lines, he was bodily removed in a truck where five Communist soldiers sat on him and finally dumped him into the United States zone.9 MARINE CORPS Col. William N. Frash, United States Marine Corps, testified that 227 marines were captured during the Korean war, and 196 were repatriated to the United States. Marine prisoners were segregated as to officers and enlisted men and were billeted in the same compounds as Army prisoners. They were subjected to the same treatment as Army prisoners insofar as indoctrination, interrogation, and exploitation were concerned." Three marines were subjected to action by the military for their collaboration. Two went through a court of inquiry and were cleared subject to restricted assignments, and the third was given a letter of reprimand and released from the Marine Corps.28 Colonel Frash said that none of the other marines who were prisoners are known to have collaborated with the Chinese Communists or North Koreans. None, in fact, participated in the Central Peace Committee, the Communist publication Toward Truth and Peace, in Communist-sponsored oratorical contests, in Communist debating societies, or in Communist-sponsored plays. Fourteen marines admitted signing petitions, but a thorough investigation satisfied the Marine Corps that these men had not degraded themselves or their country.99 During the period of their captivity, the marines assisted each other and maintained their military organization within the prison camp. For the most part they took an interest and cared for their fellow marines who were in difficulty. The existence of a strong discipline, a well-organized chain of esprit de corps and faith were given credit for the very commendable showing of the Marine prisoners of war.1 PRISONERS OF WAR OTHER THAN AMERICAN Prisoners of war who were not American or British were interrogated by a joint board of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in Japan; 313 Turks, 40 Filipinos, 22 Colombians, 12 French, 2 Greeks, 2 Netherlands, and 1 Belgian, were processed by this board. All of these prisoners were subjected to the same basic treatment as United States Army prisoners.2 Maj. Marion R. Panell, who served on this joint board and who had reviewed their records, testified that there were two groups who were particularly outstanding, namely, the Turks and Colombians. Ap-z proximately one-half of the Turks were captured in 1950 and the second half in April of 1951. A large majority of them were wounded. They were on so-called death marches and were imprisoned with American troops during the period of the very high death rate. During this time, because of the great care they took of one another no Turk died. During this same period there was a relatively high per centage of deaths among the Americans. In addition, there were only two Turkish prisoners accused of having cooperated with the Chinese Communists, and these for the relatively minor offense of having signed a petition.3 None of the other Turks in any way collaborated or cooperated with the enemy. The Turks attended forced Communist indoctrination lectures, but partially because of the language barrier, the attempted communistic lectures accomplished very little. Testimony established that the discipline and esprit de corps of the Turkish troops were very important factors in their resistance to the Communist enemy. They lived under a rigid disciplinary system whereby the line of authority goes from the top down to the last man. They stuck together as a group in caring for their ill and wounded. Their native life is more primitive generally than ours and as a result they were able to better adjust to the Chinese diet. Their closeness to the Communist world and their hatred for communism were an important factor. They broke rules and refused to obey even reasonable requests of the Chinese Communists just because it was a request by a Communist.* The Colombians also did not succumb to the Communist teaching and did not collaborate with the enemy. Their record of resistance was comparable to the Turks. Major Panell attributed their outstanding performance to the strong religious convictions of the Colombians.5 GENEVA CONVENTION VIOLATIONS Testimony was given by Lt. Col. Robert F. Grabb, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army, that at the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the North Korean and South Korean governments and Communist China had not been signatories to the Geneva Convention of 1949, and, therefore, were not bound by it. The United States, which was a signatory, did not have the United States Senate's consent to its ratification and therefore was also not bound. The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, Switzerland, however, urged upon the participants in the conflict the acceptance of the provisions of the con vention." On July 4, 1950, Syngman Rhee of South Korea announced that his Government would recognize the convention. On July 5, 1950, the United States Government announced its intention to abide by the terms of the convention. On July 13, 1950, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, which was the North Korean Government, informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that the principles of the Geneva Convention were being followed. The Swiss Government on July 16, 1952, was advised by the Foreign Minister of the Central Peoples Republic of China that the Geneva convention was being recognized with certain reservations. The reservations ran to article 85 which deals with prisoners of war becoming war criminals." Pp. 133-136. 4 Pp. 134-135. P. 136. P. 187. Lieutenant Colonel Grabb felt that the pertinent articles of the convention with respect to prisoners of war which have been violated by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans were articles 13, 14, 16, 17, and 38. These articles generally deal with the following specific violations: Solitary confinement may not be imposed except in most rare instances and then for the shortest period of time; prisoners should not be shackled; they shall not be exposed to the curiosity and insults of the local populace; they shall receive adequate medical attention; their clothing must be marked; prisoner-of-war camps and hospital facilities must be marked; clothing must be adequate; they must be free from mental torment; officers may not be forced to work; and they must be free from physical maltreatment. One of the most important failures of the Communists was to provide a protecting power. The Geneva convention is very specific that a prisoner must at all times have ready access to a representative of a protecting power who has been appointed to watch out for his interest. Although the International Committee of the Red Cross made repeated attempts to obtain recognition, it never was successful in getting anyone into North Korea.8 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTION Gen. Graves B. Erskine, United States Marine Corps, retired, now assistant to the Secretary of Defense as Director of Special