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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
JOINT INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 20, 2002
I am pleased to provide the Committees with this Statement for the Record as requested in your letter of September 17, 2002. The Department of Energy continues to make significant strides in contributing to the US government's effort to deal with the threats posed and the issues presented since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Through the Department's intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components, the sharing of terrorism-related information within the Department and with the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities has improved significantly. I am personally committed to accelerating this process. The following statement reflects the outline of the specific questions posed in your letter.
Policies, Procedures and Processes for Receiving Information. National policies for the sharing of classified information are established in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958 "Classified National Security Information.” Other national policies addressing cooperation among the Intelligence Community, law enforcement agencies and the Department are included in various Executive Orders and presidential directives such as Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," E.O. 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 61, "U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program," and PDD 39 "Counterterrorism Policy," and various Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID). The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) also identifies roles and responsibilities of Departments and Agencies for sharing intelligence information.
These national policies are implemented through the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards and Security, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence directives. Within DOE, the Office of Intelligence (IN), Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) and Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence (ODNCI) are component members of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Director, IN, is the Department's Senior Intelligence Official (SIOJ
and point of contact with the IC for all foreign intelligence activities; the Director, OCI, who is on detail from the FBI, is the Department's point of contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for investigative referrals. As members of the IC, DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components receive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence directly through authorized IC channels. This includes relevant information concerning terrorism, suspected terrorists and their associates. E.O. 12333 implementation procedures govern departmental intelligence activities including the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence information.
Under E.O. 12333 and the DOE Intelligence Procedures approved by the Department of Justice (DOJ), DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components are authorized to receive, retain, analyze and further disseminate law enforcement and security information relating to the Department's foreign intelligence and counterintelligence missions. In addition, the Department has in place specific procedures that authorize the sharing of information with intelligence components of law enforcement relating to DOE so that the information can be “fused" with intelligence information for timely, coordinated response to breaking events. Thus, while DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components do not collect purely domestic law enforcement/security information - i.e., without any international terrorist or other foreign connection -- they can and do receive missionrelated law enforcement information from the Department's security components and outside law enforcement agencies. In turn, DOE intelligence and counterintelligence components are authorized to disseminate relevant information to the appropriate federal, state or local law enforcement agencies. The primary directive controlling the handling and dissemination of intelligence within DOE is Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/6, “Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information." DCID 6/6 has been implemented at DOE in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Office of General Counsel and Community Management Staff as set forth in an implementation memorandum dated January 17, 2002.
The Department primarily receives law enforcement information concerning terrorism, suspected terrorists and their associates via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) network. That data is received and subsequently distributed to appropriate security elements within HQ and Field Elements by the DOE Office of Security (SO).
The Department receives intelligence information via Intelink and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), which functions as the IC classified equivalent of the Internet. Intelink allows web dissemination of all-source intelligence information, including a wide array of terrorist-related reporting and analysis. Additionally, DOE receives record message (“cable”) traffic disseminated by all intelligence collection entities. Analysts in IN and technical specialists at the Field Intelligence Elements (FIES), located at selected DOE facilities, have access to the full range of IC resources. From the law enforcement perspective, IN and the FIES receive terrorist-related intelligence reporting generated by the FBI as part of the Intelink information flow. Subsequently, IN and FIE personnel regularly brief and supply relevant intelligence reports to appropriately cleared individuals at DOE HQ and program offices.
Joint Organizations and Information Sharing. The Department is active in several joint organizations that support counter-terrorism. Within the Intelligence Community (IC), IN is actively engaged with the Director of Central Intelligence sponsored Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC). This group provides the focal point for the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) for dealing with the IC, and correspondingly provides the IC with a forum to collectively deal with those intelligence matters with which the OHS requires assistance. Such areas include information transfer issues associated with law enforcement, providing personnel resources to assist in terrorism analysis, organizational and procedural matters, and a vehicle for exchanging information on capabilities and initiatives.
IN is also an active participant in the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Groups (JLACG), created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff following 9/11. It provides an inter-agency forum for assisting the combatant commands with the support that they require from across the US government. Activity has been greatest with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM), both of which have domestically oriented missions. A particularly noteworthy project that has been led by JFCOM, but engages all of the domestically oriented government agencies, is the Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Database (HIFLD) which is creating a national map supported by imagery and facilities data to be available to all federal, state, and local homeland security agencies at various levels of classification. IN's contribution to this collaboration will be to provide all energy-related data (electric grid, pipelines and nuclear facilities) as online overlays that can be applied to baseline map graphics. The result will permit all government agencies engaged in crisis or consequence management operations to have extremely detailed views of the particular area of interest during any situation.
