CIVIL DEFENSE-1961

THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1961

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 1302, New House Office Building, Hon. Chet Holifield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Chet Holifield, Martha W. Griffiths, and R. Walter Riehlman.

Also present: Herbert Roback, staff administrator; Douglas Dahlin, staff attorney; Earl J. Morgan, chief investigator; Paul Ridgely, investigator; and Robert McElroy, investigator.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The subcommittee will be in order.

Mr. Ellis, will you take the chair, please?

STATEMENT OF FRANK B. ELLIS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Chairman, yesterday it was agreed that I would be permitted to file in the record a document from me as Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, dated July 18, 1961, to the Assistant Director of the Civil Accouting Auditing Division relating to the Federal contribution. And I would respectfully ask that that be made a part of the record.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. It will be received without objection.

(See Appendix 8B, p. 395.)

Mr. ELLIS. I believe, Mr. Chairman, with the permission of the committee, there is another important committee meeting that I would like to attend at this time, if I may be permitted to do so. Mr. Carey Brewer, my executive assistant, would be in charge. And I have a full staff here who can respond to any questions the committee may have.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. As I understand it, you are required to attend a Senate committee hearing?

Mr. ELLIS. Yes, sir; with your permission.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Under those circumstances, Mr. Ellis, we will be happy to excuse you.

Mr. ELLIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate your courtesy.

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Chairman, here today are representatives of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and I suggest that in order to conserve time, because we have to cover a rather wide territory, that we consider them

as joint witnesses, and that we start by asking the Defense and OCDM witnesses to come forward and take seats.

Mr. Yarmolinsky?

Mr. VANCE. Mr. Yarmolinsky is out making a phone call.

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Vance, will you come forward and identify your witnesses and your own position in the Department?

STATEMENT OF ADAM YARMOLINSKY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY CYRUS R. VANCE, GENERAL COUNSEL; ROGERS CANNELL, STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CONSULTANT TO OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MAJ. ALBERT K. STEBBINS III, DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY; ALSO CAREY BREWER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION; ACCOMPANIED BY RALPH E. SPEAR, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM AND POLICY; G. LYLE BELSLEY, RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION; JOHN F. DEVANEY, DIRECTOR OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS; AND EUGENE QUINDLEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR FEDERAL-STATE LOCAL PLANS

Mr. VANCE. Mr. Rogers Cannell, Major Stebbins, Mr. Yarmolinsky, and myself.

Mr. ROBACK. Who is in charge for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization?

Mr. BREWER. I am.

Mr. ROBACK. Will you bring forward those of your staff who can be conveniently accommodated?

Mr. Brewer, will you see that the reporter clearly gets the names of your associates?

Mr. BREWER. Yes, I have supplied the list for the record.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Yarmolinsky, will you please come forward? Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Yarmolinsky, we have suggested that in the interests of economizing time and getting the record complete that we hear witnesses conjointly from both agencies.

CIVIL DEFENSE ASPECTS OF MISSILE BASE SITING

Now we are going to start this morning by raising a basic question which has been presented to the committee before, which has been a matter of great concern, and which has been the subject of rather pointed criticism in some respects; namely, the relationship between the location of missile sites and civil defense hazards.

Do you have any commentary in addition to what was presented by the Department of Defense last year?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I do not have any specific commentary at this time on the policy of the Department. I do know that the matter is under review by the Secretary.

Mr. ROBACK. What are the possibilities? Are there possibilities, for example, for site relocation or new location?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. I should doubt that it would be possible to relocate missile bases already sited, simply in view of the very substantial investment of funds, and indeed the elaborate construction that is necessary in creating such sites.

I think the question that is involved here would relate to the siting of future bases, rather than the transfer of present sites.

Mr. ROBACK. Does the Department of Defense recognize the problem?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. The Department of Defense does recognize that there is a very real problem, and the Secretary has expressed to me his personal concern about this and his determination to find out what can be done about it.

Mr. ROBACK. It was established in our hearings and report that the military authorities, when they make site selections, do not make them on the basis of any specific civil defense advice or instruction from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

And now that the Secretary has complete authority both for civil defense and base siting, the problem becomes vested in one single authority. Would you comment on that?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Mr. Roback, I can't speak to the previous policy or practice. I know that in the enunciation of policy by the Department of the Air Force, the Air Force did state that one of the criteria involved in the process of missile siting was the possible local fallout effect on population. But I do want to emphasize that the location of these two responsibilities in the Department should make it quite feasible for us to give careful and detailed consideration at the time that a decision is being made by the military to these civil defense factors. I don't know to what extent these factors were considered as a practical matter in the past. I can assure you that they will be considered from now on.

Mr. ROBACK. Do you know, Mr. Yarmolinsky, at this time whether there are plans for missile bases which are relocatable, that is to say, where there is still flexibility?

In other words, if you study this problem, what difference will it make unless you still have time to make new decisions?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Certainly all of the missile bases to be constructed are not yet firmly selected. To give you specific information, I would have to look into that, and I would be glad to supply that for the record.

(The following information subsequently was received :)

SITING OF MISSILE BASES

In November 1955, Secretary of Defense Wilson transferred to the Air Force responsibility for establishing criteria for the site selection of ICBM bases. The goal of the site selection program was to obtain, in the most economic manner possible, maximum operational capability and minimum vulnerability, coupled with minimum hazards to civilian population. Thus, while the Air Force realized the potential danger to the civilian population in proximity to missile bases, this consideration was not determining in the location of these bases,

Air Force site selection criteria applicable to ICBM systems include, but are not limited to

(a) Operational area requirements (classified).

