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6. What are the key policy and technical impediments to implementing an effective information architecture that facilitates information sharing between agencies?

The Intelligence Community System for Information Sharing (ICSIS) is the DCI's information technology enterprise architecture and enabling infrastructure that will provide for the sharing of critical intelligence information across all elements of the IC and the dissemination of intelligence information to both traditional and non-traditional customers, including the homeland security community. ICSIS Phase One will include the following common infrastructure enablers: DCID 6/3-compliant authentication and auditing of users accessing intelligence information, encrypted cross-Community email, secure cross-Community collaborative environments, and trusted controlled interfaces for the exchange of information across security domains. The Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC CIO) will work with IC organizations to deploy priority IC databases and applications using the infrastructure and its associated ICSIS enablers for ubiquitous access to authorized users across the IC and its supported Communities.

CIA supports the ICSIS architecture. ICSIS represents the most balanced approach to sharing and protecting classified information. We support the expanded use of digital certificates to facilitate the exchange of information among appropriately cleared IC partners, customers, and colleagues. Moreover, the CIA is actively engaged in several, ICSIS-compliant projects and programs aimed at improving our ability to share information between agencies at various classification levels.

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On 1 October 2002, Mr. Louis Andre provided testimony before the 9-11 Joint Congressional Inquiry on information sharing between federal agencies and between federal and state and local agencies.

On 6 November, the Joint Inquiry forwarded several Questions for the Record the responses to which were to facilitate its inquiry into the terrorist incidents of 11 September.

Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director of DIA, has reviewed the responses to those questions and is herewith providing them for inclusion into the official record of the proceedings.

Wann Fland

Chief, Congressional Affairs

DIA Response to QFRS (U)

1. Former DIA Director, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, told the Joint Inquiry Staff that he was never sure that he received all available Intelligence information. He also said that senior Defense officials received intelligence information that his analysts did not receive. Further, the Admiral questioned what good it did for him to be aware of intelligence information that his analysts did not receive.

a. What impact, prior to 9/11, did the withholding of some intelligence information from analysts have on DIA's ability to do all-source analysis and, when necessary, provide warning reports?

The impact is impossible to quantify. Terrorism intelligence information is fragmentary and ambiguous by its very nature; relevant data is imbedded in both traditional intelligence streams and the surveillance and investigative activities of law

enforcement/security elements. Missing fragments may or may not improve the fidelity of a particular analytic assessment. Analysts essentially make assessments based on three broad categories of information:

· Information that has been observed, collected, and reported ("evidentiary"), Historical or cataloged information about a terrorist group or individual, and Analytic deduction based on a range of assumptions, perspectives, and theories Generally, as more "evidentiary" information is made available, the level of analytic confidence in the assessment's accuracy and precision increases.

We know of no instance where a reporting agency deliberately withheld information that it
believed conveyed indicators of a specific or general threat. However, the full value of
all-source analysis is realized when it relates ambiguous fragments of seemingly benign
information to validated facts developed over time, thus extracting intelligence of potential
waming value. There have been instances where reporting agencies have withheld
contextual information that we believe would have contributed to a fuller understanding of
the threat.

b. What agencies, in particular, tend to withhold intelligence information?

All agencies that originate ('own") information withhold some categories of intelligence, either because of operational security concerns or because it does nor meet established reporting thresholds.

c. How has that practice changed, if at all, since 9/11?

Reporting thresholds for information related to terrorism have been lowered across the community. When confronted by ambiguous information, originating agencies err on the side of disseminating rather than holding the information. Significant progress has been made toward the goal of full information sharing, including breaking down compartmental barriers imposed by operational security needs. Despite this progress, we believe there remain instances when information relevant to the analysis of the terrorist threat is withheld or distribution is limited to senior, non-analytic leadership due to reporting

d. What initiative did DIA take to obtain all information and what was the result of that initiative?

In the immediate aftermath of the October 2000 terrorist attack on the USS COLE, DIA initiated an effort to enhance Defense intelligence terrorism analysis. While part of this initiative dealt with enhancing analytic capability, the main emphasis was on significantly expanding the amount and type of information available to the all-source analyst. Central to that initiative was DIA's proposal to establish a data repository that contained all IC and law enforcement reporting, regardless of classification, caveat, or sensitivity. No such repository existed in the IC. We pledged that we would institute any and all safeguards imposed by the data originators, to include "air-gapping" the system, to ensure the security of the data. This data repository is operational and limited data loading is underway. We are continuing to work with reporting agencies to obtain approval to incorporate all relevant information into this central secure repository.