DOE Office of Security (SO) participates in several cooperative ventures designed to support counter-terrorism initiatives. The specific objectives of the task forces and joint efforts vary, but the overall goal is to facilitate the sharing of information and develop cognizant safeguards and security programs to address potential terrorism concerns, and include:
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Task Force (WMDTF) was established by the
The Postulated Threat Working Group sponsored and operated by the Defense
The Joint Design Basis Threat Working Group (JDBTWG) is a joint DOD and
medicines and sensing devices) are adequately protected against the Design Basis Threat postulated adversary capabilities and objectives.
The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) is the U.S. national forum that
The Counter-Terrorism Technology Oversight Group (CTTOG) is a joint
The Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC-
The Department of Defense's Physical Security Equipment Action Group
CI personnel at HQ and in the field obtain data from various federal and non-federal agencies, particularly the FBI and local DOD elements. At the National level, participation in the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) significantly enhances information sharing efforts. CI elements have become increasingly engaged with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are led by the FBI and include other federal agencies and local law enforcement organizations. In a few areas, OCI /ODNCI coordinates with the Terrorism Task Forces working under the leadership of U.S. Attomeys. OCVODNCI is also gaining access to some technology-supported sources such as Law Enforcement On-line. This information is then exchanged internally through the CI collateral information network (CI-NET). Depending on the information, field elements use such data for general threat awareness briefings to personnel throughout the DOE complex. OCI/ODNCI has supported FBI efforts to track suspected terrorists by reviewing lists of foreign visitors and assignees for potential matches to “watch lists" maintained by the FBI.
OCVODNCI personnel participate in the NJTTF, and field CI personnel participate in regional JTTF. They also work jointly with the FBI on cases on DOE personnel suspected of terrorist-related activity or DOE equities. Generally speaking, there is an open exchange of information in these forums, except for restricted portions of investigative or source information. CI normally does not have direct access to information systems that might be shared with full time JTTF personnel, nor do they have the benefit of information flow that occurs on a daily basis among those teams. The JTTF and OCVODNCI complementary liaison activities with federal, state, and local agencies are effective and have improved the flow of threat information. OCI also notes that the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is becoming more involved in unifying the CI communities' efforts to support the War on Terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive - 75 listed the protection of personnel and assets as one of the six core missions of the CI community. OCI is a member of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), and the National Counterintelligence Operations Board (NACOB) that are led by NCIX.
The combined activities of these groups result in the opportunity to share insights, needs and information gaps, requirements and priorities, questions, potential solutions and available solutions. The level and nature of involvement ranges from national government bilateral exchanges and international conferencing to individual department or agency exchanges to specific individual technical manager interchanges. The various groups and initiatives rely on a multitude of mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of information and ideas and include the cooperative authorship of threat documents and policies, safeguards and security information, and security policies.
Integration and Access into Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies.
The Department of Energy has a long history of making its expertise available to other agencies to solve pressing problems, and we are particularly active in this national priority as well. Scientific and technical experts have been detailed to other key IC organizations as well as receiving liaisons from outside organizations. Not only do these exchanges provide real-time technical capabilities to the agencies that need them, but they also give IN insight into urgent or developing issues, permit better coordinated budget and programmatic approaches, and the best possible analytical assessments. IN's access is commensurate with that of those individuals with which they are working. This access is extremely significant with respect to facilitating the flow of information between agencies.
In another example, the Department has provided a detailee to FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) activities. On an informal basis, DOE has a close relationship with the FBI Counter-terrorism and Threat Warning Group and has contacts within the WMD Operations Unit as well. DOE also has access to the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), which provide general law enforcement community information and bulletins. In addition to the FBI, DOE maintains contacts in the Secret Service, ATF, State Department, and DOD for gathering information on a case-by-case basis.
Although the Department's counterintelligence elements are not formally integrated into any other law enforcement or intelligence agency, there are three FBI personnel on detail to senior positions in the Department. During periods of heightened alert or crisis, however, CI officers are present at the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC). Likewise, depending on the nature and location of the threat, field elements are prepared to shift resources to participate full-time in the regional JTTF or other similar task forces.
Information Sharing with State and Local Law Enforcement for Securing DOE Facilities.