Operations, testified that the Defense Department is taking positive action in an attempt to deal with the prisoner-of-war problems that since the Korean war are known to be facing us. The Secretary of Defense appointed a committee to look into all aspects of the prisoner-of-war problem and a report was submitted on July 29, 1955. On August 17, 1955, the President issued an Executive order which established a code of conduct for servicemen.o The Department has developed a three-phase training program which has been in effect for more than 1 year and which places great emphasis on military discipline, esprit de corps and morale. The first phase includes a training program to develop a resistance to Communist political and economic indoctrination, a knowledge and appreciation of our American heritage, a familiarity with our world program aims, and character guidance including encouragement of religious beliefs. The second phase is designed for all units and individuals in preparation of combat. It stresses means to evade capture, and then escape and survival. The serviceman is taught how to combat and survive the physical and mental conditions which he might face under Communist control. He is taught how to deal with informers and collaborators. He is trained to combat interrogation and indoctrination techniques. The third phase is designed for especially selected units and individuals. It generally deals with bringing aid and support of the United States to prisoners.10 The training is aimed at the positive approach to the problem, namely, how our men can evade capture, escape where possible, and if captured, how to cope with the techniques employed by the Communists.11 8 Pp. 192-194. P. 196. 10 Pp. 196-197. 11 P. 196. The Department of Defense has been assisted by representatives from labor, industry and patriotic organizations in extending training in character and patriotism in the home, church and school prior to an individual entering into the service.12 General Eskine emphasized that military training and education is not the complete solution to this problem.13 Certainly the building of character and a knowledge of the moral and mental distructiveness of communism cannot begin when a boy enters the Army. It has its responsibilities, but so also do the homes, schools, and churches of America. The following is the new code of conduct for the various armed services: I. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense. II. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist. III. If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy. IV. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way. V. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause. VI. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.14 CONCLUSIONS The popular conception of "brainwashing" is not supported by the evidence. In fact, the popular idea of Russian "brainwashing" and "menticide" is given encouragement by the Communists for the sole purpose of creating false impressions that their method and manner of conducting interrogations is mysterious to the degree of being irresistible. The subcommittee feels that the aura of mystery and fear which has long been associated with Communist methods of interrogations and indoctrination is in itself a major factor in their effectiveness. It is true that the Communists have considerable skill in the extraction of information from prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding, including signing confessions to crimes they did not commit. But the subcommittee hearings clearly established that there should be no mystery about the techniques that the Communists employed. They are well known and understood. Actually their practices are based on 12 P. 197. 18 P. 197. 14 Pp. 131-132. A I the simply and easily understood idea of progressively weakening an individual's physical and moral strength. Merase or town. The Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques of psychology manipulation. Their methods are not based on some weird psychological theory. The Communists are utilizing a highly developed but completely basic system in an attempt to obtain information from their prisoners and to convert them to beliefs acceptable to their captors. This subcommittee feels that a realization of this should place us in a far better position than we were in June 1950 at the beginning of the Korean war. The Chinese Communists and North Koreans violated articles 13, 14, 16, 17, and 38 of the Geneva Convention with their use of isolation techniques, their shackling of prisoners, their exposure of prisoners to the curiosity of the local populace, their inadequate medical attention, poor clothing, gross inadequacy of foods, improper hospital facilities, the inadequacy of Chinese doctors, and physical mistreatment of American prisoners. Certain Air Force personnel were subjected to intense coercive interrogation in order to obtain military information and false confessions. Individuals, such as Captain Harris, who were able to withstand the inhuman treatment of the Communists, deserve the gratitude and admiration of the people of this country. The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the Colombians, as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted upon them by the Communists and did not cooperate or collaborate with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and credit. Although some Army prisoners exhibited a high degree of cooperation and collaboration with their Chinese captors, the subcommittee recognizes that this is not solely the Army's fault or responsibility. We do feel that the military services are to be criticized for not having fully adapted their training programs to prepare troops to be familiar with methods used by the Communists, particularly where similar techniques were used by Russians in the treatment of German prisoners of war in 1941, and Japanese prisoners of war in 1945. The subcommittee recognizes that the military services have manpower problems over which they have very little if any control and that on parents, churches, and schools rests the primary and basic responsibility-a responsibility which cannot be delegated. Survival is not possible without family and religious training and a thorough understanding of the principles on which this country was founded and now exists. If we fail in these fields, no army, navy, or air force, however strong, can protect us. RECOMMENDATIONS The subcommittee makes the following recommendations: 1. That a resolution be offered in the Senate of the United States proposing that the Senate express its great concern over the methods of interrogation, and indoctrination of American prisoners of war used by the Chinese Communists in Korea. This resolution should also recommend that the United States delegation to the United Nations be instructed to present to the United Nations the facts concerning the techniques and methods used by the Communists against American prisoners of war, together with the resulting violations of the Geneva Convention. |