weapon in order to seek previously identified and previously prepared fallout shelter.

COMPETITION BETWEEN DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

I want to point out also that while a substantial blast shelter program is somewhat competitive with active defense systems such as the Nike-Zeus, now in development, fallout shelter is complementary rather than competitive to such a system. If we are able to develop a satisfactory missile defense system, the need for blast shelter is proportionately reduced. But no currently conceivable antimissile defense system could cover the entire country. In the 1959 hearings that I referred to just now, the hypothetical attack produced initial dose rates exceeding 500 roentgens per hour on about 11 percent of the national land area. Even with effective active defense systems for all of the major targets in the United States, an enemy attack could produce enormous fallout casualties unless shelter were available.

SURVEY, MARKING, AND IDENTIFICATION OF SHELTERS

The President's program is designed to take advantage of available shelter, and in so doing, it is designed to provide a large number of shelter spaces at the least cost per shelter space in the near future. These spaces should be sufficient to give reasonably adequate protection for about one-quarter of the population. At the same time, the program is designed to explore the most economical ways of further increasing the number of shelter spaces by modifying the shelters

now available, and by planning for space in new construction adaptable to shelter use.

The heart of the President's program is the identification, marking and stocking of available community shelter space in existing buildings throughout the United States. Our best estimate by extrapolation from pilot surveys made in the past is that this program will identify some 50 million usable shelter spaces, and will provide a minimum of shelter for approximately one-fourth of our population. This does not mean that the program will save 50 million lives. Again, as the 1959 study pointed out, nearly 75 percent of the deaths from the hypothetical attack would have resulted from blast and thermal effects combined with immediate radiation effects. Other patterns of attack might increase or decrease the proportion of the population exposed to fallout alone, and thus increase or decrease the number of lives that could be saved by fallout shelter. But it is probably a reasonable estimate that the identification and marking of existing fallout shelter space could, without additional effort, save at least 10 to 15 million lives in the event of a thermonuclear attack.

The survey of existing shelter space is not only a means to utilize the greatest amount of protection that can be made available in a reasonably short time. It is also a prerequisite for future planning. We cannot work out a program to modify existing shelter space in order to increase its capacity; and we cannot decide whether to include provisions for shelter in new buildings until we know how much shelter is already available in relation to the distribution of the population and proximity to possible targets. In other words, we can't decide what we need until we find out what we have already.

MODIFICATION OF EXISTING SHELTER SPACE

It is not necessary, however, to await completion of the shelter survey before beginning work on shelter modification and on plans for dual purpose shelter space in new buildings. The survey itself, which is to be completed by December 1962, at a cost of $93 million, will concentrate first on metropolitan areas, which are also likely to have the largest number of available shelter spaces. At the same time, we propose to initiate a $10 million pilot program to test in actual practice a number of ways of modifying shelter space, primarily to increase capacity. We are particularly interested in the possibilities of forced draft ventilation, operating from standby emergency power sources, in order to multiply capacity. This pilot modification program will be confined to existing Federal buildings in order to avoid problems of ownership and control.

We propose also to provide $7.5 million to cover the additional cost of planning and construction to include fallout shelters in new Federal buildings. Out of this program we hope to develop architectural plans that will substantially reduce the actual incremental cost of shelter in new buildings considerably below present estimates. These programs will also serve as an incentive for State and local governments and as a model for other public buildings, schools, and offices.

STOCKING AND EQUIPPING SHELTERS

As you are well aware, a shelter is of little value until it is stocked and equipped with the minimum essentials for survival during the 1or 2-week period that it may be continuously occupied. Since the spaces that we identify will be public shelters-and we will not mark them unless they can be made available to the general public, although they may be located in privately owned buildings, I believe it is our responsibility to provide survival stocks and equipment. Also, the Federal Government is in a position to procure these stocks in quantities that make it possible to bring their cost down to a minimum. We are proposing to equip the shelters with 5-day austere emergency rations. Consumption of this ration by some persons may involve some discomfort. But in areas of highest fallout contamination, its ready availability will be essential to survival.