2. We understand that DIA did not receive or was not aware of three key pieces of information concerning al-Mihdhar or al-Hazmi: 1) The August 23, 2001 CIA message to FBI, State, Customs, and INS that linked the two individuals to Usama bin Ladin and placed them in Los Angeles; 2) the August 28,2001 HQ FBI communication to the New York Field Office that linked the two individuals to USS Cole perpetrators; or 3) the June 2001 INS granting of a visa application extension to al-Hazmi at a Lemon Grove, California address.

a. Did DIA or any of the service criminal investigative organizations especially the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), receive any or all of those three pieces of information?

DIA was neither on distribution for nor made aware of any of the three referenced reports prior to September 11, 2001. The question of whether the NCIS or other Service organizations were aware of the information should be referred to them.

b. Has anything fundamentally changed since 9/11 in terms of who has access to the databases that contained information on Hazmi and Mihdhar?

While progress has been made regarding the sharing of operational information and cables, DIA does not have full access to the information in those databases.

c. Given your understanding of the NCIS mission and capabilities, what would you have expected it to do knowing that individuals with links to Usama bin Ladin were or had been in Southern California or that there were links to known USS Cole perpetrators?

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service has operating procedures that would have guided their actions in such a scenario. This question should be referred to the NCIS.

d. Are you or the service criminal investigative services now receiving information from CIA, FBI, and INS similar to the 2001 information? If not, why not? (Rep. Bishop)

While we don't know the extent of what we don't know, we are confident there are categories of information to which DIA analysts do not have access. We are aware that some reporting is not being disseminated to our analysts or it is being restricted to senior non-analytic officials, due to reporting agencies operational security concerns. We are not in a position to question, nor would we second-guess, operational and security decisions made by reporting agencies. However, this data is not analyzed in the context of other reporting and it is not undergoing rigorous analytic review to determine validity

and to develop further insights. We renew our pledge to the reporting agencies to institute any security controls or protocols they require to place this information within our central data repository.

e. If the DIA had intelligence that a base in San Diego was threatened, could that information be shared and sent to the local police? If the local police get threat information first is that information shared with the DIA today? (Rep. Pelosi)

While any answer would be speculative and the type of information to be shared driven by the range of possible scenarios, we are certain that the basic threat information could and would be shared with the threatened party and all those involved with security in the surrounding area. DIA makes every attempt to disseminate threat information at the lowest possible classification level. Moreover, DIA has an on-going initiative to share information with state and local law enforcement organizations.

3. Current acting DIA Director Admiral Jacoby in his statement for the record said that there was a need for a paradigm shift in the ownership of information. His position is that ownership of information must reside with the analysts, not the collectors.

a. How, practically, can that shift be accomplished, given the traditional practice of
collectors to provide what they perceive to be 'value-added' work by processing
information into formats and categories they believe to be more useful to

Admiral Jacoby did not recommend impeding the ability of collectors to provide valueadded exploitation, interpretation, and packaging of raw information. On the contrary, analysts look upon such activities as insightful and beneficial. Instead, he contended that all collected information should be subjected to a parallel process wherein the raw information - - once decoupled from any source identification data that must be protected - is subjected to additional analytic scrutiny and integrated with the wide variety of other data, assumptions, and perspectives that may differ from those held by the collectors.

b. How can the needs of the analysts be met and still accommodate those of the collectors?

As stated above, the needs of the analysts and collectors are not and should not be exclusive.

4. The Director, DIA, chairs the Senior Military Intelligence Officer's Conference (SMIOC) meetings from time to time. Over the years systemic information issues have emerged from those meetings. In September 1998 one such meeting received information briefings on the East African Terrorist Bombings and the War on Terrorism. One participant observed that there must be a "domestic piece" to emphasize FBI reporting. Another stressed that there was a "commercial piece," as well with FAA. A third representative encouraged information sharing throughout all agencies as has been done with the war on drugs. Yet another recommended a community strategy for designing a framework to study and attack terrorist organizations.

a. How is it with that this shared understanding after a critical event in 1998, by the summer of 2001 we don't seem to be much better off in working together and in sharing information? What happened in the meantime?

DIA has long been a proponent of full information sharing across the intelligence and law enforcement communities. DIA initiatives to enhance Defense terrorism analysis in early 2001 represented our most concentrated effort to increase the volume and scope of

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