(b) Acceptable geology; sufficient area for dispersal.

(c) Consideration of potential danger to civilian population.

(d) Support and facilities within economic investment.

(e) Support maximum missiles each support base.

(f) At least 18 nautical miles from city, 25,000 population.

(g) Separation (classified).

(h) Ability adjacent community to support personnel.
(i) Avoid areas adjacent to other prime targets.

(k) Commuting distance, support base to site.

(7) Climatology as it affects supportability.

(m) Explosive quantity distance criteria to roads and buildings will be met. Compatibility of area utilization.

(n) Cost comparison; secure maximum firepower for funds available to attain most effective posture.

On July 31, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated his policy on the placement of missile sites, in the following memorandum to the Secretaries of the military departments:

It is the policy of the Department of Defense that missile sites shall not be located in such a relationship to populated areas that an enemy attack on the sites would subject the population to an avoidable fallout hazard.

Any exceptions to this policy must be approved in writing by both the Secretary of the service involved and either the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Mr. ROBACK. The Department of Defense has under study a report which was sent to it, I know, from Prof. James McDonald, of the University of Arizona, who has made a rather technical analysis of the problem of the fallout hazard associated with missile siting.

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes, this material is currently under study in the Department of the Air Force.

Mr. ROBACK. In the Department of the Air Force?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. In the Air Force; yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Will you undertake to submit to us any relevant studies or findings on the subject?

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBACK. Do you have any other observations on the matter? Mr. YARMOLINSKY. Only to reiterate the fact that it seems to me the placing of these responsibilities in the Department will make it that much more likely that we will be able to that much more certain, I should say that we will be able to give the fullest possible consideration to these factors.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. This subcommittee found that these missile bases were being located without regard to the populations around the bases, that they were being located in some instances upwind from nearby cities, and in some instances they completely encircled cities, in our country. This is, in my opinion, a very regrettable policy. It appears to the chairman that the selection of these areas was done without any regard at all to the resulting effect of multimegaton attack on these hardened bases.

The sole consideration seemed to be to harden the bases against attack. And no consideration was given to the fact that, as testimony showed before our committee, whereas a one-megaton explosion could destroy a soft base, it would take 30 megatons to destroy a hardened base of the type under consideration.

The resultant radioactivity that would be spread by 30 megatons of explosives, and the location of the base upwind from the center of

population, apparently were not considered at all. Possibly it was more convenient for the officers and personnel of these bases to be close to the cities, as well as to shows and restaurants and that sort of thing, but the basic problem of protection for the people of the United States was not given the proper consideration.

Of course, this is not your fault. We recognize that you are a latecomer to the scene.

But, nevertheless, the Department of Defense bears the stigma, in my opinion, of irresponsibility in locating these bases. And I would strongly urge that if there are more bases to be considered, that they be located in thinly populated areas, and at least on the downwind side of great populated areas.

Mr. ROBACK. Mr. Chairman, James E. McDonald, who is a professor at the Institute of Atmospheric Physics, University of Arizona, Tucson, has submitted to us and the Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government, papers analyzing the problem. He says in "An Analysis of Civil Defense Hazards Being Created by Emplacement of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Near Tucson,' among other things:

It is the thesis of this paper that failure to locate all of these 18 Titan sites well downwind of (east and southeast of) Tucson's 225,000 residents will reduce survival chances of this entire unprotected population essentially to zero.

If unchallenged on scientific grounds, this analysis will fill a serious information-gap for Tucson citizens who have never been given by the Air Force or other agencies any inkling of the magnitude of the hazards they will confront when these sites become operational a few years from now.

We discussed this matter in our report last year, but what we are requesting now from the Department of Defense is a specific response to the statement by Professor McDonald, and any relevant information you may have on the subject.

Mr. YARMOLINSKY. We will supply information in response to that material, Mr. Roback.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We not only have the city of Tucson, but there are other cities that are in a similar position.

(The following information subsequently was received:)

AIR FORCE ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER, "AN ANALYSIS OF FALLOUT HAZARDS FROM ICBM SITES LOCATED UPWIND OF CITIES," BY DR. JAMES E. MCDONALD, THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

This paper was presented at the joint meeting of the American Meteorological Society and American Geophysical Union, Washington, D.C., April 20-22, 1961. The basic thesis of the paper was that civil defense hazards have been created by emplacement of ICBM launching sites upwind of population centers rather than downwind. The siting of Titan missiles upwind of Tucson, Ariz., was cited as a case in point. The Air Force has analyzed Dr. McDonald's paper and submits the following comments:

The major shortcoming of this paper is that it treats only with a narrow aspect of the ICBM siting problem, within only one community area and with only one factor of the many site selection criteria, to the exclusion of other important considerations.

In addition to the fallout criteria in ICBM site selection, other important eriteria were utilized. The most important of these criteria is that of operational effectiveness; it is important that our ICBM's have the capability to strike desired enemy targets with required payloads. This criteria leads to siting of our ICBM squadrons in areas of our country that will permit such target coverage in accordance with our missile range and payload capabilities. A second portion of this criteria, as utilized in the past, was the urgency of deploying our force in-being and operationally ready to meet the estimated enemy threat. 73266-61-8