While noting that the technology currently exists that would allow terrorists to produce one of several lethal CBRN weapons, the report also describes the current difficulties in acquiring or developing and in maintaining, handling. testing, transporting, and delivering a device that truly has the capability to cause "mass casualties." We suggest that that analysis is still fully valid today. Second Report-Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism By the second year, the Advisory Panel shifted its emphasis to specific policy recommendations for the Executive and the Congress and a broad programmatic assessment and functional recommendations for consideration in developing an effective national strategy. The capstone recommendation in the second report was the need for a comprehensive, coherent, functional national strategy: The President should develop and present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office. As part of that recommendation, the panel identified the essential characteristics for a national strategy: It must be truly national in scope, not just Federal. It must be comprehensive, encompassing the full spectrum of deterrence, For domestic programs, it must be responsive to requirements from and fully It should be built on existing emergency response systems. It must include all key functional domains—intelligence, law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, public health, medical care providers, emergency management, and the military. It must be fully resourced and based on measurable performance. Of course, the Panel recognizes that in light of September 11, 2001 this objective has been difficult to achieve. However, the principles contained within this strategy and their requirements remain the same. The Second Annual Report included a discussion of more effective Federal structures to address the national efforts to combat terrorism. We determined that the solutions offered by others who have studied the problem provided only partial answers. The Advisory Panel attempted to craft recommendations to address the full spectrum of issues. Therefore, we submitted the following recommendation: The President should establish a senior level coordination entity in the Executive Office of the President. The characteristics of the office identified in that recommendation included: · Director appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, at "cabinet-level" rank Located in the Executive Office of the President Authority to exercise certain program and budget controls over those agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism • Responsibility for intelligence coordination and analysis · Tasking for strategy formulation and implementation Responsibility for reviewing State and local plans and to serve as an information An interdisciplinary Advisory Board to assist in strategy development We included a thorough explanation of each characteristic in our Second Annual Report. For instance, we determined that this office should have the authority to direct the creation, modification, or cessation of programs within the Federal Interagency, and that it have authority to direct modifications to agency budgets and the application of resources. We also recommended that the new entity have authority to review State and geographical area strategic plans and, at the request of State entities, to review local plans or programs for combating terrorism for consistency with the national strategy. Although not completely structured around our recommendations, the model for the creation of the Office of Homeland Security came from this recommendation. To complement our recommendations for the federal executive structure, we also included the following recommendation for the Congress: The Congress should establish a Special Committee for Combating Terrorism—either a joint committee between the Houses or separate committees in each House—to address authority and funding, and to provide congressional oversight, for Federal programs and authority for combating terrorism. The philosophy behind this recommendation is much the same as it is for the creation of the office in the Executive Office of the President. There needs to be a focal point in the Congress for the Administration to present its strategy and supporting plans, programs, and budgets, as well as a legislative “clearinghouse" where relevant measures are considered. We recognize that Congress is still in the process of working towards this objective. In conjunction with these structural recommendations, the Advisory Panel made a number of recommendations addressing functional requirements for the implementation of an effective strategy for combating terrorism. The recommendation listed below are discussed thoroughly in the Second Annual Report: Enhance Intelligence/Threat Assessments/Information Sharing Improve human intelligence by the rescission of that portion of the 1995 guidelines, promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, which prohibits the engagement of certain foreign intelligence informants who may have previously been involved in human rights violations Improve Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) through an expansion in research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of reliable sensors and rapid readout capability and the subsequent fielding of a new generation of MASINT technology based on enhanced RDT&E efforts Review statutory and regulatory authorities in an effort to strengthen investigative and enforcement processes Improve forensics capabilities to identify and warn of terrorist use of unconventional weapons - Expand information sharing and improve threat assessments Foster Better Planning/Coordination/Operations Designate the senior emergency management entity in each State as the focal point for that State for coordination with the Federal government for preparedness for terrorism Improve collective planning among Federal, State, and local entities Enhance coordination of programs and activities Improve operational command and control of domestic responses The President should always designate a Federal civilian agency other than the Enhance Training, Equipping, and Exercising Improve training through better coordination with State and local jurisdictions Improve Health and Medical Capabilities Establish a national advisory board composed of Federal, State, and local public health officials and representatives of public and private medical care providers as an adjunct to the new office, to ensure that such issues are an important part of the national strategy Improve health and medical education and training programs through actions that include licensing and certification requirements Establish standards and protocols for treatment facilities, laboratories, and reporting mechanisms Clarify authorities and procedures for health and medical response Medical entities, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, should conduct periodic assessments of medical facilities and capabilities Promote Better Research and Development and Create National Standards - That the new office, in coordination with the National Institute for Standards and Third Report-For Ray Downey Our Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress builds on findings and recommendations in our First and Second Annual Reports delivered in 1999 and 2000. It reflects a national strategic perspective that encompasses the needs of all three levels of government and the private sector. It seeks to assist those who are dedicated to making our homeland more secure. Our recommendations fall into five categories: ✔ Empowering State and Local Response by ensuring the men and women on the front line of the war against terrorism inside our borders have the tools and resources needed to counter the murderous actions of terrorists; ✔ Enhancing Health and Medical Capacities, both public and private, to help ensure our collective ability to identify attacks quickly and correctly, and to treat the full scope of potential casualties from all forms of terrorist attacks; ✔ Strengthening Immigration and Border Controls to enhance our ability to restrict the movement into this country, by all modes of transportation, of potential terrorists and their weapons and to limit severely their ability to operate within our borders; ✔ Improving Security Against Cyber Attacks and enhancing related critical infrastructure protection to guard essential government, financial, energy, and other critical sector operations against attack; and ✔ Clarifying the Roles and Missions for Use of the Military for providing critical and appropriate emergency response and law enforcement related support to civilian authorities. Mister Chairmen, I should note that the substance of all of the recommendations contained in the third report were approved by the panel at its regular meeting held on August 27 and 28, 2001-Tuesday the 28th being exactly two weeks prior to the attacks of September 11. Although we thoroughly reviewed those recommendations subsequently, the panel unanimously agreed that all were valid and required no supplementation prior to publication. The recommendations contained in that report, listed below in summary formed, are discussed in detail in the body of the report, and further supported by material in the |