The ration to be procured is to be packaged so as to have a shelf life of at least 5 years. It will be inexpensive, easily prepared, and consistent with the restricted water and heat available in shelters. A ration of this type has been developed by the Department of Agriculture. Although not comparable to the diet of our citizens today, it is similar to the regular diet in certain areas of the world. The basic ration need not be exhausted in 5 days. As you know, the duration of shelter confinement can be estimated from radiation measurements. If the fallout is extremely high, no food at all should be eaten for the first day or two, and shelter occupants must stretch out their consumption. In some instances occupants may bring some food with them to the shelter.

Water is more essential for survival than food. In our planning we have allowed a 2 week's supply at the rate of 1 quart per person, per day, packaged in special containers. Some first-aid medical supplies are necessary. Their ready availability will eliminate the need for healthy occupants of the shelter to expose themselves to radiation in order to search for first-aid supplies and assistance.

To use a fallout shelter effectively, the occupants must have meters to determine the radiation dose rates, and accumulated doses inside, and the dose rates outside the shelter. Instruments are available that meet requirements recommended by a National Academy of Sciences committee. Lastly, shelter equipment includes essential sanitation supplies, and simple tools in the event that the shelter should be on the fringe of the blast area and the exits become blocked with debris. The program also includes some funds for secure storage of supplies in those shelters in which secure storage is not already available.

HOME WARNING SYSTEM

Available shelters can be more effectively used if there is an adequate, dependable warning system to tell people when to use them. In taking shelter from fallout, time is not, as you know, critical, since the fallout travels with the wind and will not fall back to the ground outside the immediate circle of blast damage for a half hour or more. Nevertheless, the present siren warning system has serious drawbacks. These are considerable time delays in some areas, and the sirens may be inaudible indoors under some circumstances.

The President's program, therefore, includes a good start on the installation of a home warning system, the National Emergency Alarm Repeater (NEAR) system. The NEAR system does not tell the citizen what to do it alerts him to turn on his radio in order to receive instructions.

If an extensive system test in Michigan proves successful, it is proposed to begin national installation of this household warning system, which operates on electrical impulses imposed on regular power lines. Federal funds would be used to cover the cost of the signal generators. The receivers would be sold to the general public. A marketing survey has already indicated a high acceptance rate at the anticipated retail price of $5 to $10.

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT

Any operation depends upon intelligence; defense against fallout depends on information on the nature of the fallout pattern and its intensity in particular locations. The President's program, therefore, contains funds for radiological detection equipment, to cover the cost of detection kits for some 90,000 monitoring stations, in addition to the 50,000 already equipped with kits; aerial monitoring equipment; and individual meters. These meters would be used by workers who may have to expose themselves to fallout when they undertake decontamination operations, rescue work, and emergency distribution of food and essential supplies from outside stockpiles.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Lastly, the President's program proposed to increase funds for research and development more than threefold. The program of identification, marking, and modification of shelter space in existing structures is designed to buy all the shelter protection we can at the least cost, in the shortest possible time. To assure that any additional units of protection purchased at a later date are also obtained at lowest cost, a vigorous program of research and development is required. Similarly, we believe that research and development can reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of warning and emergency communication systems. The experience and facilities of the Department of Defense in research and development work should be particularly helpful in pointing out paths that civil defense research and development ought to explore.

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

Another element in the program is funding to begin to provide fallout protection and standby power for the approximately 1,300 broadcasting stations cooperating in the emergency broadcast system. The program also contains funds to provide backup communications for vulnerable wire line links between these stations and local and regional civil defense headquarters by providing simple radio communications equipment. It contains funds to improve the national warning system (NAWAS) which runs from North American Air Defense Headquarters to some 450 warning points throughout the country. NAWAS is manned around the clock. It is tested daily, and it